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CHAPTER I 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: COMPULSORY VOTING IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
Political participation is the lifeblood of representative democracy (Norris 2002: 5). 
Citizens can participate in a democratic society in a variety of means, such as voting, 
campaigning, or protesting. One definition of political participation describes it as “those legal 
activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of 
government personnel and/or the actions they take.” (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978: 46) From this 
definition and range of activities, this dissertation focuses on the voting process, in which the 
selection of government personnel or the actions they take are determined through the 
mechanism of polls. 
The individual decisions of private citizens to participate or abstain in elections are 
considered a standard measure of political participation and, in general, as an indicator of a 
country’s democratic health. Hence, voting turnout is a useful measurement to compare 
participation across subnational units, countries, and population groups. It also allows a 
comparison of rates of participation across time. From cross-time comparisons, scholars have 
found long-term declines in levels of turnout in established democracies (Franklin 2004; Gray 
and Caul 2000). Because voting is a mechanism for expressing citizens’ political opinions and 
preferences, a declining turnout could mean that the political system is not taking into account an 
increasing proportion of citizens’ inclinations. Moreover, research has found that the group of 
citizens that opts for abstention is not a random sample of the total population but a biased group 
that shares certain characteristics. Of particular importance is the fact that those who abstain are 
	 2 
less wealthy, less educated and less engaged in the political system (Dalton 1996; Lijphart 1997; 
Powell 1986). The argument goes further: because this group turns out in lower rates, their level 
of influence in the political system is poor. Lever (2009) summarizes this argument in two steps: 
low turnout means unequal turnout, then, unequal turnout reflects and reinforces social 
disadvantages. 
There have been some administrative solutions for increasing levels of turnout. Electoral 
management bodies in some countries have tried to ease the process of voting for citizens in the 
form of automatic registration, weekend voting, machine voting, and absentee voting. These 
measures highlight efforts made by electoral authorities to diminish the costs of transaction. 
Other proposals focus on civic education. Electoral authorities often try, for example, to 
implement discussions of civic duties in schools or informational fairs in public spaces as 
attempts to motivate citizens to participate and engage in elections and politics. However, it is 
not clear whether a long-term predisposition, such as the citizens’ sense of duty to vote, changes 
with these short-term interventions. 
The easiest, fastest and most effective response to low levels of turnout in a country is the 
implementation of compulsory voting. The objective of this dissertation is to assess the operation 
of compulsory voting in Latin America. This topic is highly related to electoral participation due 
to the fact that compulsory voting increases participation, which is one of the most robust 
findings in political science literature, particularly when it is enforced. Scholars have found this 
rule increases turnout around 10 to 15 percentage points in industrialized countries (Jackman and 
Miller 1995) and in similar proportions in Latin America (Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004). In 
doing so, compulsory voting maximizes turnout and so it brings us closer to the ideal of 
universal turnout or full participation. Scholars who favor compulsory voting argue that it is not 
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enough to have universal suffrage –the opportunity to vote- because a lot of people opt out of 
exercising their rights. Instead, a democratic society should aspire to universal participation –
encouraging the use of the opportunity to vote, even pushing citizens to the polls via negative 
incentives, such as monetary fines (Lijphart 1997; Rovensky 2008). 
Even though this rule is not widespread, it is still employed in a small number of 
countries in the world. According to Birch (2009), 29 states in the world employ compulsory 
voting. From this group, Latin America stands out as the region where most countries use this 
rule: 16 countries in total. Compulsory voting is implemented through various procedures in 
Latin America. For example, Bolivia has compulsory voting with enforced sanctions. This 
country has monetary fees and civic sanctions if a citizen abstains. Other countries, like Mexico, 
have symbolic compulsory voting. In Mexico’s case, this means that the Mexican Constitution 
stipulates that voting is compulsory but the Electoral Code (or any other legislation) does not 
establish penalties for not voting. So, there is a noteworthy variation that can be used when 
considering compulsory voting as an independent variable in models of turnout, or as a 
dependent variable for explaining the origins of this rule in Latin America. This dissertation aims 
to tackle both approaches: compulsory voting as a dependent and as an independent variable. In 
doing so, this dissertation takes seriously the notion that scholarship needs to explain the origins 
of this electoral rule in Latin America and to analyze its consequences for Latin American 
citizens’ behaviors and attitudes. 
The implementation of compulsory voting is heavily debated among politicians, policy-
makers and political scientists. This debate revolves around normative issues and 
consequentialist arguments about pros and cons of its implementation. Not being the central 
point in this dissertation, I, however, briefly present the normative debate in the next section. 
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The Debate about the Implementation of Compulsory Voting 	
The idea of compulsory voting involves a normative discussion about the nature of 
voting. Some academics see voting from a civic duty perspective, in which the focus relies on 
principles such as representativeness, majority will, inclusive participation, and legitimacy. On 
the contrary, other academics see voting from a liberal perspective, in which the focus is on 
liberty and free will. 
The first perspective emphasizes that voting should be seen as a civic duty (Hill 2002; 
Lijphart 1997). In this view, citizens should be obligated to fulfill their civic duties. For example, 
citizens have a duty to pay taxes. In some countries, citizens are obligated to collaborate with the 
justice system as juries. In others, citizens have a duty to service in the military. The obligation 
to perform citizens’ duties is in part an intrinsic characteristic, but in some occasions it is also 
enforced by the state. This is the case of compulsory voting, where the state enforces turnout via 
symbolic calls to fulfill citizens’ duties or via monetary fees and civic sanctions.  
From a liberal perspective, voting should be understood as a right that citizens are free to 
exercise (Abraham 1955; Jones 1954, mentioned in Rovensky 2008). In this view, citizens are 
free to decide whether to vote or to abstain. Any interference in the individual’s decision is seen 
as an intolerable coercion. Liberal supporters claim that if individuals have a right to vote, they 
should also have a right to abstain. However, opponents of this view argue that if citizens are 
completely free to participate, they also have the liberty to sell their votes (John Stuart Mill cited 
in Birch 2009: 41). 
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Compulsory voting, as a coercive mechanism to promote participation, is often opposed 
from the liberal camp. Between ideals of social interest and individual freedom, opponents of 
compulsory voting opt for the latter. Yet, scholars debate whether the principle of liberty is a 
reasonable objection given the considerable potential benefits of compulsory voting. For 
instance, Engelen (2007) argues that a state could not work if its citizens would be completely 
free from their obligations and duties. Moreover, Lijphart (1997) mentions that “compulsory 
voting entails a very small decrease in freedom compared with many other problems of 
collective actions that democracies solve by imposing obligations” (11). Furthermore, opponents 
of the liberal view say that the libertarian ideal is illusory and so the state can legitimately 
enforce participation via compulsory voting. 
This electoral rule provokes another debate that revolves around its consequences. 
Because of its direct effect on increasing turnout, compulsory voting is frequently seen in a 
favorable light with respect to its consequences. When more people go to the polls, the 
preferences of the majority are better registered, then the outcome is supposed to be more 
representative of the electorate and it would bestow more legitimacy to the elected authorities 
and the democratic regime (Hill 2000). 
Representation is one of the desirable outcomes of an election. Ideally, ballots should 
pick up citizens’ voices and translate them to the political system in the form of elected 
authorities and preferred policies. When voting is voluntary, some groups are more likely to vote 
and this may create unequal participation and influence. In such circumstances, elections would 
fail to represent the average citizen. Lijphart (1997) mentions Tingsten’s law of dispersion, 
which states that “the probability of differences in voting turnout is smaller the higher the 
general participation is.” (2) Thus, because compulsory voting increases turnout, it should also 
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decrease differences in voting turnout across groups and, consequently, elections under 
mandatory voting should be more representative of the majority. Moreover, rulers selected in 
elections with low levels of turnout often do not receive a full mandate and their decisions might 
often be in doubt. Thus, because the will of the majority is better represented under elections in 
countries with compulsory voting, the legitimacy of elected authorities may be less questioned. 
Compulsory voting is also promoted as an effective measure to deal with a collective 
action problem in elections. Given that each vote has a negligible contribution in the final 
outcome, citizens may consider their vote useless and they may finally decide to abstain. If so, 
they are not collaborating to a public good –the selection of the government-, but they are 
nonetheless receiving its indirect benefits. A citizen becomes a free-rider. In an extreme 
situation, all citizens may make the same reasoning and turnout would be zero, which is a 
potential risk for a democratic system. Some scholars propose that citizens would accept being 
coerced as long as the state guarantees others would also be coerced (Rovensky 2008). Other 
scholars assume that compulsory voting, in this situation, would be understood as a coordinating 
device to prevent “free riding” (see Birch 2009). 
There are other positive effects of the implementation of compulsory voting. For 
example, Kato (2008) and Lijphart (1997) propose that compulsory voting diminishes the role of 
money in politics. The argument is that parties in a voluntary voting system have to get out the 
vote of their supporters. This system then depends a lot on parties’ funds. In this view, elections 
are more an expression of mobilization rather than an expression of preferences. So, the 
introduction of compulsory voting should release parties from the need to raise considerable 
funds for mobilization and from the need of major donors. However, they still need votes and 
this would be a motivation for parties to represent the general interest. 
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Political information is another dimension on which compulsory voting may have a 
positive effect. The argument is that compulsory voting not only forces people to go to the polls, 
but it also forces people to think about politics and to be informed to cast a valid ballot. 
However, this hypothesis is not undisputed. Empirical evidence arrives at ambiguous 
conclusions about the effect of compulsory voting on citizens’ information and engagement. 
Moreover, opponents of this idea propose that compulsory voting forces unwilling and 
disengaged people to turn out, those who otherwise would abstain. As a consequence, in a 
compulsory voting system, this electoral rule would introduce noise and the quality of elections 
would be deteriorated. Jakee and Sun (2006), for example, find that more random votes in 
compulsory voting would lead to nearly random electoral results. Further, compulsory voting not 
only pushes to the polls uninformed voters who would more likely cast spoiled ballots, but it also 
may generate voters’ rejection and increase protest votes (Engelen 2007).  
Finally, the implementation of compulsory voting presents some practical challenges. 
Lijphart (1997) mentions that the probabilities of the implementation of this electoral rule in 
most countries are low. The case of the United States is of particular interest for him. From his 
point of view, compulsory voting is difficult to implement, given constitutional objections, yet 
not impossible.1 Further, the implementation and organization of compulsory voting is costly. 
Research has found that enforcement matters, but enforcement implies a bureaucracy to find, 
investigate and punish abstainers. Thus, the state has to invest public resources to maintain this 
bureaucracy. Opponents of compulsory voting argue that the investment is not worth it, given 
that it is not clear whether compulsory voting has positive effects on citizens’ well-being.  
																																																								
1 See for example an endorsement of compulsory voting expressed by President of the United States Barack Obama 
in 2015 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/19/president-obama-endorses-
mandatory-voting/).  
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In conclusion, the debate about compulsory voting includes a normative discussion about 
the nature of voting: whether it is a right or a duty. In this discussion, political theorists are 
actually evaluating two ideals: liberty and free will on the one side and representation and 
legitimacy on the other side. There is not a solution to this debate because this is not an empirical 
argument, but rather a normative debate, in which scholars emphasize values and recommend the 
implementation or not of compulsory voting from their perspectives. At the end, each society 
(and their legislators, politicians and policy makers) has to decide which value they want to 
favor, evaluate the pros and cons of compulsory voting in their countries, and decide for or 
against its implementation or continuity. 
Compulsory voting also includes a debate about the consequences of this rule. There are 
arguments in favor and against compulsory voting. Political scientists have tried to empirically 
test these arguments, but they have arrived at mixed conclusions. There is only one robust 
conclusion: compulsory voting increases turnout. Whether increasing levels of turnout mean less 
inequality of participation in a democratic society is an open hypothesis. Whether compulsory 
voting increases levels of political knowledge and interest is debatable. Results with respect to 
the effect of compulsory voting on the proportion of random and protest votes are inconclusive. 
And finally, whether compulsory voting helps to build more fair social and political outcomes 
requires further evaluation. There have been significant steps towards solving these questions, 
but still more research is needed. This dissertation takes part in this collective academic 
enterprise. 
Before turning to the empirical chapters of this dissertation, I will present a panorama of 
electoral participation in Latin America, to show a remarkable variation in levels of turnout 
across countries, in part explained by the presence or not of compulsory voting. Next, I will 
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present a description of compulsory voting and the different procedures with which it is applied 
in Latin America. This information is the background context of this dissertation.  
 
Turnout in Latin America 	
As a region, the Americas display huge variation in levels of turnout. I use data from the 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA International) with respect to voter 
turnout from 120 presidential and parliamentary elections in 27 countries in the Americas in the 
last ten years (2005-2015).2 According to these data, the 2011 presidential elections in Haiti 
registered the lowest turnout in the region in the last ten years3 (22.4%) and the 2009 presidential 
and parliamentary elections in Bolivia recorded the highest turnout (94.6%). The average turnout 
for this period is 66.9%. Figure I.1 shows the proportion of presidential and parliamentary 
elections by levels of turnout in intervals.4 
																																																								
2 Data include information from countries in North, Central and South America. Argentina and the United States are 
the two countries with the highest number of elections in this period (7 elections, 5 parliamentary and 2 presidential 
elections). Bahamas, Belize, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago are the countries with the lowest number 
of elections in this period (2 parliamentary elections). 
3 Haiti is clearly an outlier. Its parliamentary elections in 2006 show a very low turnout (28.3%). Parliamentary 
election in Venezuela in 2005 is other case with a very low level of turnout (25.3%). This last situation was due to 
irregularities in electoral procedures that did not guarantee free elections. Opposition parties did not trust in the 
Consejo Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Council) to organize free and fair elections and finally they 
withdrew from the electoral run. Figure I.1excludes these observations.  
4 See Appendix 1 for a table that shows turnout by country. 
	 10 
	
Figure I.1: Turnout in Latin America by Intervals 
(Source: IDEA International www.idea.int/vt) 
 
This figure shows variation in levels of turnout, but it ranges mostly in the interval from 
60% to 80%. It is also remarkable that the difference between the lowest and the highest turnout 
in the Americas in the last 10 years is around 50 percentage points. Several institutional features 
have been hypothesized as having an impact on levels of turnout, such as proportional 
representation and unicameral versus bicameral legislatives. Among these institutional 
characteristics, the implementation of compulsory voting is often included as a significant 
determinant of turnout. IDEA International data allow a classification of countries according to 
whether or not a country implements compulsory voting. 
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Table I.1. Turnout by Type of Country 
Type of Country Num. Elections 
Average 
Turnout Min. Max. 
Countries with voluntary voting 53 58.9% 22.4% 92.1% 
Countries with compulsory voting 67 73.2% 44.6% 94.6% 
(Source: IDEA International www.idea.int/vt) 
 
According to this classification, countries with compulsory voting show on average 
higher levels of turnout, as the literature has demonstrated. The difference between the two types 
of countries is 14.3 percentage points, which is consistent with previous analyses (Fornos, 
Power, and Garand 2004). However, it does not mean that all countries with voluntary voting 
have low levels of turnout and that all countries with compulsory voting have high levels of 
turnout. There is variation within each type of country. For example, the 2006 parliamentary 
elections in Colombia (40.5%) and the 2013 presidential elections in Chile (42%) can be 
considered typical examples of countries with voluntary voting and low levels of turnout, as 
expected. The 2007 and 2012 parliamentary elections in Bahamas (92.1% and 90.8% 
respectively), the 2012 and 2013 presidential elections in Venezuela (80.3% and 79.6% 
respectively), and the 2011 general elections in Nicaragua (79.1%) are rare cases of countries 
with voluntary voting and high levels of turnout. Elevated participation in these elections may be 
due to their controversial nature, in which a series of political scandals, violence, controversies, 
and accusations of fraud were pervasive. 
In the group of countries with compulsory voting, the 2009 and 2015 parliamentary 
elections in Mexico (44.6% and 47.7% respectively) and the 2005 parliamentary elections (46%) 
and the 2009 presidential elections (49.9%) in Honduras are the countries with the lowest levels 
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of turnout. A plausible explanation is that these countries apply symbolic compulsory voting. 
This means that this electoral rule is mentioned in legislation, but sanctions are not defined and 
enforcement is not applied. On the other side, Bolivia and Uruguay, countries with enforced 
compulsory voting, display the highest levels of electoral participation in the region. 
Data from IDEA international also allow a refined classification. This institution codifies 
this electoral rule in a four-fold classification: voluntary voting, countries with symbolic 
compulsory voting (no established sanctions), countries with compulsory voting and sanctions, 
and countries with compulsory voting and enforced sanctions. Map I.1 shows countries in the 
Americas according to this classification. 
	
Map I.1. Countries by Compulsory Voting in the Americas 
(Source: IDEA International www.idea.int/vt) 
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In this dissertation, I propose an improved measurement of compulsory voting, which I 
explain in detail in Chapter II. This new classification is based on a careful review of Latin 
American Constitutions and Electoral Codes. In the next section, I describe how compulsory 
voting is defined in each country and the monetary fines and civic penalties for abstainers, if 
applied, according to their legislation. 
 
Variation in the Implementation of Compulsory Voting in Latin America5 	
Compulsory voting is applied in different ways in Latin America. In this section I 
describe compulsory voting based on Latin American legislations. The first source is each 
country’s Constitution, which defines citizens’ political rights and duties and in doing so it 
defines whether voting is a duty or an obligation in a country. This characteristic is deeply 
defined and specified in the Electoral Codes and related legislation. 
In some countries, the Constitution states that voting is a right and/or a duty, but does not 
specify voting as an obligation. I consider these countries as having voluntary voting. In other 
countries, the Constitution does not exactly say voting is obligatory, but the Electoral Code 
contains an obligation to vote. I consider these countries as having compulsory voting. When 
their Constitutions or Electoral Codes literally define voting as an obligation, but their electoral 
legislation does not establish penalties for abstainers, I consider these countries as having 
symbolic compulsory voting. This means that there is an intention to make voting compulsory, 
but there is no realization of that intention. In countries where Constitutions or Electoral Codes 
say voting is an obligation and electoral legislation establishes penalties, for example monetary 																																																								
5 From this point I exclude the United States, Canada and Caribbean countries from the analyses. 
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fees and/or civic restrictions for abstainers, these are considered as having compulsory voting 
with sanctions. 
Table I.2 presents countries with compulsory voting in Latin America, the legal base of 
compulsory voting in their Constitutions, and monetary fees and civic penalties defined in their 
electoral legislation.	Latin American countries not shown in this table do not mention the 
obligation to vote in their Constitutions or in their Electoral Codes. Their constitutions usually 
mention that voting is a duty or that citizens are free to exercise their right and so I have 
considered these as countries with voluntary voting. 
 
Table I.2. Characteristics of Compulsory Voting by Country in Latin America 
Country Nature of voting Penalties 
Argentina The Electoral Code says 
voting is a duty (Art. 12). 
 
The electoral code establishes 
monetary fees (Art. 125) and 
civic restrictions (Art. 126) 
for nonvoters who have not 
justified their abstention. 
 
Bolivia The Constitution says voting 
is obligatory (Art. 6). 
The Electoral Code mandates 
that the National Electoral 
Court is in charge of setting a 
monetary penalty for 
abstainers (Art. 29). 
It also mentions civic 
restrictions if citizens do not 
have the suffrage certificate. 
Citizens designated to be 
Electoral Juries who have 
failed to do their duties are 
punished with monetary fees 
and 3 days of arrest. 
 
Brazil The Constitution says voting The Electoral Code 
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is obligatory for all Brazilian 
citizens older than 18. It is 
voluntary for those older than 
70 years and those between 16 
and 18 years old (Art. 14). 
 
establishes a monetary fine for 
abstainers. It also mentions 
civic restrictions (Art. 7). 
 
Chile  Until 2012 the Constitution 
says voting is obligatory for 
Chilean citizens (Art. 15). A 
modification of the 
Constitution eliminated the 
obligation to vote and 
established automatic 
registration for all citizens 
(Law 20,568). 
Before 2012, Law 18,700 
indicates that electors are 
those with valid registration in 
the Electoral Registry. 
Electors are under the 
obligation to vote (Art. 60). 
This law also establishes 
monetary fines for abstainers 
(Art. 139) and reasons for 
justification.  
 
Costa Rica The Constitution says voting 
is obligatory for all citizens 
enrolled in the Civic Registry 
(Art. 93). 
 
The Electoral Code mentions 
that voting is a duty, but it 
does not reiterate voting as an 
obligation and does not 
establish penalties for not 
voting. 
 
Ecuador The Electoral Code says 
voting is obligatory for all 
Ecuadorian citizens older than 
18. It is voluntary for those 
between 16 and 18 years old 
and for those older than 65 
(Art. 11). 
 
The Electoral Code 
establishes a monetary fine of 
10% of the minimum wage 
for abstainers. It increases to 
15% for abstainers selected as 
electoral authorities (Art. 
292). 
Honduras The Constitution says voting 
is obligatory (Art. 44).  
 
The Electoral Code has a 
chapter about electoral crimes 
and offenses (Title XII), but it 
does not mention penalties for 
not voting. 
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Mexico The Constitution mentions 
that voting is a citizens’ 
obligation (Art. 36). 
 
The Electoral Code does not 
establish penalties for not 
voting. 
Paraguay The Constitution says voting 
is universal, free, direct, equal 
and secret. It does not mention 
the obligation to vote (Art. 
118). 
 
However, the Electoral Code 
establishes “exceptions from 
the obligation to vote” (Art. 
94). 
Peru The Constitution says voting 
is obligatory until a citizen is 
70 years old (Art. 31). 
 
The Electoral Code 
establishes that the Electoral 
National Jury is the institution 
in charge the enforcement of 
penalties for not voting (Art. 
251). Other legislation defines 
monetary fees according to 
poverty level of the province 
where abstainer lives. It also 
abolishes civic restriction for 
abstainers (Law 28859, Art. 
5). 
 
Uruguay The Constitution says voting 
is obligatory (Art. 77). 
 
The Law 13,882 regulates the 
obligation to vote. It 
establishes monetary fees 
(Art. 10) and civic restrictions 
for not voting (Art. 12 and 
13). 
 
This list shows that compulsory voting is concentrated in South America.6 In this sub 
region, Colombia and Venezuela are the two only countries with voluntary voting. Actually, 
Venezuela employed mandatory voting until 1993 when this country abolished the obligation to 
vote. Colombia is the only case in South America where compulsory voting was never applied. 																																																								
6 I exclude Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana from this list.  
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Moreover, most countries in South America apply compulsory voting with established sanctions. 
Paraguay is the only case where Constitution mandates the obligation to vote, but electoral 
legislation does not regulate penalties for nonvoters. 
A different scenario is observed in Central and North America. Countries in these regions 
often apply voluntary voting or symbolic compulsory voting. From all 16 countries in these 
regions, just three countries (Mexico, Honduras, and Costa Rica) apply a non-enforced 
obligation to vote. It is worth noting the situation in the Caribbean, where no country applies 
compulsory voting. 
This classification of compulsory voting slightly differs from previous ones. For example 
Panagopoulos (2008) and Singh (2011) distinguish among countries with no formal sanctions, 
countries with moderate sanctions (fine only) and countries with high sanctions (fines and civic 
restrictions). These authors also rely in IDEA’s coding for enforcement, which goes from low or 
weak to high and strict. This last variable gauges to what extent compulsory voting laws are 
enforced in practice. For example, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Panama are coded as having compulsory voting with no sanctions, but from a review of their 
legislation I code these countries as having voluntary voting, because their legislations do not 
mention any sanctions and do not specify the obligation to vote. 
In this dissertation, I will focus only on legislation. I have not considered enforcement in 
practice, but I assume that countries that establish penalties in their electoral legislation 
implement mechanisms to enforce electoral laws in a greater or lesser degree. However, I 
understand that penalties can be defined in legislation but they may go unenforced in practice 
	 18 
due to resource constraints or lack of bureaucracy control.7 A measurement of the real 
enforcement of compulsory voting would need a process-tracing of compulsory voting in each 
country. As an example, abstainers in Peru receive a letter from the Unit of Collection of the 
National Electoral Jury (JNE). Abstainers can appeal and present a justification. If they do not do 
it, they have to pay a fee within 15 days. If abstainers do not pay the fee or justify their 
abstention, the case is channeled to the Coercive Liability Office. This office is allowed to seize 
funds in abstainers’ bank accounts. 
In the first round of the 2011 presidential elections in Peru, 16.3% of electors failed to go 
to the poll stations. They represent more than 3 million people. The monetary fee in Peru for 
abstainers varies from 18 to 72 soles (U.S.$7 to $30), and 180 soles (U.S.$ 70) for citizens 
selected as electoral authorities. Thus, potential collection is at least U.S. $ 21 million if all 
abstainers would pay their penalties. However, the JNE cannot reach all abstainers because of 
administrative and procedural issues. This institution relies on addresses on the register of 
identification, but when people move and do not renew their information, the JNE is unable to 
locate them. As a consequence, actual collection is lower, but it is still noteworthy. From 
information of the JNE, in 2013 this institution collected around 2’404,655 soles (U.S. $925,000) 
in monetary fines (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones 2014). 
After presenting information about levels of turnout in Latin America and the 
mechanisms by which compulsory voting is applied in this region, I present a summary of the 
dissertation and next I move to the empirical chapters. 
 
																																																								
7 Laws in other domains (for example in squatting and street vending) are intentionally unenforced because 
politicians want to maximize votes as well as rents (See Holland 2015). 
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The Dissertation in Brief 	
To summarize, this dissertation proposes a comprehensive evaluation of compulsory 
voting in Latin America. In doing so, it evaluates this electoral rule as a dependent and as an 
independent variable. As a dependent variable, this dissertation analyzes the origins of 
compulsory voting in Latin America. As an independent variable, it examines whether 
compulsory voting diminishes the differences in electoral participation across socioeconomic and 
political groups, as the literature suggests. It also assesses the effect of compulsory voting on the 
citizens’ sense of duty. Here, I offer a short summary of each chapter of this dissertation. 
In chapter II, I propose that a broad understanding of the origins of compulsory voting 
should include an analysis of the factors influencing the timing of the implementation of 
universal suffrage. After a broad analysis of four countries (Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, and 
Peru), I demonstrate that in the wake of pressures for social transformation in Latin American 
countries around the beginning of the twentieth century, variations in the balance of power 
among factions of the elites and between elites and disenfranchised groups are fundamental for 
understanding whether universal suffrage and compulsory voting were implemented as a 
package or if they were implemented at different points in time. I propose that where elites faced 
a serious threat from disenfranchised groups pushing for inclusion and threatening with demands 
for revolutionary or redistributive change, compulsory voting was implemented in close 
proximity to the expansion of the electorate. On the other hand, where elites did not face as 
strong a set of forces for broader political inclusion, but faced electoral violence and fraud 
spurred on by competition among elite factions, compulsory voting, as part of a package of 
reforms, offered a means to reduce such maladies by modernizing the electoral competition. 
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In chapter III, I explore how the rational calculus of voting varies between countries with 
compulsory voting and countries with voluntary voting in Latin America. In countries in which 
voluntary voting is the norm, vote-eligible adults have the liberty, at least from a legal point of 
view, to decide whether to vote or to abstain. In countries with compulsory voting rules, 
however, the decision to vote is influenced by the potential of facing sanctions if a citizen 
abstains. This is important, as the act of compelling individuals to vote is thought to homogenize 
the pool of voters, so that political representation and influence is more equally distributed across 
different segments of the electorate. Based on this notion, some have argued that compulsory 
voting offers an attractive institutional remedy to fix the problem of inequality in electoral 
participation and influence. Yet, it is not clear precisely how or to what extent this electoral rule 
alters the decision to go to the polls or abstain, and therefore it is unclear how or even whether it 
affects biases in the composition of the electorate. To address whether compulsory voting 
reduces or eliminates biases in electoral participation, I examine how the decision to vote or 
abstain varies for citizens who live in countries with voluntary voting versus those who live in 
countries with compulsory voting. Building on the rational calculus of voting paradigm, I assess 
variables related to the three key dimensions of the rational choice calculus of voting paradigm: 
costs, benefits, and duty. I use three rounds of the AmericasBarometer survey from 2010 to 2014 
to test these ideas in 18 countries in Latin America. This chapter contributes to the study of 
compulsory voting by providing strong evidence that compulsory voting is more effective at 
diminishing political differences than socioeconomic or civic-minded gaps in electoral 
participation.  
In Chapter IV, I evaluate a second-order effect of compulsory voting laws. Ample 
research in psychology, education, and management posits a detrimental effect of systems of 
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reward and punishment: performance increases, but motivation suffers a decline. I apply this 
framework to theorize on the negative “side effects” of compulsory voting laws. Following this 
line of thinking, I hypothesize that when the state threatens citizens with a fine if they do not 
vote, voter performance (turnout) increases, but intrinsic motivation falls. I also assess whether 
these effects vary across individuals who may have greater sensitivities to threat. In the final 
section of this chapter, I distinguish results for low authoritarians and high authoritarians. I test 
these expectations using a survey experiment in Peru, a country with compulsory voting and 
varying levels of enforcement. The results support expectations in some situations: when people 
are reminded about both types of punishments, they express lower levels of civic duty in one 
indicator of duty. Moreover, the effect is monotonic for two indicators of duty: the harsher the 
punishment, the lower the intrinsic motivation to vote. 
In sum, this dissertation aims at assessing the origins and consequences of compulsory 
voting. In doing so, it builds on the rational choice paradigm, develops original hypotheses and 
implements a multi-method approach to evaluate them. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
II. THE STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPULSORY VOTING AND 
FRANCHISE EXPANSIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 	
Introduction 	
In the congressional discussions over proposals to reform the Peruvian electoral system at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, one perceptive legislator commented, “the debate seems 
to be on principles...when it actually is based on a calculus of who would benefit.” Not only in 
Peru, but across Latin America around the turn of the twentieth century, governments deliberated 
and implemented electoral reforms in the face of pressures stemming from demands made by 
previously excluded groups seeking input and influence within fledgling oligarchic modern 
nation states. During this period, some countries pursued reforms that extended the franchise8 
and made voting compulsory, while others opted only for the latter and held off expanding the 
electorate until decades later. What accounts for the different sequence of institutional outcomes? 
As referenced in the quote presented here, much discussion around electoral reforms in the 
period centered on the rights and obligations of citizens. Yet, while the diffusion of ideas and 
norms may have defined the menu of electoral reforms under discussion, I argue that elites were 
motivated to support some reforms over others by strategic considerations that reflected the 
balance of power and this, in turn, explains variation across countries in the nature of the 
																																																								
8 In this chapter, I focus on the expansion of the franchise to illiterates. The chapter does not deal with the 
enfranchisement of other groups, such as women. 
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sequence each followed in implementing compulsory voting and universal suffrage during the 
twentieth century. 
Through an analysis of four countries, in this chapter I demonstrate that, in the wake of 
pressures for social transformations in Latin American countries around the beginning of the 
twentieth century, variation in the balance of power among factions of the elites and between 
elites and disenfranchised groups is fundamental to understand if universal suffrage and 
compulsory voting were implemented as a package or if they were implemented at different 
points in time. Where elites faced a serious threat from disenfranchised groups pushing for 
inclusion and threatening with demands for revolutionary or redistributive change, compulsory 
voting was implemented in close proximity to the expansion of the electorate. Unable or 
unwilling to resist expanding the franchise to include groups with strong mobilizing capacities, 
elites in these cases turned to compulsory voting as a means to minimize electoral losses. On the 
other hand, where elites did not face as strong a set of forces for broader political inclusion, but 
faced electoral violence and fraud spurred on by competition among elite factions, compulsory 
voting, as part of a package of reforms, offered a means to reduce such maladies by modernizing 
the electoral competition. Thus, balance of power and strategic considerations played key roles 
in determining whether universal suffrage and compulsory voting reforms were implemented 
jointly or, instead, whether systems adopted compulsory voting while holding off on significant 
expansions to the electorate. 
The period that I focus on is between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning 
of the twentieth century, when Latin American elites in power faced pressures for social 
transformations that included demands to extend political rights and to open electoral 
participation. These demands took different forms, from serious revolutionary threats in 
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Argentina to moderate assertions from weak parties in Bolivia. These demands appeared shortly 
after the independence period in Latin America, emerging as a dispute between elites and would-
be elites, named criollos.9 The idea of franchise expansions arose from many sources, included 
the diffusion of the modern ideal of representative democracy from Europe and the United 
States, spilling over into Latin America. The demand for voting rights was sparked in the context 
of modernization and urbanization of Latin America’s main cities, which facilitated the 
development of a civil society and political organizations (Sabato 2001). These demands for 
political inclusion largely came from the urban middle and working classes via emerging new 
parties. 
During this period, elites took different strategies, conditional on their power. I propose 
that the institutional outcome depended on the balance of power between those who demanded 
liberalizing reforms and the elites in power at the time. I present a model with four potential 
outcomes: if the balance of power is in favor of those who demanded reforms, universal suffrage 
is highly likely to result and no compulsory voting. If both sides are strong, the conflict between 
them will lead to the extension of the franchise and to compulsory voting in the same package of 
reforms. If the balance of power is not in favor of disenfranchised groups, the continuation of the 
status quo is more likely when elites are powerful, but if elites are divided due to factional fights, 
the most likely outcome is the implementation of compulsory voting alone, with no expansion of 
suffrage. Each scenario and its expectations are grounded in considerations of the strategic 
calculus of elites and disenfranchised groups. Table II.1 summarizes these scenarios: 
																																																								
9 Criollo is a term to identify mixed people with some Spanish ancestry, born in the Colonial America. After 
independence, this term was used to name descendants of mixed people. 
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Table II.1. Four Scenarios from the Interaction of Elites and Disenfranchised Groups 
Disenfranchised group 
Elite 
Powerful and Organized  Divided due to conflicts 
among factions 
Powerful, pose a valid threat Change to franchise expansion 
and compulsory voting at the 
same time  
Change to franchise expansion 
and then, years later, 
compulsory voting 
Weak, cannot pose a valid 
threat 
Continuation of the status quo 
(neither franchise expansion 
nor compulsory voting)  
Change to compulsory voting 
and then, years later, franchise 
expansion 
 
In what follows, I first present a theoretical framework to understand the institutional 
outcome most likely to emerge from different configurations of power between those who 
demanded reforms and the elites in power. I ground my argument in the literature about changes 
in electoral rules that emphasizes strategic considerations of political actors to support or oppose 
those changes. 
Second, I describe the context of pressures for social transformation around the beginning 
of the twentieth century in four Latin American countries as a critical juncture, in which elites 
were confronted with the decision to choose an institutional arrangement that was unlikely to 
change once in place. Then, I examine the institutional outcome in each country and how they 
are related to the theoretical framework. In this chapter, I analyze a set of countries that fostered 
universal suffrage before compulsory voting, Argentina and Uruguay, and a set of countries that 
implemented compulsory voting and later universal suffrage, Bolivia and Peru. In the case of 
Peru, I am able to present a more detailed case study by probing into archival documents 
recording representatives’ debates in the Congress. As an extension, I provide some evidence 
and discuss how to place other countries in Latin America in this theoretical framework. I 
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conclude by proposing that the argument developed in this article can be expanded to five 
countries not scrutinized here. 
 
The Implementation of Electoral Rules as a Struggle of Power 	
This chapter proposes that a comprehensive understanding of the origins of compulsory 
voting should include the analysis of the factors influencing the timing of the implementation of 
universal suffrage. The analyses of the balance of power between ruling parties and opposition 
groups and the strategic considerations of political actors offer insights about the sequence in the 
implementation of universal suffrage and compulsory voting. I build on extant explanations for 
the strategic implementation of universal suffrage and compulsory voting and synthesize both 
into a single account of the implementation of these two electoral rules. 
 
Compulsory voting and Enfranchisement as Strategic Decisions 	
I suggest that, in order to understand the reasons behind the implementation of 
compulsory voting, we also need to understand the rationale for the expansion of the franchise. 
Regarding enfranchisement, the literature emphasizes the role of revolutionary threats from 
below as an explanation for elites’ willingness to expand the franchise (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2000, 2001; Aidt and Jensen 2011) and finds empirical support for this hypothesis versus 
alternative explanations (Przeworski 2009). In this branch of the literature, disenfranchised 
groups conquered suffrage and elites simply reacted to these threats. Later models introduce 
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elites’ agency and propose a game of two actors: the elite and the disenfranchised group (Xi 
2013).10 
In general, I assume that there is a logical, inherent order of elite preferences. First, elites 
prefer the continuation of the status quo, which means they prefer to avoid changing the electoral 
rules. Elites, therefore, seek to evade expanding the suffrage, to prevent a change from 
majoritarian to proportional representation, and a change in ballot structures, among other 
reforms. Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), I propose that the status quo is defined as a 
nondemocracy, in which a large proportion of the population is excluded from the political 
process and a small proportion forms the wealthy elite. Those excluded may organize an 
insurgency at any point. The success of the insurgency depends on the proportion of excluded 
individuals who take part in it (λ=0 means that no one joins the insurgency and λ=1 means that 
all excluded citizens join the insurgency). So, in order to be successful, the insurgency’s 
organizers have to solve a collective action problem. 
During the insurgency, a fraction of the income of the economy is destroyed and this 
fraction is proportional to λ. If λ is relatively small, then the insurgency fails. Excluded groups 
are not able to get over the collective action problem and the cost of organizing a credible threat 
and only a small fraction of the income is destroyed, but elites are still more powerful than 
disenfranchised groups, and, as a consequence the status quo persisted. However, if elites are in 
trouble owing to factional struggles, then they begin an intramural negotiation that does not take 
into account disenfranchised groups’ interests. 
																																																								
10 Xi (2013) also introduces the role of the middle class and proposes that elites first grant a gradual expansion of the 
franchise to the middle class in order to gain its support for maintaining the status quo, over which elite governs. 
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Second, if λ is relatively large, this situation becomes a threat for elite dominance. When 
the disenfranchised group is able to get over the collective action problem and the costs of 
organizing a threat and calculates that benefits exceed costs; they can pose a valid threat to elites 
in form of protests, strikes, and civil unrest. Because an increasing λ means also an increasing 
destruction of income of the economy, strong elites prefer a negotiation rather than the 
continuation and exacerbation of the threat. It implies that elites are more likely to cede and 
implement a franchise expansion as a way to calm down protests and as a credible commitment 
of future redistribution. On the other side, disenfranchised groups prefer also to negotiate rather 
than to continue a costly threat of insurgency with an uncertain outcome given that elites are still 
quite powerful. At the end, after the negotiation, the result is the inclusion of an important mass 
of new voters, which means a change in the median voter in future electoral results and the end 
of the former political equilibrium. 
On the other hand, if elites are relatively weak, they have little power to negotiate with 
disenfranchised groups and as a consequence they lose everything. In this case, an insurgency is 
highly likely to succeed. This is the reason why they will always prefer to prevent an uprising. At 
the end, disenfranchised groups take the power and implement transformative changes in 
electoral rules, such as universal suffrage. This is the worst scenario for elites’ interests. In sum, 
elites’ order of preferences is: Status quo > Negotiation > Loss of power. Each situation depends 
on the power of disenfranchised groups (λ) and on the strength of the elite, i.e. whether its groups 
are coordinated or not. 
What role does compulsory voting play in this model? Compulsory voting can have 
consequences for the electoral fortunes of parties running for office. It is a well-known fact that 
this electoral rule increases turnout, pushing to the polls those who otherwise would not go to 
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vote. If those who do not vote were a random sample of the population, there would be no 
changes in the distribution of votes, but scholarship finds that this group tends to have particular 
characteristics and, as a consequence, they may change the characteristics of the median voter 
when they are compelled to vote. As such, governing parties may introduce this rule to create an 
electoral advantage when they think they have a large base of untapped voters among those who 
do not vote. For parallel reasons, opposition groups may demand the implementation of 
mandatory voting if they think non-voters include a lot of their supporters. In both cases, groups 
in government and in the opposition are acting strategically. They want the implementation of 
this law to move electoral results in their favor. 
Along this line, Helmke and Meguid (2007) propose that strategic rightist governments 
evaluate if they have a large base of untapped supporters among non-voters, then they use 
compulsory voting as a measure to get out the vote of this group, composed mainly of wealthy 
voters, and as a result, they are able to level the electoral playing field, disturbed after a franchise 
expansion. Their argument seems to challenge the conventional wisdom in the discipline. Since 
Lijphart, the usual assumption is that leftist parties, who are supported by the poor and the less 
educated and who are less likely to vote, would benefit from compulsory voting. Helmke and 
Meguid propose the opposite: right-wing established parties would benefit from this electoral 
rule in the context of franchise expansions. These authors mention scholars that find that 
compulsory voting pushed to the polls wealthy members of the upper bourgeoisie in Europe at 
the end of the nineteenth century. Moreover, disenfranchised groups, composed mostly of poor 
and less educated citizens, turned out in droves when an expansion of the franchise was granted, 
because Leftist parties had an unmatched organizational ability to mobilize newly-enfranchised 
voters. Helmke and Meguid’s selection of cases –Argentina Luxembourg, and Singapore- 
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provides support for this expectation and they conclude that “An incumbent conservative 
government facing an emerging political opposition with superior mobilization capacity 
strategically adopted compulsory voting to minimize electoral losses.” (29) 
In this setting, the elites in government have a twofold problem: on the one side, their 
supporters are abstaining under voluntary voting, and, on the other side, their opponents are more 
effective at encouraging their supporters to go to the polls under universal suffrage, and, as a 
consequence, they are acquiring more electoral power, which threatens the status quo of elite 
dominance. In response to this threat, incumbent elites have two options: restrict again suffrage 
or implement compulsory voting. They do not opt for a restriction of suffrage because when the 
expansion of the franchise is granted, it is extremely difficult to come back to the initial point 
(disenfranchisement). It would imply a continuation and probably an intensification of protests 
and civil unrest, and, as a result, it would exacerbate the threat with an increasing destruction of 
income. Thus, elites would choose not to penalize their opponents, but to push their supporters to 
the polls via compulsory voting. The end result would be a diminished or a finished threat. 
I propose that Helmke and Meguid’s argument is tied to a particular case of the timing in 
the implementation of franchise expansions and compulsory voting: when universal suffrage is 
implemented at the same time as compulsory voting. This outcome is tied to a previous scenario: 
when both sides negotiate. In this case, elites are still quite powerful and disenfranchised groups 
are able to pose a valid threat. I propose that still-powerful elites may think to implement 
compulsory voting as a way to level the electoral playing field, unbalanced after the 
implementation of universal suffrage that granted the right to vote mostly to opposition parties’ 
supporters. Birch (2009) mentions that “making electoral participation mandatory was viewed as 
a means of mitigating the impact of other electoral reforms, especially franchise expansion” (28-
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29). In this scenario, opposition groups’ and elites’ interests contradict and finally the 
institutional outcome is the implementation of both electoral rules. Elites see a loss of power, but 
they are able to retain some. Disenfranchised groups gain the right to participate, but they have to 
share power with the elite. 
In this previous scenario, there is a balance of power between elites and disenfranchised 
groups that leads to a negotiation. However, a second scenario may present an unbalance in favor 
of disenfranchised groups – when λ is relatively large and so they are able to organize an 
insurgency and elites are weakened due to internal fractures. In this case, elites could not 
negotiate and so they had to accept only universal suffrage. Thus, the most likely outcome after 
the implementation of universal suffrage is an elite’s loss of power. In this scenario, compulsory 
voting may arrive years later, as a corrective to universal suffrage (Stengers 1990 mentioned in 
Birch 2009; Conley and Temini n.d.). 
In both cases universal suffrage was implemented before or at the same time as 
compulsory voting. Yet, empirically we know that actually some countries implemented 
compulsory voting before universal suffrage. For example, Bolivia implemented compulsory 
voting in 1924 and then universal suffrage in 1952, 28 years later; and Peru legislated 
compulsory voting in 1931 and universal suffrage in 1979, 48 years later. The remaining 
scenario explains this sequence. 
What happens when disenfranchised groups are not powerful enough to pose a severe 
threat for the elite’s dominance? This is the case when the disenfranchised group cannot 
overcome the collective action problem and the costs of organization or they see that the costs 
are too high for not-so-high benefits, and as a consequence they do not pose a valid threat (i.e. 
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when λ is relatively small); and in turn elites in power are coordinated and are still powerful. The 
most likely result from this correlation of forces is the continuation of the status quo of partial 
enfranchisement and voluntary voting. This is the best scenario for elite’s interests, but it was 
highly unlikely given the broad diffusion of pressures for social change in Latin America. 
In an alternative scenario, elites can be weakened due to internal fractures. The elites are 
not homogenous actors, but they actually consist of subgroups, each group having a particular set 
of interests. For example, they comprise landowners, the bourgeoisie, and an industrial class in 
some cases. In order to be considered as a homogenous and strong actor, these subgroups need to 
be coordinated in a system in which each subgroup has its interests satisfied. When they are not 
coordinated, each group may push for policies closer to its interests and these policies may 
disturb other subgroup’s interests. This situation disrupts the equilibrium and originates rising 
disputes among factions, which put the whole elite at risk. 
In a fourth scenario, elites are in trouble because of internal factional disputes. These 
disputes may emerge confrontationally in electoral times and, as a result, elections may become a 
struggle for deciding who the primus inter pares is. I propose that under this balance of power, 
the most likely result is the implementation of compulsory voting, but not an expansion of the 
franchise. In this scenario, the elite calculate that the threat from the disenfranchised group is not 
powerful enough and so they decide not to extend rights of participation, but they at the same 
time calculate that electoral violence and internal disputes may put their dominance at risk, and 
consequently they implement electoral reforms, that include compulsory voting, as a way to 
modernize voting procedures, with the expectation to stop disputes among factions of the elite. 
The idea is that this modernization of electoral rules would bestow representativeness to elected 
authorities, at least for the minor group of those with rights of participation. Previous scholarship 
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has emphasized that internal disputes among factions of the elite are one of the reasons for 
franchise expansions (Jack and Lagunoff 2006; Lizzeri and Persico 2004). Here I propose that, 
under certain circumstances, they can also be a reason for the implementation of electoral 
reforms, that include compulsory voting, but not universal suffrage. 
In summary, I propose that the interaction between the disenfranchised group and the 
elite can be summarized in four scenarios. In this chapter, I analyze four countries profoundly: 
Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Peru. At the end, I expand the model to other four countries: 
Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, and Chile, and I present partial evidence to support their inclusion in 
this model. This main group of countries is a convenience sample of cases, which allows for an 
initial assessment of this theoretical framework. Argentina is an example of scenario A in Table 
II.2, where a powerful elite confronted powerful parties and groups representing disenfranchised 
people. As a result, this country enacted universal suffrage and compulsory voting in 1912. 
Uruguay is in the middle between scenario A and B. The conditions were similar to the 
Argentinean case, but the process by which Uruguayan elites processed the conflict changed. In 
this country, parties avoided the conflict between elites and disenfranchised groups. They agreed 
to prevent an insurgency and consequently they implemented universal suffrage in 1915 and then 
soon compulsory voting in 1917 in the same package of reforms. 
Bolivia and Peru are cases in which divided elites faced weak disenfranchised groups. 
They are examples of the scenario C. Bolivia implemented compulsory voting in 1929 and Peru 
in 1931. Elites in both countries were able to delay more profound reforms. Universal suffrage 
arrived many years later, in Bolivia in 1952 and in Peru in 1979. I have not presented a case of 
scenario D, where the status quo prevailed, but I assume this was the situation in each country 
before the beginning of the period of social and political transformations –what Acemoglu and 
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Robinson (2001) characterize as a nondemecracy. At the end of this chapter, I will extend this 
analysis and will argue that other countries not scrutinized here can be placed in this model. 
Table II.2. Four Scenarios from the Interaction of Elites and Disenfranchised Groups 
Disenfranchised group 
Elite 
Powerful and Organized  Divided due to conflicts 
among factions 
Powerful, pose a valid threat Change to franchise expansion 
and compulsory voting at the 
same time 
Scenario A: Argentina 
Uruguay 
Change to franchise expansion 
and then, years later, 
compulsory voting 
Scenario B 
Weak, cannot pose a valid 
threat 
Continuation of the status quo  
Scenario D 
Change to compulsory voting 
and then, years later, franchise 
expansion 
Scenario C: Bolivia and Peru 
 
There are alternative explanations for the enactment of compulsory voting. Birch (2009) 
mentions that compulsory voting may be implemented as a continuation of a legal colonial 
tradition. In Latin America, this tradition should come from the Spanish Empire. However, 
Sabato (2001) argues that after independence Latin American constitutions were characterized 
by a break with the colonial order and its institutions. Moreover, the Spanish Empire was not 
characterized for the implementation of this rule. Actually, the 1812 Spanish Constitution 
(Constitución de Cádiz) was the one that arrived to Peru. Under this liberal Constitution, Peru 
celebrated its first elections for a Junta of Government, in which indigenous people were granted 
the right to vote, but this Constitution did not establish the obligation to vote. 
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Birch also mentions that compulsory voting may be implemented to improve the quality 
of democracy and to prevent electoral abuse, for example bribes for not voting in voluntary 
voting systems. This interpretation is similar to the scenario in which elites seek to improve 
electoral rules in order to prevent intramural conflicts. In this interpretation compulsory voting 
was implemented, as part of a package of reforms, to modernize the electoral system. In this 
way, elites, for example, want to prevent vote buying and post electoral violence in some Latin 
American countries. Thus, this chapter encapsulates this interpretation in a broader frame.   
 
Pressures for Social and Political Transformation in Latin America 	
In this section I describe the period where several social and political transformations in 
Latin America emerged, from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Huntington (1993) identifies the first wave of democratization from around 1826 to 
1926, in which Argentina, Uruguay and Chile are included in Latin America. In this wave, many 
countries in the world and in Latin America experienced pressures for democratization and for 
changes in electoral rules. 
I suggest that this period was a critical juncture in each country. According to Mahoney 
(2001), critical junctures are defined by two components: they are choice points and, once an 
option was selected and time passes, it is more difficult to revert to the initial point. Economic 
and political crises and the legacies of the War of the Pacific fueled social convulsion in many 
Latin American countries. I focus the analysis on the interaction between conservative elites in 
power and disenfranchised groups that pushed for social, economic, and political inclusion. In 
some countries, the social convulsion led to threats to elite dominance, as in Argentina, where 
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this threat manifested in intense strikes, riots, and protests. The case of Uruguay is distinctive 
because political elites prevented a revolution through agreed-upon reforms. Economic and 
political crises did not translate in to severe social revolts in Bolivia and Peru because the groups 
that demanded changes in the political system were relatively weak and because the oligarchy 
counted on the military among its allies. In these countries, an important source of instability 
came from internal disputes within a still powerful elite, especially in electoral times. In each 
country, elites in power faced a dilemma: maintain the status quo or change electoral institutions. 
When they chose an option, this institutional arrangement almost irreversibly persisted. 
 
Argentina and Uruguay: Still Powerful Elite and Rising Disenfranchised Groups 	
Argentinean conservative elite faced this dilemma, which culminated in the 1912 reform, 
known as the Saenz-Peña Law. Before this electoral change, electoral participation in Argentina 
was, in abstract, free, but in practice an elite of notables, representing only the upper class of 
Buenos Aires (porteños), dominated the electoral process (Historia Electoral Argentina (1912-
2007), 2008). In this period, Argentina and Uruguay experienced social unrest, with increasingly 
strong groups clamoring for economic and political reforms. According to this framework, this 
means that λ was relatively large and therefore a considerable fraction of the income would be 
destroyed. In Argentina, Munck (1987) mentions that “the statistics on strikes mask the fact that, 
in 1907, two-thirds of all strikes were lost by the workers, whereas by 1910 this proportion was 
reversed as the working class strove successfully to defend its organizations and living 
standards” (28). McGuire (1995) indicates that “unable to advance their interests through the 
vote, workers took to the streets in massive and often violent demonstrations that deeply 
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unsettled the elite” (206). The Unión Cívica Radical (UCR or ‘Radicals’), formed in 1891 as a 
party that represented workers and demanded electoral reforms, threatened the government with 
civic disturbances. They organized three intense revolts and Saenz-Peña, the leader of the 
reformist program within the conservative elite, had to make an agreement in 1910 with Hipólito 
Yrigoyen, leader of the UCR, to prevent new armed uprisings. This agreement included a 
commitment to legislate electoral changes. Devoto (1996) argues that the Saenz-Peña law was a 
strategic measure to calm down the social agitation, by incorporating the UCR into the electoral 
arena. I propose that the intensity of the protests placed Argentinean elite in a contentious 
context in which they faced a severe threat from excluded but well-organized sectors of the 
society. 
Uruguay also observed profound economic and political crises at the end of the 
nineteenth century due to two civil wars in 1894 and 1904. The labor movement in this country, 
fueled by socialist and anarchist groups, adopted a strategy of boycotts, sabotages, and strikes, 
demanding better work conditions. The activation of the working class led to the first general 
strike in 1911, in which Montevideo, the capital city, was completely shut down. For the 
government, this strike took the form of an urban insurrection (Rosenthal 1995). 
However, political elites faced promptly this challenge –a rising threat- through a 
political agreement, and not by a confrontation between both sides. A faction of the Colorado 
party headed by José Batlle –the liberal side in the bipolar system- and the Blanco (National) 
party –close to the conservative side- agreed with the need to prevent rising social conflicts in 
Uruguay and they reached a pact to implement a series of social reforms, including the 
enactment of universal male suffrage in 1915 for the elections for a Constituent Assembly next 
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year. Zeballos (2013) called this path as an “agreed electoral inclusion”.11 This case shows that 
negotiated reforms are measures to prevent social conflicts from escalating. Thus, pressures for 
social transformation were resolved quite peacefully in this country. 
 
Bolivia and Peru: Divided Elites and Weak Disenfranchised Groups 	
The cases of Bolivia and Peru show a different scenario. In both countries, quite powerful 
elites faced relatively weak demands from leftist organization representing disenfranchised 
groups, in the middle of economic and political crises after the calamitous War of Pacific at the 
end of the nineteenth century. Most instability in these countries was due to poor economic 
conditions and internal fractures within the elites. 
Bolivia, for example, went into the twentieth century governed by an oligarchic elite, 
divided in two main factions: the Liberals and the Conservatives. Gamarra and Malloy (1995) 
describe this period as a superficially stable two-party system, because volatility was observed 
within the elite, immersed in factional disputes, in which “the real game was one of ‘ins’ and 
‘outs,’ with the latter, regardless of party affiliation, forming coalitions to harass and unseat the 
incumbent” (401). After a Liberal period, the Republicans, a new elite party, took the power after 
a coup in 1920. Several rival factions composed the Republicans, Liberals, and Conservatives 
parties. Whitehead (1981) mentions that “they [the Republicans] in turn broke up into rival 
factions that were unable to coexist within the framework of electoral competition, but instead 
resolved their differences by force” (314). Paz Salas (1997, cited by Van Cott 2000) also 
portrays this period as one of “constant conflict among multiple forces characterized by strong 
leadership and factionalism.” Moreover, conflicts increased in electoral periods because “neither 																																																								
11 In Spanish, Zeballos called this path as “ampliación pactada”. 
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party would concede electoral defeat to the opposition, resulting in bloody post-electoral battles” 
(163). Van Cott (2000) names the Bolivian party system at this period as “an arena for intra-class 
personalistic disputes among the oligarchy and the tiny middle class dependent upon public 
sector employment” (164). 
In Bolivia, indigenous masses were not allowed to participate in political decisions 
because of literacy and property requirements. Gamarra and Malloy (1995) calculate that less 
than 10 percent of adult males voted in this period in Bolivia. Van Cott (2000) identifies Bolivia 
at the beginning of the twentieth century as an exclusionary party system, in which indigenous 
people did not have representation and artesanos –a sort of new urban middle class that was 
comprised of merchants and craftsmen, and some indigenous peasants- fought to be part of the 
selective group. 
Bolivia saw the rise of a weak leftist movement in the twenties, particularly the populist 
Partido Obrero Socialista, which tried to be the voice of the large indigenous population, but its 
organization was feeble and consequently this party did not pose a threat to the oligarchic regime 
in form of frequent and severe protests, strikes, or demonstrations. Further, Van Cott (2000) 
indicates that “They [indigenous people] strive to participate in politics but on their own terms, 
independent of groups such as parties that may seek to coopt or dominate them” (158). 
In the case of Peru, from the beginning of the twentieth century, a period called the 
‘Aristocratic Republic’ matured in this country. This period revealed a change in the relative 
political power between factions of the elite, from landowners to a bourgeois class, associated 
with export activities. The oligarchy preserved their power, but it was divided in several parties: 
the Partido Civilista, the Partido Demócrata, and others, each representing a faction of the 
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aristocratic sector and led each by a caudillo. Elections in this period were wars of clans among 
regional oligarchies. Del Aguila (1997) notes that elections in this time were more an expression 
of the capacity of mobilization of each candidate, and not an expression of the popular will. Each 
elected government inaugurated a period of instability. Conflicts within the ruling elite had 
several sources: the clash of interests between coastal exporters and Andean landowners, the 
relationship of the elite with urban proletariats and their unions and parties, and the relationship 
of the elite with the indigenous mass. 
When instability increased to levels that put at risk the continuation of the status quo, the 
military, assuming the role of “watching dog of the oligarchy”, overthrew the government and 
installed a military junta that after a period called again for elections in which the winner should 
be a member of one of the factions of the oligarchic group. Risks to the continuation of the status 
quo included, for example, a reformist government that put too much emphasis on welfare, such 
as Billinghurst’s government from 1912 to 1914,12 or an eventual electoral victory of populist 
parties, such as the Aprista party in 1931. 
The change of the economic model at the beginning of the twentieth century, from an 
emphasis on the agriculture sector to a growing import/export industry, produced the rise of an 
urban working class and an exacerbation of the feudal system in rural areas. New political 
parties, such as the Aprista party and the Comunista party tried to organize the urban working 
class in unions and fought for their demands. The Aprista party focused on the coastal region of 
the country, particularly the north of Peru, where they achieved a high degree of influence 
among sugar mill workers. The Communist party also worked to organize urban workers into 																																																								
12 Basadre (1980) notes that “In that way, after twenty years of civil governments from 1895, [a deadlock between 
Billinghurst and the Parliament] generated the intervention of the Armed Forces in politics, a force characterized as 
a decisive referee in this irreconcilable fight among parties in a not-working democracy” (74: author’s translation). 
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unions. One example of their rising force was the organization of the first national strike in 1911 
in which they fought for better economic conditions at work; however, they did not include 
political demands, in part because the working class in urban areas was slowly getting access to 
education and consequently they were gradually incorporating in the electoral body. The level of 
political exclusion was particularly high for peasants because they were mostly illiterates and did 
not have an easy access to education. Still, they did not have a party that advocated for their 
interests. 
The emergence of the Aprista and the Comunista parties posed the first serious challenge 
to oligarchic rule in Peru, but despite their efforts in the organization of the working class, these 
new parties did not imply a severe threat to the dominant elite. Cotler (2005) mentions that after 
1930 the Comunista party organized revolts in mining enclaves, but these uprisings were rapidly 
dissolved by the Armed Forces, allies of the oligarchic regime. Moreover, the oligarchy was able 
to ban the Aprista party from the electoral arena and prosecuted, jailed and exiled Aprista’s 
leaders. 
The context in each country resulted in different institutional outcomes: the 
implementation of universal suffrage or compulsory voting, or both. I argue that these outcomes 
depend on the balance of power between those who demanded transformations and elites in 
power. In the next section, I explain how the balance of power in each country produced an 
institutional outcome that fits the theoretical frame. 
 
Institutional Outcome 	
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Scenario A: Franchise Expansion and Compulsory Voting 	
In Argentina, universal male suffrage was in place since the beginning of the republic, 
but the literature indicates that it did not prevent electoral fraud and a low turnout. Actually 
Alonso (2000) states that from 1880 to 1916, “elections were simply an exercise in repression 
and manipulation by the landed elite” (144). The UCR, an opposition party, demanded an 
electoral system that would guarantee free elections and put pressure on the conservative elite via 
contentious tactics. The Conservatives, the dominant elite, faced a dilemma: they could make 
universal suffrage work, but it would risk reducing their electoral share and consequently they 
could lose elections; or they could maintain the status quo, but it would mean a continuation of 
the social unrest. Thus, this period was a crucial moment of decision for the elite: a critical 
juncture. 
On the other side, disenfranchised people wanted to be really included and to change the 
political equilibrium towards policies closer to their interests. In order to seek their inclusion, 
they need to organize a costly threat of insurgency. Their strategic calculus involves weighing 
the cost of insurgency’s organization and government’s repression versus the expected benefits 
of being incorporated if the revolution succeeded. In Argentina, Radicals and Communists, 
which represented the working-class sector, were able to overcome collective action problem and 
the cost of organization, and, as a result, this country presented an increasing social agitation that 
posed a serious threat to the Conservatives’ dominance. This threat included an escalation in 
number and intensity of strikes and violent demonstrations. Birch (2009) notes that “the situation 
had by the first years of the twentieth century grown so tense that legally incorporating the mass 
population into electoral politics was seen as preferable to retaining the status quo of violent 
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protest and non participation, even if it meant that those who introduced the measure lost 
politically as a result” (32). 
As a result of the power of Radicals and Communists, the Saenz-Peña Law set universal 
suffrage to work. The literature has pointed out that the Saenz-Peña Law was a calculated risk 
taken by the Conservative party to calm down the social agitation (Devoto 1996; Historia 
Electoral Argentina (1912-2007) 2008).13 However, the Conservative party was still powerful 
enough to not to cede all the power to the Radicals and to devise rules – such as compulsory 
voting, among others – for preserving their electoral influence. 
There is a debate about the causes of the implementation of compulsory voting in 
Argentina in 1912. On the one side, some scholars argue only normative reasons for its 
implementation. For instance, Castro (2007), García-Garro (2013) and Devoto (1996) mention 
that compulsory voting (and public education and obligatory conscription) was implemented as a 
“school of citizenship.” In this view, the electoral reform intended to democratize political 
decisions. 
On the other side, other scholars affirm that the electoral reform was a conservative 
elite´s tactic to deal with the Radical´s threat. García-Garro (2013) cites a legislator who said “it 
is more comfortable to make a new Electoral law than to repress a general strike every six 
months” (5: author’s translation). This tactic included the implementation of compulsory voting. 
This rule was not thought to extend electoral participation to the masses; on the contrary, it was 
implemented with the goal to push the conservative supporters to the polls. Nelson (2001) states 
																																																								
13 Devoto also presents an optimistic view about the extension of suffrage. This view highlights the ideological 
convictions of the proponents of this reform and their legitimate belief in the benefits of this change for Argentina. 
In the middle, Devoto cites Botana’s El Orden Conservador that proposes that reformists were convinced this law 
was good and also they were optimist about their electoral chances under the new law.  
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that upper classes in Argentina were lethargic and that wealthy citizens displayed high levels of 
abstention in elections. De Privitellio (2012) notes that the electoral reforms sought to 
incorporate the conservative citizens to the electorate via the obligation to vote rather than 
popular groups. Actually, illiterates were strategically excluded from penalties and so from the 
obligation to vote, according to the enacted legislation.14 
Thus, I argue that the Conservatives in Argentina proposed compulsory voting as a way 
to counteract the potential negative effects of universal male suffrage by obligating the wealthy 
to turn out. This perspective is consistent with that of Helmke and Meguid (2007), who state that 
“Granting universal male suffrage without adopting compulsory voting thus ran the risk that elite 
voters would simply continue to stay at home (or engage themselves in more leisurely pursuits) 
while the newly enfranchised groups would turn out in droves.” (30) The institutional result is 
what De Privitellio (2012) called a “qualified universal suffrage”15, because the opportunity to 
vote was extended to all citizens, but only wealthy citizens were obligated to turn out. 
In sum, Argentina around 1912 is an example where there was a dispute between 
emerging parties and a conservative elite. Radicals and Communists pushed for electoral changes 
that benefitted them: a real implementation of universal suffrage; and the Conservative party 
proposed a measure for preserving part of their dominance: compulsory voting. The result was 
the implementation of both as a package of reforms, and it meant a change in the balance of 
power from a declining but still powerful oligarchic party to new emerging parties, that was a 
symptom of the emergence of new sectors in the Argentinean society.  
 																																																								
14 The Article 84 of the Law 8.871 (Saenz Peña’s law) says “There is no penalties for illiterates voters and for those 
who live at more than 20 kilometers from their electoral place” (author’s translation). 
15 Sufragio universal calificado in Spanish. 
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Uruguay as a Middle Path Between Scenario A and B 	
In Uruguay, universal male suffrage was first proposed in 1915. Caetano (2011) mentions 
that the government of Batlle, from the Colorado party, the reformist sector in the political 
system, proposed several reforms, emphasizing the economic transformation of the country: 
nationalization of industries, promotion of unionism, an agrarian reform, and an increase in taxes 
for the wealthy. Batlle’s faction thought that these transformations would reduce social 
discontent and counteract increasing polarization in the country. These reforms were not 
revolutionary, but a disruptive threat for the hegemony of the conservative coalition in urban and 
rural areas represented by the National Party, which included agrarian landowners, the Catholic 
Church clergy, and the Armed Forces in Uruguay. Zeballos (2013) points out that “the 
‘batllismo’ (Batlle’s faction) kept a distance from socialism, and calmed down the conservative 
class, becoming a shock-absorbing reformism of the social conflict” (24, author’s translation). 
In this context, both parties agreed to implement universal male suffrage in the 1916 
elections for a Constituent Assembly. Batlle thought that the “vote would be more effective than 
a revolution…the votes of unionists plus the votes of good-will men of all social classes would 
peacefully achieve needed reforms.” On the other side, “conservative groups preferred to extend 
the franchise than a revolt of rural sectors that implied the destruction of property” (Zeballos 
2013: 27-29, author's translation). This was the first step in a series of political transformations in 
the country. 
Caetano (2011) mentions that the first elections under universal male suffrage for a 
Constituent Assembly were a sort of plebiscite of Batlle’s reformist project. Contrary to his 
expectations, results of these elections meant a stop in his endeavor. Uruguayan citizens voted 
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for moderation and sought conciliation between two parties. The Constitution was supposed to 
be a mechanism to reach agreements between parties, but the mandate was not clear. The 1917 
legislative elections complicated the situation even more because the results favored Batlle’s 
camp and so both sides could claim legitimacy in their options about the reformist agenda. In 
order to prevent a deadlock, main party leaders reached an agreement on a formula to satisfy 
main demands of each side. This was called El Pacto de los Ocho. This project was voted and 
ratified in 1917 (Chasquetti 2003). 
This project introduced changes in the executive power, like a shared executive in hand 
of a president and an administrative national council, proposed by the Batlle’s faction and the 
Colorado party. The National Party proposed changes in the electoral system, such as the 
introduction of mandatory registration, secret vote, and proportional representation. For the 
conservative class, the expansion of suffrage was viewed as a tolerable measure to prevent 
conflicts. This package of changes also included compulsory voting: the obligation to vote for 
male citizens. Under the framework I have asserted here, the assumption is that the National 
Party estimated a large base of untapped supporters among not registered citizens and abstainers 
and wanted to push them to the polls via mandatory registration and compulsory voting.16 
Thus, the case of Uruguay shows that under a moderate threat a hyper integrated society 
and a rooted political party system led to an agreed upon solution that included a suffrage 
expansion and compulsory voting. Parties were key to this outcome because their characteristics 
(popular, multi classist and of national scope) prevented class conflicts (Zeballos 2013). 
According to Table II.2, Uruguay is a case in the middle between scenarios A and B because this 																																																								
16 In discourses in the Constituent Assembly, National party legislators claimed Uruguay needed mandatory 
registration to fight against abstention and they also affirmed that citizens should be educated in their duties, so 
Uruguay needed a law that obliged all citizens to vote (Zeballos 2013). 
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country experienced powerful demands from excluded sectors of the population, but these 
demands did not translate in extreme violence. A quite powerful elite prevented this situation via 
an agreement. 
The sequence in the implementation of universal suffrage and compulsory voting also 
includes a path by which compulsory voting was implemented prior to the introduction of 
universal suffrage. The cases of Bolivia and Peru are of this type. In these countries elites were 
still powerful but they experienced serious problems because of internal conflicts (i.e. rivalries 
among factions for power and for economic issues) and new parties representing the 
disenfranchised groups were relatively weak. According to Table II.2, Bolivia and Peru are 
examples of scenario C. 
 
Scenario C: Compulsory Voting and Later Franchise Expansion 	
In Bolivia, for example, compulsory voting was ruled in 1924 and pushed to the polls 
only those entitled to cast a ballot: a minority of Bolivian society. Before its implementation, it is 
fair to assume that each faction of the elite tried to carry to the polls more supporters than rival 
factions did, as scholars have pictured Bolivia in those years. This situation led to concerns about 
electoral procedures and rules, accusations of fraud, and finally to losers’ rejection of final 
results. Liberals and Conservatives, the two factions of the Bolivian elite, used vote buying and 
forced disenfranchised people to register and turn out in order to win elections. At the same time, 
both parties accused the other of fraudulent maneuvers. The winning strategy consisted of 
convincing voters that the other party was dishonest while their own faction was a fair 
competitor. The loser in this game of crossfire accusations had a last tactic: threaten the 
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government with abstention to delegitimize the elected government. In the end, each elected 
government inaugurated a new precarious period in the middle of a volatile context. Thus, 
elections were a struggle afflicted with violence and corruption among powerful intra-elite 
factions to decide who was stronger and who was going to govern and they were more a 
reflection of mobilization capacity than a reflection of ‘popular’ will. 
Voting rights were restricted in theory, but in practice parties used disenfranchised people 
as means to win elections. Irurozqui (1996) names this scenario a “democratic fiction” in which 
popular will was manipulated depending on the economic and material resources of both parties. 
The Liberal and the Conservative parties were oligarchic groups formed by the traditional landed 
elite and the newly emergent tin elite, whom excluded lower sectors and established a 
clientelistic relationship with middle class of the Bolivian society. These parties were not rooted 
in the society and were not representative of any other group beyond the elite. They also lacked 
any programmatic platform, despite the fact that they used the terms “liberal” and “conservative” 
as party labels (Irurozqui 1996). In words of Gamarra and Malloy (1995), the parties were 
“vehicles to capture and circulate state patronage among the dependent middle class” (399). 
According to Irurozqui (1996), political elites and intellectual groups did not appear to 
consider an extension of suffrage to resolve electoral problems. On the contrary, they looked 
down on popular vote and accused middle and lower class voters of being the cause of electoral 
corruption. Elites argued that these ‘bad citizens’ who sell their votes and oblige parties to buy 
participation perverted the political system and they claimed that popular segments of the 
population did not have education and civic skills to obtain the right to vote. In turn, neither 
indigenous peasants nor artesanos did consider an expansion of the franchise as a critical 
demand. Irurozqui argues that the group of artesanos did not want an expansion of the franchise, 
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but they wanted to be part of the discriminatory group of citizens with rights. They did not seek a 
change in electoral rules to expand the franchise, but they tried to fulfill requirements, such as 
education or property, to be part of those with economic rights. Among many other factors, these 
reasons might explain why artesanos and peasants did not organize a movement to fight for their 
inclusion. They mostly pursued an individual strategy of social mobility. 
In this context, I propose that the implementation of electoral reforms, which included 
compulsory voting, should be understood as a measure to prevent electoral irregularities. After 
the 1920 elections and the subsequent Republican Party’s coup d’état, the elite became aware of 
the need for less vicious voting procedures. After the modification of electoral regulations, 
President Saavedra stated that “There have also been important modifications to the voting 
process, in order to shield it from fraud, violence and foul play” (Whitehead 1981: 316). In the 
case of compulsory voting, if supporters of all factions were entitled to vote and were obliged to 
go to the polls, then the winner may claim representativeness, at least for the Bolivian elite. I 
conclude that compulsory voting was part of an agreement among factions to prevent intra-elite 
factional disputes and to stabilize rotation in power, and not as a measure to promote ample 
participation. 
Peru went down a different path than Argentina and Uruguay and more like that 
experienced by Bolivia and consequently this country is also an example of scenario C. In Peru, 
when compulsory voting was initially implemented, legislators did not have broad inclusion in 
their mind, but they wanted to prevent electoral violence, to modernize elections and so to assure 
a reasonable competition among elite factions. For example, Villarán (1931), a representative of 
the conservative elite, wrote in the draft bill of the 1933 Constitution that “the absence of 
regulatory majorities has been the immediate origin of our agitations, revolutions, dictatorships 
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and political crimes. If we want to eradicate these misfortunes, we should try to make real the 
popular vote” (27; author’s translation). Actually, when he mentioned ‘popular vote’, he meant 
educated male suffrage. 
From the end of the nineteenth century to 1931, when a new constitution was legislated, 
Peru experienced a period of severe instability and elections in this period were wars of clans. 
For example, the situation before the presidential election in 1876 was so exceptionally violent 
that candidates from the two parties –both parties of the elite: the Partido Civilista and the 
Partido Nacional- agreed for a disarmament to prevent an escalation of more violence (Loayza 
2005: 437). Peralta (2005) highlights that Peru ran the most violent elections in its history in the 
period from 1895 to 1919. 
Quite surprisingly, restrictions to citizenship and franchise did not have much opposition 
from excluded segments of the population.17 Members of the Andean elite, local caciques who 
might fight for an extension of the franchise for indigenous people, agreed with the political 
exclusion because it disqualified poor members of peasant communities, with whom they 
competed for land in rural areas (Cotler 2005). 
The first two decades of the twentieth century exhibited the emergence of new sectors in 
the society: urban blue-collar workers and a substantial white-collar middle class. The Aprista 
and the Comunista parties organized these new groups, but they could not get enough power to 
be a severe threat for elite dominance. In sum, the political landscape around the thirties in Peru 
displayed still powerful factions of the oligarchy in dispute, Armed Forces as allies and 
																																																								
17 From the independence in 1821 to the end of the eighteenth century, Peru experienced a liberal wave and several 
Constitutions did not require literacy as a requirement for citizenship and franchise, and so indigenous people were 
allowed to vote. From the end of the eighteenth century, after the War of Pacific, literacy was introduced as a 
requirement and it excluded a huge mass of indigenous population of the political decisions.  
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mediators of elites factions, rising parties representing new urban sectors, and a huge mass of 
indigenous, mostly illiterates, with neither power nor representation. 
This status quo faced an economic crisis because of the depression of the thirties. 
Incapable of solving this problem, the military overthrew President Leguía, installed a military 
junta, and called for elections for a Constituent Assembly and a new president in 1931. These 
elections were a breakpoint in Peru’s electoral history because they allowed the participation of 
leftist parties -the Aprista and the Comunista parties. The results gave the Aprista party and the 
Socialista party a minority while oligarchic parties still held the majority of seats in the 
Assembly. Sánchez Cerro and his party, the Unión Revolutionaria, obtained a majority in the 
Constituent Assembly despite they gained just 38% of the popular vote. This electoral share was 
enough to control the Assembly with 67 seats, while the Aprista party, the main opposition party, 
gained 27 seats. 
This election was organized under a new Electoral Code that included the creation of an 
electoral management body and an electoral registry. It also included compulsory voting. I 
conclude that this electoral reform was a way to modernize electoral procedures with the 
expectation to prevent intra-elite violence and fraud. Basadre (1946) recognizes that “the draft 
bill implied a revolutionary innovation in Peru, compared to the sinful practices of the past.” 
(112; author’s translation). Moreover, Villarán (1931), member of the committee in charge of 
writing the draft bill of the 1933 Constitution, stated that “Instituting the mandatory registration, 
the draft bill sets the basis for the obligation to vote, including in this way a principle of Political 
Law already established in modern legislations” (9: author’s translation, emphasis added). 
However, this reform did not include an expansion of the franchise to illiterates, despite some 
legislators of the new Constitution thought illiterates should be included.  
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Once in debate, the Assembly engaged in intense discussion over rights to vote for those 
between 18 and 21 years old and for women in the new Constitution. Leftist parties took a 
position in favor of incorporating young citizens and women into the electorate, arguing that 
these citizens were part of the economy and had social responsibilities and in turn the state 
should give them the right to vote.18 However, this incorporation had opponents, who argued 
lack of maturity of younger people and lack of experience of women.19 Finally, people between 
18 and 21 years old and women were not granted the right to vote in presidential elections. 
Parties associated with the oligarchic elite ruled citizenship for men from 21 years old. 
Opposition parties claimed this restriction gave advantage to oligarchic parties in power.20 
It is significant that the vote for illiterates was hardly debated in this Constituent 
Assembly. Villarán was against the proposal of giving the vote to illiterates, but he proposed that 
indigenous people should have representation and proposed not an individual right, but a 
collective vote, based on peasant communities (Basadre 1946: 232). It seems that the Aprista 
party and Comunista party thought they could fight in the case of women and the young cohort, 
but in the case of illiterates, these parties might see it as a lost cause given the balance of power 
in the Assembly, in favor of the Sánchez Cerro’s Unión Revolucionaria, which had the majority 
of seats. In any case, The Aprista and the Comunista parties wrote a report in which they 
																																																								
18 Castro Pozo, from the Socialist party, defended this position and said: “They [younger citizens] are elements of 
production; they contribute to increase capitalists’ fortunes and state’s income, so they have the right that the state 
gives them a political decision” (From Diary of Debates in Peruvian Congress, author’s translation). 
19 Legislators associated with the ruling government wrote a report in which they expressed their reasons for 
opposing women’s enfranchisement. They said: “Given that the number of women is higher than the number of 
men, according to statistics, it is not prudent to expose the country to uncertain transformations that may create this 
incorporation with no restrictions of a numerous electorate to the political life, with no habit in the fundamental 
function of suffrage.” (From Diary of Debates in Peruvian Congress, author’s translation). 
20 An opposition representative said: “The prohibition of the illiterates’ vote means an unjust exclusion of a huge 
mass of national people from all political rights. Thus, oligarchy is favored and it contributes to a exclusionary 
system, in conflict with substantive principles of democracy.” (Author’s translation) 
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expressed their reasons for supporting the enfranchisement of illiterates. They argued that 
illiterates had civic responsibilities and therefore they should also have rights.21  
At the end, women were allowed a restricted right to vote in municipal elections, but not 
in presidential ones; literate males older than 21 years old were fully enfranchised; and illiterates 
were fully restricted. For illiterates, enfranchisement had to wait half a century to be enacted. 
In sum, I propose that there was alternation among factions of the elite in Peru, but 
changes in power were not the results of peaceful elections or agreed transitions, but the results 
of contentious processes. I suggest that elites wanted to prevent more violence and thus 
compulsory voting was implemented in the 1933 Constitution as part of a set of reforms intended 
to stop violence and irregularities and to modernize the electoral system, with the last goal of 
assuring a reasonable competition among factions of the elite and as a measure to preserve elite’s 
power. 
 
Further Consequences After Critical Junctures 	
The change of the electoral rules had further consequences in each country. In Argentina, 
for example, after the implementation of universal suffrage and compulsory voting, the Unión 
Cívica Radical took the power in the 1916 elections. The Saenz-Peña Law incorporated 
emerging parties into the political arena, but the Radical party was most successful at taking 
advantage of the new rules. So, it seems that the Conservatives miscalculated how the coalition 
of forces was going to be after the reform and were unable to anticipate and prevent Radicals’ 																																																								
21 An opposition representative said: “There are no distinctions between literates and illiterates. If there are no 
differences for paying taxes and for military service, etc., there should not be a difference for the right to vote” 
(From Diary of Debates in Peruvian Congress, author’s translation). 
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victory in the 1916 presidential elections. After this election, the old order stepped back and the 
UCR hegemony began in Argentina. However, after 14 years, the Armed Forces, supported by 
the Conservatives, organized a coup, dissolved the constitutional government, and inaugurated a 
new dictatorship. 
In the Argentinean case the conflict between parties represented the old oligarchy and 
parties representing excluded groups was probably inevitable given the classist nature of these 
parties. In Uruguay, disenfranchised groups meant an increasing threat for the conservative side 
if they were not included, but once incorporated in the electoral arena there was not a sole party 
that represented this group given the multi-classist nature of parties in Uruguay. Both 
characteristics are related to the quite nonviolent outcome in Uruguay. In this country, the 
conquest of universal male suffrage and compulsory voting was an outlet for tensions in the 
society. 
The opposite happened in countries that delayed the implementation of a franchise 
expansion to illiterates, such as Bolivia and Peru. In Bolivia, for example, the old order came to a 
crisis after the Chaco War with Paraguay in the thirties. After this war, leftist opposition groups 
gained support and political power, particularly the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario 
(MNR). Old Liberal and Conservative parties were perceived as responsible for the defeat in the 
war against Paraguay and newly activated working-class groups emerged as viable alternatives to 
govern (Gamarra and Malloy, 1995). From all emerging groups, the MNR was most successful 
to capitalize this discontent and finally under a platform that proposed the extension of suffrage 
(among other revolutionary measures), this party won the 1951 elections in a landslide victory 
(42.9% of the votes); however the military prevented that the MNR took office and installed a 
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military junta. Finally, in 1952, the MNR, with the support of indigenous people and workers, 
organized an insurgency and overthrew the military regime. 
Under the MNR rule, the illiterates were finally enfranchised, but their interests were not 
completely represented in the political arena. The MNR’s goal was to mobilize and control 
peasants and labor groups activated during the insurgent acts. They co-opted the indigenous 
movement and did not promote policies in their favor, but strategies to preserve MNR’s power. 
At the end, MNR replicated patronage strategies as a measure to deal with factionalism.  
In Peru, in turn, Sánchez Cerro, a candidate close to the oligarchy but with popular 
support, won the 1931 presidential elections, but the Aprista party claimed fraud. The elected 
president banned the Aprista party, jailed its leader Haya de la Torre and deported its 
representatives in the national Congress. The Aprista party was prohibited to participate in a 
presidential campaign until 1962 (Cotler 2005). From 1931 to 1968, oligarchic parties 
successfully maintained their power. They could block the implementation of electoral rules 
against their interests or they could co-opt emerging parties, giving them some power, but not 
enough to threaten their rule. When opposite parties were allowed to share power, they 
abandoned their demands for universal suffrage as a way to keep their influence. The Aprista 
party, for instance, gained more political power and they co-governed with the elite from 1944 to 
1947. In this period, they abandoned their demand to enfranchise illiterates in order to preserve 
their pact with the oligarchic ruling party.22 As a result, citizenship remained a privilege of male 
literate adults, roughly 20% of the total adult population. 
																																																								
22 The Aprista party still pushed for a reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18 years old. 
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After this period a progressive military group took power and started a path of 
irreversible changes in Peruvian society that included an agrarian reform and more participation 
of excluded sectors. The extension of the franchise to illiterates was finally a reality in Peru in 
1979. A Constituent Assembly gave the 1979 Constitution in which one of the most important 
measures was to finally give the right to vote to the illiterates, who were around 25% of the total 
population, most of them indigenous people. All political parties agreed with this measure, but 
there were nuances. Leftist parties claimed for immediate inclusion,23 the Aprista party wanted a 
gradual incorporation,24 and rightist parties expressed reservations about illiterates’ electoral 
knowledge and their inclusion in the next presidential run.25 Going beyond normative discourses, 
the rational calculus of what party is going to get advantage from illiterates’ vote was mentioned 
in this debate.26 Finally the position of leftist parties prevailed and consequently illiterates were 
allowed the right to vote for the first time in Peruvian history in the 1980 elections. 
																																																								
23 Del Prado, from the Socialista Party of Peru said: “Our proposal, however, corresponds with the fundamental 
purpose for what we are here in this assembly: to contribute to give a new Constitution with a new concept of 
democracy, supposing that all groups here decide at least to eliminate two embarrassing burdens of the past: the 
article 53 of the current Constitution [it banned political parties associated with international organizations, such as 
the Communist, the Socialist and the Aprista parties] and the electoral discrimination of illiterates.” (From Diary of 
Debates in Peruvian Congress, author’s translation). 
24 Sánchez, from the Aprista party, argued: “we realize that we have to decide if the right to vote for illiterates is 
facultative or obligatory, if illiterates have the same possibilities to know the responsibility of suffrage than literates 
do, and therefore if they should suffer the same penalties that the literates face. We should think, because there are 
proposals, if the right to vote can be gradual or not. If it can begin, like that of women, in municipal elections, o if it 
can be postponed, as it once was in other period.” (From Diary of Debates in Peruvian Congress, author’s 
translation). 
25 Salazar, from the rightist conservative Partido Popular Cristiano, said: ““They have the right, according to a 
scientific and a democratic point of view, to exercise their rights…[but] They are not prepared to choose a position 
with responsibility in an electoral process; therefore, because they are more than a million three hundred thousand 
citizens in 1980, according to statistics from the National Planning Institute, they could be a deciding group and they 
may lead the country, not to what all Peruvians aspire, a progressive and responsible country that soon can leave the 
crisis we face, but they may be a double-edge sword and contribute to the climax of chaos.” (From Diary of Debates 
in Peruvian Congress, author’s translation). 
26 Napurí, from a leftist party, argued: “the debate seems to be on principles...when it actually is based on a calculus 
of who would benefit with the vote of illiterates…the APRA [Aprista party] would benefit with the vote of illiterates 
because they have historical connections…with the mass in general and with certain groups of the peasantry in 
particular. The PPC [a rightist conservative party], obviously, does not have possibilities to get a part of this 
electoral share because they are a new organization, with no connections of this kind and then the votes of illiterates 
do not go to this political party…Acción Popular [a centrist party] does think that they can gain in this domain, 
	 57 
Compulsory voting was barely debated in this Constituent Assembly. Legislators 
assumed this electoral rule by default and they thought it benefited the country because high 
turnout means representativeness of elected authorities.27 As a result, Peru inaugurated a new 
democratic period with a new Constitution that ruled universal suffrage and compulsory voting.28  
The history of Bolivia and Peru exhibited tortuous paths for full enfranchisement. 
Oligarchic elites were able to delay this reform, but it meant an accumulation of social tensions, 
that finally exploded in a form of a revolution or a military coup that overthrew conservative 
elites from power. In both countries, the indigenous population was the group most affected with 
the participatory restriction, particularly in Peru where an indigenous movement did not emerge. 
The four countries examined up to this moment are a convenience sample that tests two 
of the four cells in this model. I argue that that these two cells are the main portion of this 
argument because they are related to the different paths countries followed: one in which 
countries expanded the franchise and later implemented compulsory voting, and the other in 
which countries first enacted compulsory voting and years later they passed a franchise 
expansion. Thus, both cells include countries that currently have both electoral rules. However, 
Latin America currently observes countries that do not implement both, but just universal 
suffrage and not compulsory voting (f.i. Colombia). In an effort to further test this theoretical 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
because the architect Belaúnde Terry [a former president of this party] walked from side to side of the country and 
because they have built ties; they think they can have a chance of getting the vote of illiterates.” (From Diary of 
Debates in Peruvian Congress, author’s translation). 
27 Representative Pareja Paz-Soldán said: “Compulsory voting is a right, it is a duty, it benefits the country because a 
representative elected by 80% or 90% of participation of the electorate has higher autonomy and he is actually a 
representative of the popular will.” (From Diary of Debates in Peruvian Congress, author’s translation). 
28 Peru still had some excluded groups. This Constitution did not bring the vote to the military and the members of 
the police. Later amendments modified this Constitution and the military and members of the police are currently 
allowed the right to vote.  
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framework, I expand the model to four new countries in the next section, in which I provide 
initial evidence to place them in one of the four cells in the model.  
 
Expanding the Model to Other Countries 	
Reviewing a number of illustrative cases, I find that Argentina is a clear example when 
emerging disenfranchised groups faced still powerful elites and so this country exemplifies 
scenario A. Uruguay is a case where a contentious scenario was activated, but factions of the 
elite agreed electoral reforms in order to prevent an escalation of social tensions. This country is 
an example in the middle between scenario A and B. In Uruguay, elites were not extremely 
divided and they did not want to cede all the power. Disenfranchised groups, in turn, were 
powerful but they accepted a negotiation in Uruguay. Hence, conditions were the same and the 
outcome was similar, while changed was the process by which Uruguay arrived to this outcome. 
Uruguay prevented a conflict and dealt with differences by institutionalized means. 
Bolivia and Peru fit the scenario C, in which disenfranchised groups could not pose a 
revolutionary threat, consequently franchise expansions were not implemented and compulsory 
voting was a measure to stop intra elite disputes. So, this electoral rule did not mean full 
participation in this context, but it meant a way to organize electoral competition and rotation in 
power and finally to modernize elections only for the oligarchic group. It was a modernization 
for only the conservative elite. From its implementation, this electoral rule was a default option 
in several constitutions enacted later. This equilibrium could not be maintained for a long time 
and finally social pressures exploded in a form of a revolution, as Bolivia’s 1952 insurrection, or 
a military coup, as Peru’s 1968 coup. Finally, after several decades, franchise expansions to 
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illiterates were implemented in these two countries. When a franchise expansion accompanies 
compulsory voting in these countries, they finally mean (almost) full participation. The 
expansion of the franchise changed the electoral map in these countries and has further 
consequences. For instance, Del Aguila (2009) associates this massive growth of the electorate 
with the crisis of the national party system in Peru and the emergence of regional parties and 
outsiders. 
A question is whether this argument can be extended to other countries in the region. 
Here, I provide some evidence that gives some indications on how other countries in the region 
may fit this theoretical framework. Brazil’s history, for instance, resembles Peru’s. Until 1930, a 
period called the First Republic matured in this country, one in which a traditional elite from 
rural states, controlled by local coroneles –rural bosses, dominated the political landscape. 
Electoral fraud was common in this period. For example, factions of the elite illegally introduced 
votes of illiterates, non-existent, and deceased persons in their favor (Love 1970). This was a 
period of instability and violence. As Love (1970) states “Such instability arose from divisions 
among the political elite (based primarily on regional cleavages) and occasionally from 
dissatisfaction among military officers, many of whom were recruited from non-elite strata” (13). 
After the 1930 Revolution of Getulio Vargas, fueled by urbanization and industrialization 
in Brazil, the balance of power changes in favor of new unrepresented urban groups in addition 
to a still powerful traditional elite in rural states. In this context, compulsory voting was 
legislated in 1932. I hypothesize that this electoral rule was enacted with the goal to assure 
reasonable non-violent elections. In Brazil, compulsory may work as an instrument to provide 
representativeness to both rural coroneles and urban authorities. In addition, I propose that 
enfranchisement for illiterates was not legislated because this group did not have a strong party 
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to represent their interest. The continuation of the power of coroneles provides some evidence of 
the weakness of illiterates, mostly people from rural areas. In 1962, the presidential elections 
marked the consolidation of the urban sectors and parties. From the sixties, some voices in the 
Parliament began to discuss the vote for illiterates; however, the Congress was still dominated by 
rural interests and so, enfranchisement for illiterates had to wait 25 years more and finally it was 
legislated in 1988. In sum, Brazil presented a scenario with factions of the elite in dispute and a 
weak group of illiterates with no power and representation. 
Ecuador, in turn, since independence, experienced a conflict among factions of the elite: 
trade-oriented liberal forces of the coastal area, the conservative landowners of the mountain 
region, and military caudillos (Nohlen and Pachano 2005). This equilibrium came to an end after 
the Revolución Juliana in 1925, in which a group of reformist young officers installed a civilian 
government and enacted broad social legislation, including the first extension of suffrage to 
women and also compulsory voting in 1929 (Quibell 2002). However, extensions of the 
franchise did not include illiterates. The Partido Socialista, formed in 1926, and the Partido 
Comunista, formed in 1931, represented rising urban blue-collar workers, not people from rural 
areas, mostly peasants. 
Political instability characterized the period from 1925 to 1948 in Ecuador. A series of 
coup d’états took place and the situation got worse after the defeat in the war with Peru. In 1945, 
an additional effort to modernize the elections was made and “the Supreme Electoral Court 
(Tribunal Supremo Electoral) was created as an institutional base to ensure an effective electoral 
process” (Nohlen and Pachano 2005: 366). Finally, a military dictatorship began in 1972 and 
lasted until 1979, when Ecuador transited to democracy and enacted the right to vote for 
illiterates. Similar to the case of Peru, illiterates had to wait several years to have the right to vote 
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because they did not have a strong party to represent their interests. Moreover, compulsory 
voting was legislated in the thirties in both countries as a part of several measures to modernize 
elections. However, military interventions and several economic and political crises prevented a 
stable competition among factions of the elite in Ecuador. 
Thus, Brazil and Ecuador followed a sequence in which compulsory voting was 
legislated before universal suffrage. In Brazil, compulsory voting arrived in the Constitution of 
1932 and the right to vote for illiterates in 1988. Ecuador went to a similar path. This country 
legislated compulsory voting for literate persons aged 18 to 65 in 1929 and years later they 
introduced the right to vote for illiterates, mostly quichua people, in 1978. According to the 
theoretical frame in this chapter, compulsory voting should have been introduced as a measure to 
modernize elections, to impede electoral violence and fraud, and to provide a reasonable 
competition among contentious factions of the elite, and universal suffrage should not have been 
introduced because opposition groups could not pose a severe threat. 
Colombia, on the other side, seems to be a country closer to Uruguay’s path. This country 
established universal male suffrage in 1936 for all citizens older than 21, and legislators in 
Colombia did not discuss the introduction of compulsory voting until recently. According to this 
chapter, we should expect a consensual agreement among factions of the elite in a moderate 
contentious scenario, as Uruguay’s path. In Colombia, after a period of Conservative hegemony, 
in which Liberals suffered electoral arbitrariness, and after the Guerra de los Mil Días (War of 
the Thousand Days), the two parties reached a settlement to prevent conflicts and seek mutual 
tolerance in 1890 (Posada-Carbó 1997). From this period, several measures were introduced to 
modernize elections: representation of minorities, direct presidential elections, but not an 
extension of the suffrage for illiterates in national elections. Jaramillo and Franco-Cuervo (2005) 
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mention that “This and other measures enabled new social sectors to integrate into the political 
system.” (296) An open franchise was allowed only in second-order elections. However, as time 
passed, these restrictions were often ignored. Posada-Carbó (1997) notes that “social pressures to 
widen the franchise…was generally absent from not only Colombia but most other Latin 
American countries, for one simple reason: large segments of the popular sectors, particularly in 
the urban areas, were already in possession of the vote.” (259) Moreover, Colombia in this 
period did not observe class struggles. As Uruguay, the absence of class conflict was due to the 
multiclass nature of the Liberal and the Conservative parties. Their social bases were similar, yet 
Liberals had more influence in urban cities and Conservatives in rural areas. Thus, both 
characteristics, the agreement between parties and their multiclass nature, favored the gradual 
inclusion of the universal suffrage, finally legislated in 1936, and the absence of compulsory 
voting in Colombia, despite the diffusion of this electoral rule in the region. 
In Chile, voting and registration were voluntary for literate men. Compulsory voting was 
legislated in 1964, but only for those allowed to register: literate men and women. Illiterates 
were an ample majority; more than two-thirds of adult men (Colomer 2004) but they did not 
have representation. The parties that were supposed to represent them did not do so. Valenzuela 
(2004) says “the Chilean left, including the very first set of labor movement leaders, never 
pressed for an abolition of the literacy requirement. Hence, they did not see this limitation as one 
that affected their voting potential” (64). Further, Nohlen (2005) notes that Chile from 1932 to 
1973 was a stable political system despite this country experienced severe political disputes. 
Power circulated and presidents in this period represented all political parties: liberals, radicals, 
Christian democrats, and independents from left to right. At the end, the right to vote for 
illiterates arrived in the early seventies, but due to the Pinochet’s military coup, illiterate people 
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could not exercise the right to vote until the 1989 elections. In sum, Chile may be an example of 
a cartel of elites that circulated power among them and prevented the rise of parties representing 
disenfranchised groups. Thus, Chile may be an example of the scenario where the status quo 
remains.  In some sense, this scenario is also the starting point from which Bolivia, Peru, 
Argentina, and Uruguay transited to a new situation, i.e. the status quo before the critical 
juncture. 
Table II.3 presents an initial assessment of the place of some Latin American countries 
according to this framework. It shows the conditions, the expected institutional outcome and the 
countries that fit these expectations. In addition to Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, and Bolivia that I 
explain deeply in this chapter I offer a place for Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, and 
Chile. 
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Table II.3. Four Scenarios from the Interaction of Elites and Disenfranchised Groups for 
Latin American Countries 
Disenfranchised group 
Elite 
Powerful and Organized  Divided due to conflicts 
among factions 
Powerful, pose a valid threat Scenario A: Change to 
franchise expansion and 
compulsory voting at the same 
time  
Argentina 
Uruguay 
Scenario B: Change to 
franchise expansion and then, 
years later, compulsory 
voting, if any 
Colombia 
Venezuela 
Weak, cannot pose a valid 
threat 
Scenario D: Continuation of 
the status quo (neither 
franchise expansion nor 
compulsory voting) 
Chile and status quo before 
reforms in other countries 
Scenario C: Change to 
compulsory voting and then, 
years later, franchise 
expansion 
Bolivia 
Peru 
Ecuador 
Brazil 
 
Conclusion 	
The argument in this chapter focuses on a period in Latin American countries at the 
beginning of the twentieth century when pressures for social changes emerged, including 
electoral reforms, such as franchise expansions and compulsory voting. I propose that this 
context was a critical juncture in each country, in which oligarchic elites had to decide whether 
to reform or to maintain the status quo. According to the literature, elites may or may not opt for 
franchise expansions, depending on the strength of new parties representing disenfranchised 
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groups to pose or not to pose a severe threat and also on the coordinating capacity of the ruling 
parties. 
If elites are in trouble and disenfranchised groups are powerful, the most likely outcome 
is the implementation of only a franchise expansion. If elites are still powerful to negotiate to 
keep some power, they implemented compulsory voting as a rule to balance the electoral playing 
field, agitated after the implementation of a franchise expansion. 
When disenfranchised groups could not pose a revolutionary threat, a franchise expansion 
was less likely because elites did not need to include emerging groups of the population. If elites 
are powerful, the status quo prevailed, but if they are divided due to factional disputes, 
compulsory voting was implemented as part of a series of reforms intended to stop violence and 
fraud in elections and so as a rule to secure a reasonable competition among contentious elite’s 
factions. Once an institutional arrangement was selected, it persisted as a default option. 
Birch (2009) mentions that compulsory voting was introduced as a measure to improve 
the democratic quality of the electoral process. In this chapter, I relate this institutional outcome 
to a particular scenario: when divided elites face weak disenfranchised groups. Further, she also 
mentions that the introduction of compulsory voting was also likely in a context where 
established right-wing parties face newly-enfranchised workers. Here, I propose two outcomes 
depending on the strength of elites. If they are strong, they could negotiate and the final outcome 
is the implementation of a franchise expansion and compulsory voting. However, if they were 
weak and could not negotiate, compulsory voting was not legislated. Thus, this chapter 
encapsulates previous explanations and enriches our understanding about the origins of 
compulsory voting in Latin America. 
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This region has recently observed some cases in which lawmakers propose to change or 
have already changed electoral rules in their countries. For example, Chile changed from 
voluntary registration and compulsory voting to automatic registration and voluntary voting. 
Public opinion and political elites in this country are currently discussing to come back to 
compulsory voting. As mentioned before, representatives in Colombia are considering changes 
to compulsory voting. In Peru the debate about the change from compulsory to voluntary voting 
emerges frequently in electoral times. This chapter highlights the strategic considerations of 
political actors to agree with or to oppose a change in the institutional status quo. Thus, while 
this chapter focuses on explaining the nature and sequence by which electoral reforms 
concerning franchise expansion and compulsory voting were implemented initially in the Latin 
American region, it also makes a contribution by highlighting the relevance of strategic 
considerations, which likely explain the historical institutional paths toward these types of rules 
in other countries and, as well, are relevant to understanding the voices arguing for and against 
contemporary changes in the electoral regulation. 
This chapter focuses on the origins of this electoral rule in Latin America. The next 
chapters move on to the consequences of compulsory voting. Specifically, chapter III explores an 
intended consequence of compulsory voting: an equalization of electoral participation across 
socioeconomic and political groups. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
III. SHIFTING RATIONALES: DETERMINANTS OF VOTER TURNOUT IN 
COMPULSORY VERSUS VOLUNTARY VOTING COUNTRIES IN LATIN 
AMERICA 	
Introduction 	
In most countries around the world, citizens are asked to vote in regular democratic 
elections to select presidents, legislators and any number of subnational officials. In countries in 
which voluntary voting is the norm, vote-eligible adults have the liberty, at least from a legal 
point of view, to decide whether to vote or to abstain. In countries with compulsory voting rules, 
however, the decision to vote is influenced by the potential of facing sanctions if a citizen 
abstains. Because most vote-eligible citizens want to evade penalties, they will go to the polls at 
a higher rate than in countries that do not threaten citizens with punishments for not voting. If 
more people are going to the polls, then an expectation in countries with compulsory voting is 
that this rule may significantly reduce differences in electoral participation. For example, the 
difference in electoral participation between wealthy and poor people may vanish. Tingsten 
(1937, mentioned in Lijphart 1997) affirms that “the probability of differences in voting turnout 
is smaller the higher the general participation is” (2). Based on this notion, politicians, policy-
makers, and political scientists assume that mandatory voting can eliminate participatory gaps, 
and in consequence this electoral rule moves countries closer to the ideal of full participation. 
This is important, as the act of compelling individuals to vote is thought to homogenize the pool 
	 68 
of voters, so that political representation and influence is more equally distributed across 
different segments of the electorate. 
Yet, it is not clear precisely how or to what extent this electoral rule alters the decision to 
go to the polls or abstain, and therefore it is unclear how or even whether it affects differences in 
the composition of the electorate. To address whether compulsory voting reduces or eliminates 
differences in electoral participation and of which type, I attempt to answer this question: how 
does the decision to vote or abstain vary for citizens who live in countries with voluntary voting 
versus those who live in countries with compulsory voting? Building on the rational calculus of 
voting paradigm, I assess variables related to the four key dimensions of the rational choice 
calculus of voting paradigm: costs, benefits, the probability of casting a decisive vote, and duty. 
This chapter contributes to the study of compulsory voting by providing strong evidence 
that compulsory voting diminishes in a greater extent political differences than socioeconomic or 
civic-minded differences in electoral participation. This rule exerts an equalizing effect for 
variables related to the benefits of voting. For example, this rule eliminates the difference in 
electoral participation between partisans and non-partisans and between those who campaigned 
for a candidate and those who did not. It also affects variables related to the costs of voting and 
to the sense of duty. For example, it diminishes the gap between older citizens and younger 
citizens and it lowers the difference between those with high levels and those with low levels of 
internal efficacy. 
These findings are relevant because they indicate that compulsory voting is effective at 
selectively reducing differences in electoral participation but it is far from perfect. Finally, these 
results indicate that there are groups in the society that are reluctant to push to the polls and so 
they require alternative strategies. Of particular note is the case of young people for whom the 
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penalties established in compulsory voting systems do not establish enough incentives to 
equalize their participation. This situation raises the question of whether negative incentives –
penalties - are the ideal motivators of turnout, or whether legislators should also think in positive 
incentives –rewards - to increase participation of these disadvantaged groups. Also of interest is 
the case of older citizens (those older than 66 years old) who are more likely to vote than those 
younger than 66 in voluntary voting systems. This finding might indicate high levels of duty 
among these citizens. Probably, levels of duty are high enough to exceed the costs involved in 
the act of voting and the relatively low benefits expected in this activity, and so they decide to 
turn out. 
In brief, this chapter proposes, first, to test the impact of compulsory voting on the 
composition of the electorate, with a particular focus on Latin America, a region with 
considerable variation in the application of compulsory voting rules. Second, it examines 
whether and to what extent compulsory voting changes the rational calculus of voting. In 
particular, I analyze whether compulsory voting is more effective in reducing socioeconomic, 
political, or civic-minded differences in electoral participation. To test these hypotheses, I 
develop hierarchical models, in which I use individual-level variables, country-level variables, 
and cross-level interactions to provide the most empirically rigorous test possible for my 
expectations. I obtain robust results across three rounds of the AmericasBarometer surveys. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first part briefly presents the rational calculus of 
voting paradigm and discusses how components of the calculus of voting vary across electoral 
systems. Then I derive hypotheses about differences in the calculus of voting between voluntary 
voting and compulsory voting systems. The second part introduces data and methods that I use to 
test these hypotheses. I test these expectations using the 2010, 2012 and the 2014 rounds of the 
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AmericasBarometer survey by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).29 In the 
following section, I present the results of a series of logistic and hierarchical logistic models. 
Finally, I summarize the results and discuss the implication of the findings. 
 
Theoretical Framework 	
The rational calculus of voting model assumes that each individual voter is able to decide 
whether to vote or to abstain. If individuals vote it is because they calculate low costs and (at 
least relatively) high benefits, because they have an elevated sense of duty, and/or because they 
estimates that their vote would have a reasonable probability of being decisive for the election 
outcome. If they abstain they do not receive any punishment for not voting. Thus, the decision to 
vote depends on costs, expected benefits, the probability of casting a decisive vote and the 
citizens’ sense of duty; each of these is a component within the standard utilitarian model of 
turnout.30 
Yet, this branch of the literature has concluded that voting is not rational, given that costs 
(the C-term) exceed benefits (the B-term) that are weighted down by the infinitesimal probability 
of casting a decisive vote in mass elections. Since its original formulation (Downs 1957; Tullock 
1967), research has focused on each component of the calculus of voting in a series of efforts to 
salvage voters’ rationality. 
Trying to solve this paradox, Downs raises the notion that not voting is costly for 
democracy and that voting introduces long-term benefits from participation. Later, Riker and 																																																								
29 Data and questionnaires can be found at: www.lapopsurveys.org. 
30 The standard rational calculus of voting formula is: U = p*B –C, where U is the utility from the act of voting, p is 
the probability of being decisive, B denotes the expected benefits if my preferred candidate wins, and C are the cost 
involved in the act of voting. 
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Ordeshook (1968) modify Downs’ equation and introduce the sense of duty (the D-term) into the 
calculus as an additive term.31 They conceptualize the sense of duty as related to the citizen’s 
internal satisfaction of carrying out their civic duties32 —a reward for the act of voting and being 
part of a political community, regardless any utilitarian benefit. 
In this standard model of turnout, the state (or any other institution) does not interfere in 
the individual decision to vote. Citizens are not punished if they do not fulfill their civic duties. 
However, there are many countries in the world where the state promotes voting via conditional 
negative incentives: monetary fees or civic restrictions in case a citizen fails to vote. An evident 
question arises: how does the rational calculus of voting change in countries with compulsory 
voting? And, if it changes, what component of the rational calculus of voting does compulsory 
voting alter? 
 
The Calculus of Voting Under Voluntary and Compulsory Voting Systems 	
The literature has not taken many steps to examine the microfoundations of compulsory 
voting (see a balance, e.g., Blais 2006). Previous research on turnout in Latin America uses 
compulsory voting as an independent variable in models of electoral participation at the 
aggregate level. From a neo-institutional perspective, this branch of the literature has defined 
three dimensions that influence voter turnout: socioeconomic factors, the institutional 
arrangement, and the political environment (Altman 2007; Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; 
Pérez-Liñán 2001). These models indirectly refer to the rational calculus of voting. For example, 																																																								
31 The equation is: U = p*B –C + D. 
32 They mention, for example, “the satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting”, “the satisfaction from 
affirming allegiance to the political system”, “the satisfaction from affirming a partisan preference”, “the satisfaction 
of deciding going to the poll” and “the satisfaction of affirming one’s efficacy in the political system” (28) 
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much of the focus to date on electoral turnout has been on factors related to socio-economic 
status, which it is a characteristic assumed to be related to the costs of voting. Given that these 
individuals otherwise turn out to vote at lower levels in voluntary voting settings (Dalton 1996; 
Lipset 1963; Powell 1986), some have argued compulsory voting offers an attractive institutional 
remedy to fix the problem of inequality in electoral participation and influence (Lijphart 1997). 
Wealth is not the only socioeconomic characteristic that influence turnout and that might 
introduce inequalities in participation in voluntary voting systems. Research has also focused on 
education as a determinant of turnout, because less educated people face a higher cognitive 
barrier to participate; and so, compulsory voting should also be an equalizing force in this case. 
Similarly, other socioeconomic characteristics less inspected in the literature may demarcate 
other inequalities in participation. For example, young people, older people, women, and those 
who live in rural setting turn out to the polls at lower levels in countries with voluntary voting, 
and consequently compulsory voting should also equalize participation among these groups. 
Education and age have not only been associated with the costs of voting, but also with 
the citizens’ sense of duty. Scholars have found that more educated citizens exhibit higher levels 
of sense of duty than their less educated counterparts (Achen 2012; Bowler and Donovan 2013).  
Further, duty is a factor of age: measures of duty increases in older cohorts (Rallings and 
Thrasher 2007). Thus, these variables are indicators of both of the dimensions of the rational 
calculus of voting. 
Why would compulsory voting eliminate these differences in electoral participation?  
Panagopoulos (2008) argues that mandatory voting introduces a new term in the calculus of 
voting: the cost of abstention, which is a penalty for not voting with certain probability 
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determined by the enforcement.33 If poor people, illiterates, young, and older citizens face higher 
material and cognitive costs to cast a ballot in voluntary voting countries, they should increase 
their rate of participation in compulsory voting countries because they prefer to avoid the cost of 
abstention. In reality, though, it may not be the case that penalties established in compulsory 
voting systems completely shift the calculus of those at lower levels of socio-economic status, 
and so perhaps compulsory voting would not equalize participation at the end. Actually, 
Panagopoulos (2008) finds that turnout depends on levels of penalties. Thus, in some countries, 
penalties may not be high enough to change the calculus of voting for some groups of voters 
towards a decision to vote. Further, Singh (2011) provides evidence that variables associated 
with the costs of voting and with duty (age, income, education) do not lose statistical 
significance in countries with compulsory voting systems in a sample of 36 countries in the 
world. Similarly, research in Latin America finds that differences among socioeconomic groups 
in compulsory voting countries persist and are statistically significant (Maldonado 2011). 
Therefore, if costs in voluntary voting introduce differences in electoral participation, it is not 
clear whether the cost of abstention has a full equalizing effect in compulsory voting systems 
across socioeconomic groups. This chapter will test this hypothesis. Empirically, I examine 
whether those expected to turnout in lower levels to the polls in voluntary systems – that is, those 
with less wealth, those with less education, younger and older citizens, and those who live in 
rural settings – are more apt to turn out in compulsory voting systems. 
In this rational calculus of voting framework, costs are not the sole determinant of voter 
turnout; benefits, the probability of casting a decisive vote, and duty also matter. The literature 
has barely worked with these dimensions to explain voter turnout in Latin America. Fornos, 																																																								
33 Kato (2008) also introduces the notion that compulsory voting introduces a new term into the rational calculus of 
voting. He adds the possibility that there could be sanctions for not voting and inducements for voting.  
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Power, and Garand (2004), for example, include the salience of elections in models of turnout. 
This variable is related to the probability of casting a decisive vote in the rational calculus of 
voting. Similarly, Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita (2013) define three dimensions that affect 
the propensity of voting: resources, networks, and motivation. The latter includes variables that 
may be associated with the benefits of voting, such as party identification, and with the citizens’ 
sense of duty, such as satisfaction with democracy. 
Hence, how do benefits and duty change when voting is mandatory? This chapter also 
proposes to evaluate whether compulsory voting diminishes or eliminates differences related to 
these dimensions. According to the standard model, those who expect fewer benefits and those 
who exhibit low levels of duty are less likely to vote, and these differences should create unequal 
turnout when voting is an option and not an obligation. Consequently, following Lijphart’s 
reasoning, these differences in turnout may also create gaps in electoral participation. 
Surprisingly, the literature has scarcely dealt with changes in these terms of the rational calculus 
of voting across types of systems. Carlin and Love (2015) is a recent attempt to evaluate the 
behavior of some variables across electoral systems. They propose that voting is less 
psychologically demanding when voting laws ease electoral participation, and then, empirically, 
party identification, for example, should lose explanatory power in models of electoral turnout in 
compulsory voting systems. Their expectation is similar to the one proposed here: compulsory 
voting should reduce the effect of variables that explain voter turnout in voluntary voting 
systems. However, there are differences. I place these expectations within the rational calculus of 
voting paradigm and I propose these variables may lose explanatory power just because more 
people are going to the polls. Another prior attempt to examine how socioeconomic, political, 
and attitudinal variables change between types of countries is found in Seligson et al. (1995) who 
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find that individual-level political variables are stronger predictors of voter turnout when 
participation is low, but these variables have much less effect when turnout increases. 
Thus, this chapter also proposes to assess the relevance of aspects that increase the stakes 
that individuals perceive in a given election, factors linked with the benefits of voting: those who 
identify with a party, those who have tried to convince others to vote for a different candidate or 
party, and those who have campaigned for a candidate or party. I also evaluate whether 
compulsory voting is effective at reducing differences in participation by variables related to 
citizens’ civic characteristics, variables associated with the sense of civic duty in the calculus of 
voting paradigm, for example support for democracy, system support, and internal efficacy.34 
These are meaningful turnout gaps. For example, partisans are more likely to support less 
moderated positions on certain issues than are non-partisans (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). If 
partisans are more likely to cast a ballot, elections could produce more polarized results. Further, 
if less motivated citizens are less likely to cast a ballot, this could generate a vicious circle in 
which they do not participate and consequently politicians fail to pick up their voices, and then 
they may feel unrepresented, and finally they may prefer to ‘exit’ to the political system, in 
Hirschman's (1970) terminology. Given that compulsory voting rules increase turnout, it should 
also help to eliminate these gaps. 
Yet, if compulsory voting is not likely to wipe out differences in electoral participation 
by socioeconomic groups, would it eliminate differences by political groups or by civic 
characteristics?  Do variables related to the benefits of voting and to citizens’ sense of duty lose 
significance in compulsory voting systems? In the next section I empirically test whether and to 																																																								
34 Internal efficacy has been found to be a strong predictor of citizens’ sense of duty. Below I explain how they are 
related. 
	 76 
what extent compulsory voting laws reduce the effects of correlates of voter turnout (related to 
the costs, benefits, and duty) in Latin America. 
 
Methods and Data 	
To answer the question of whether compulsory voting diminishes or eliminates 
differences in electoral participation, I use data from the 2010, 2012 and 2014 waves of the 
AmericasBarometer surveys for 18 countries in the region. Each survey uses a nationally 
representative sample of voting-age citizens and includes a core section of comparable questions 
that are identical from country to country.35 I use the following question as the dependent 
variable: 
VB2. Did you vote in the last presidential elections of [year]?  
(1) Voted [Continue]   
(2) Did not vote [Go to VB4NEW]    
(88) DK [Go to VB10]                     (98) DA [Go to VB10]       
|__|__| 
 
In countries with a ballotage36, that is, a second round of voting if the first round returns 
for the leading candidate do not cross a certain threshold, this question asks for the respondent to 
report their voting behavior for the first round. In the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey, 76.5% 																																																								
35 Countries included are: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and Dominican Republic. I am 
excluding the USA and Canada. Also excluded are Caribbean countries: Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Belize, and Suriname. 
36 Most countries in Latin America conduct a second round of elections when no candidate obtains a certain 
threshold of votes, commonly 50%. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, Dominican Republic 
and Uruguay require more than 50% of votes to win in the first round. Argentina requires more than 45% or more 
than 40% with a difference of 10% with respect to the second place. Ecuador and Costa Rica require more than 
40%. Nicaragua requires more than 40% or more than 35% with a difference of 5% with respect to the second place. 
Mexico, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela do not have second round. 
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reported having voted in the last presidential election, but results show significance variation 
across countries, ranging from Venezuela where 91.5% reported having voted, to Colombia 
where 60.8% reported having turned out. In the 2012 sample, 78.8% of respondents reported 
having voted in the last presidential election and this percentage varies from Peru where 90.6% 
reported having voted, to Honduras where 50.7% reported having turned out. For the 2010 
round, 76.4% reported having voted and it goes from Uruguay (93.5%) to Costa Rica (58%).37 
Table III.1 shows a comparison of actual turnout and reported turnout in each country in 
the 2014 AmericasBarometer surveys according to the type of system. There are differences 
between actual turnout (the one registered in each country´s electoral institution) and reported 
turnout. Empirically, research finds over reported turnout in postelections surveys (see Selb and 
Munzert 2013). In some cases, I find sub reported turnout, but most of them show a small 
difference. A particular case is Bolivia where reported turnout is 18.4 percentage points smaller 
than official turnout. A reasonable explanation is the time passed between the election and the 
survey. In Bolivia, the 2014 AmericasBarometer asked for the 2009 presidential election, so it 
passed more than four years and citizens might have forgotten their electoral behavior. 
As a key point in my argument, I have hypothesized that the components of the rational 
calculus of voting vary depending on whether it is a country with a voluntary voting system or a 
country with compulsory voting laws. To create an indicator of compulsory voting in Latin 
America, I rely on previous measures (Singh 2014) but change some classifications based on a 
few rules. I have distinguished three categories: countries with voluntary voting, countries with 
compulsory voting with no sanctions, and countries with compulsory voting that enforce 
sanctions in their legislations. 																																																								
37 See Appendix 2 for figures that compare reported turnout by country in 2014, 2012 and 2010. 
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In order to classify Latin American countries, I reviewed their Constitutions and Electoral 
Codes. The basic distinction is between voluntary and compulsory systems. To be classified as 
mandatory, it is necessary that the electoral code says voting is an obligation – in other words, it 
is not enough if it says that voting is a duty (“deber” in Spanish). For example, I have coded the 
Dominican Republic as a country with voluntary voting because its constitution establishes the 
vote is “a citizen’s right and duty” and that voting is “personal, free, direct, and secret” 
(Constitución Política de la República Dominicana, Article 208). Its electoral code does not 
mention that voting is obligatory.38 I have classified Honduras as a country with compulsory 
voting with no sanctions because its constitution says voting is “universal, obligatory, equal, 
free, direct, and secret” (Constitución Nacional de Honduras, Article 44, emphasis added), but 
its electoral code does not establish penalties for non-voters. Countries in which their 
Constitutions mention that voting is obligatory and in which their Electoral Codes stipulate 
sanctions for abstention are coded as having compulsory voting with enforced sanctions. A broad 
explanation of this classification is found in the chapter I. 
The data (either official turnout or reported participation) show higher rates of 
participation in countries with compulsory voting with enforced sanctions than in countries with 
compulsory voting with no sanctions or countries with voluntary voting. However, these 
differences cannot be attributed only to the type of electoral system because there are other 
factors at work, such as the relative wealth of the country. Models in this chapter seek to isolate 
the effect of compulsory voting controlling for the effect of standard covariates.  
																																																								
38 This classification differs from IDEA’s, which is the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance and that provide knowledge to democracy builders, including classifications of electoral systems. This 
institution classifies Dominican Republic as a country with compulsory voting with no sanctions. 
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Table III.1. Official Turnout, Reported Turnout and Difference by Country and Type of 
Electoral System in 2014 
Country Official Turnout 
Reported 
Turnout 
AB 
Difference Type of System Mean turnout 
Mean 
Reported 
Turnout 
Guatemala 69.4% 72.3% 2.9% Voluntary 65.1% 73.20% 
El Salvador 55.3% 74.6% 19.3% Voluntary 
  Nicaragua 73.9% 69.5% -4.4% Voluntary 
  Panama 74.0% 70.1% -3.9% Voluntary 
  Colombia 49.3% 60.8% 11.5% Voluntary 
  Chile 49.4% 67.8% 18.4% Voluntary 
  Venezuela 79.7% 91.5% 11.8% Voluntary 
  Dominican 
Republic 69.8% 78.7% 8.9% Voluntary 
  Mexico 63.1% 74.9% 11.8% Compulsory with no sanctions 65.3% 74% 
Honduras 61.2% 74.6% 13.4% Compulsory with no sanctions 
  Costa Rica 68.2% 72.3% 4.1% Compulsory with no sanctions 
  Paraguay 68.5% 74.2% 5.7% Compulsory with no sanctions 
  
Ecuador 81.1% 92.2% 11.1% 
Compulsory with enforced 
sanctions 85.1% 82% 
Bolivia 94.6% 76.2% -18.4% 
Compulsory with enforced 
sanctions 
  
Peru 83.7% 84.8% 1.1% 
Compulsory with enforced 
sanctions 
  
Uruguay 89.9% 84.7% -5.2% 
Compulsory with enforced 
sanctions 
  
Brazil 81.9% 76.9% -5.0% 
Compulsory with enforced 
sanctions 
  
Argentina 79.4% 77.2% -2.2% 
Compulsory with enforced 
sanctions 
  Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP and IDEA International 
In a strict sense, countries with compulsory voting are those with enforced sanctions. 
Countries with compulsory voting with no sanctions can be named as countries with symbolic 
compulsory voting. These countries are closer to countries with voluntary voting, but they still 
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differ because they enshrine the ideal of an obligation to vote in their Constitutions and Electoral 
Codes. Further, people in countries with symbolic compulsory often know their Constitutions say 
voting is mandatory, but they are unsure if there are sanctions. From informal conversations with 
people in Honduras, for example, citizens say they prefer to act as if the Electoral Code 
establishes penalties for not voting. 
In this chapter, I propose to group independent variables together according to the 
dimensions of the rational calculus of voting. I have found indicators of each of these 
dimensions. For the cost component, given that elections are, almost certainly, a low-cost low-
benefits act, I identify those potential voters who face higher barriers to participation as they are 
comparatively more affected even by low economic and cognitive costs.39 However, age and 
education are not only related to the costs of voting, but also to the sense of civic duty.  
To tap these barriers, I use indicators for illiterates40 (3.5% in 2014, 4.1% in 2012, and 
3.4% in 2010) and for those in the lower socioeconomic classes41 (41.5% in 2014, 42% 2012, 
and 41.6% in 2010). I include two indicators related to age; one for young people (between 16 
and 25 years old42, 21.1% in 2014, 23% in 2012, and 25.5% in 2010)43, and other for older 
people (older than 66 years, 8.7% in 2014, 8.3% in 2012, and 7% in 2010). I also include 
																																																								
39 Blais (2000) uses a tailored question that is worded as follows: “Do you find it very easy, somewhat easy, 
somewhat difficult, or very difficult to get information to decide how to vote?” Here I use socioeconomic variables 
that are standard in the literature (see Carlin and Love 2015; Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2013; Sanders 1980). 
40 The survey asks for respondents to report their years of schooling. I define illiterates as those who report none. 
41 They include those who are in the first and second quintiles of wealth. 
42 Four countries allow people younger than 18 to vote: Nicaragua, Ecuador, Brazil, and Argentina. In Ecuador, 
Brazil, and Argentine, voting is voluntary for people between 16-17 years old. 
43 The AmericasBarometer includes people who did not have the legal age to cast a ballot when the last presidential 
election took place. For example, the last presidential election in Mexico when the AmericasBarometer was fielded 
in 2012 was in 2006. Thus, because legal age to cast a ballot is 18 years old in Mexico, those who were between 18 
and 24 at the time of the survey could not vote in the 2006 election. They may respond ‘I did not vote’ in the survey 
when they really were not allowed to vote, and therefore they may artificially augment the proportion of true 
abstainers. In this chapter, I have excluded in the following models those who were not allowed to vote when the 
election took place. 
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indicators for women (51.5% in 2014, 50.8% in 2012, and 51.5% in 2010), and for those who 
live in rural settings (26% in 2014, 29% in 2012, and 26.6% in 2010). Sanders (1980) identifies a 
similar set of variables when he builds an index of the C-term based on rural residency, 
educational level, income, and length of residence in the community.44 
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) measure the benefits of voting through a dichotomous 
variable that taps whether the voter cares about the election’s results. Similarly, Blais (2000) 
gauges this term of the calculus of voting with a question that asks how important it is to the 
respondent which party wins the election. Sanders (1980) uses party affiliation and interest in the 
campaign to build an index that measures the B-term. In this chapter, I use indicators that 
identify individuals for whom electoral results may be more relevant. I include a measure of 
party identification (36.3% in 2014, 31.9% in 2012, and 32.9% in 2010)45, a measure that taps 
whether respondents have worked for a campaign (8% in 2012 and 10.8% in 2010)46, and a 
measure that gauges whether respondents have tried to convince others to vote for a party or 
candidate (14.9% in 2012 and 29.2% in 2010).47 
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) argue that the D-term includes five kinds of satisfaction: 
satisfaction derived from compliance with the ethic of voting; satisfaction derived from affirming 
allegiance to the political system; satisfaction derived from affirming a partisan preference; 
																																																								
44 In this chapter, I use separate variables for the variables related to costs, benefits and duty given the low values of 
the Cronbach’s alpha for the combination of these variables into an index for each dimension of the calculus of 
voting. For example, the Cronbach’s alpha for variables related to the cost dimension is 0.18 in 2014 and 0.17 in 
2012, for variables related to the benefits is 0.44 in 2012, and for variables related to the sense of duty is 0.39 in 
2014 and 0.42 in 2012. 
45 The question is worded as follows: “VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?” 
46 The question is worded as follows: “PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral 
campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] election of [year]?” This 
question was not included in the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer. 
47 The question is worded as follows: “PP1. During elections times, some people try to convince others to vote for a 
party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate?” This question was 
not included in the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer. 
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satisfaction derived from deciding to go to the polls, and satisfaction derived from affirming 
one’s efficacy in the political system. Further, they mention that the duty battery was dropped 
from the ANES because it was strongly correlated with a sense of political efficacy. Some 
scholars have tapped this concept using tailored questions related to voting as a duty, whether 
duty is important to preserve democracy, and whether a respondent would feel guilty if they had 
not voted (Blais 2000; Blais and Achen 2010; Blais and Young 1999).48 In this analysis, I rely on 
three indirect indicators of duty. Two are related to the satisfaction derived from affirming 
allegiance to the political system: support for democracy (average score=0.70 on a 0-1 scale in 
2014 and 2012, and 0.71 in 2010)49 and system support (average score=0.52 in a 0-1 scale in 
2014, 0.52 in 2012, and 0.54 in 2010).50 One is related to the satisfaction of affirming one’s 
efficacy in the political system: internal efficacy (average score=0.49 on a 0-1 scale in 2014, 0.47 
in 2012, and 0.49 in 2010), which is highly correlated in the ANES with measures of civic duty, 
according to Riker and Ordeshook.51 
Electoral competitiveness has been used as a measure to tap the probability of casting a 
decisive vote in the rational calculus of voting paradigm (Blais 2006; Panagopoulos 2008; Singh 
2011), because when elections are defined by a narrow margin, each vote has a higher 
probability of affecting the outcome of an election and consequently individuals have a higher 
propensity to go to the polls. I measure the closeness of elections as the difference between the 																																																								
48 In the next chapter, for instance, I will use tailored questions to tap the citizens’ sense of civic duty. 
49 The questionnaire includes the following question: “ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have 
problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this 
statement.” This question was asked on a 1-7 scale and was recoded into a 0-1 scale. 
50 System support is an index based on five questions related to evaluation of whether courts guarantee a fair trial, 
whether respondent respect political institutions, whether the respondent think basic rights are protected in his 
country, whether the respondent feels proud of living in his country, and whether the respondent supports the 
political system in his country. All these questions were asked on a 1-7 scale and were recoded into a 0-1 scale. 
Next, an index was created. I recoded this index into a 0-1 scale. 
51 This question was worded as follows: “EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of 
this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?” It was collected on a 1-7 scale and recoded 
into a 0-1 scale. I have also recoded it into a 0-1 scale in this analysis.  
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leading two candidates in the first round of the last presidential election in each country included 
in the 2010 (from 0.56% to 40.3%), the 2012 (from 0.56% to 37.8%) and the 2014 (from 1.36% 
to 37.8%) rounds of the AmericasBarometer surveys. This measure was then logged to avoid 
bias from outliers. 
A potential concern is that reported turnout is measured after the voting behavior took 
place. In some cases, elections occurred several years before the AmericasBarometer asks 
respondents to report on their turnout. This may introduce unintentional misremembering. The 
result may be that individuals erroneously report having voted in prior elections when they have 
not done so. To mitigate the time concern, I have replicated these models using only respondents 
from countries in which elections were held in the last three years and the results are similar to 
those presented here.52 
 
Results 	
Effects of Costs, Benefits, and Duty on Turnout by Type of Country 	
I begin with basic models that have turnout as the dependent variable and individual-level 
variables that tap the costs, benefits, duty components and country fixed effects (not shown, but 
available upon request) as predictors, using logistic regression techniques. Results for these 
models are shown in the Appendix 4 and they are in the expected direction. Those who face 
stronger barriers to participation are less likely to vote, as expected, except for women and older 
citizens, whom I hypothesized to be less likely to vote. From these variables, it is worth noting 																																																								
52 See Appendix 6 for results using the 2014, 2012, and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer in this restricted 
sample. 
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the highly negative substantive effect of being young in the likelihood of turning out. The 
difference in predicted probabilities between young people (between 16 and 25 years old) and 
others (more than 25 years old) is -17.7% in 2014, -31.8% in 2012, and -29.9% in 2010. On the 
contrary, I find that older citizens are more likely to vote than those younger than 66 years old. 
The difference goes from 7.4% in 2014 to 7.7% in 2010. This last result is consistent with 
previous research in Latin America (Altman 2007; Seligson et al. 1995) and also consistent with 
the idea that older citizens exhibit higher levels of duty, a fundamental predictor of turnout. 
Coefficients for variables related to the benefits of voting (party identification, persuasion 
and campaigning) are all positive and statistically significant in these rounds of the 
AmericasBarometer. From these three variables, party identification and campaigning have the 
strongest effects. Further, variables related to duty seem to have smaller effects than variables 
related to the benefits of voting. The coefficients for support for democracy and internal efficacy 
are positive and statistically significant, yet their effects are relatively small. These results also 
indicate that those who feel they understand the most important political issues are more likely to 
turn out than those who do not. 
An initial comparison of the differences in conditional effects between types of systems 
involves to split the sample of countries in two by dichotomizing the compulsory voting 
variable53, where countries with no sanctions are coded as countries with voluntary voting54, and 
then to compare the coefficients and expected discrete changes between types of countries. I 
expect to observe smaller or null effects on countries with compulsory voting. 
																																																								
53 Countries with compulsory voting with enforced sanctions in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, 
Peru, Chile, and Uruguay. Chile changes from voluntary registration and compulsory voting to automatic 
registration and voluntary voting in 2012. 
54 Countries with voluntary voting in Latin America: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, 
Panama, Costa Rica, Colombia, Paraguay, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. 
	 85 
Detailed results from these models are in the Appendix 5 for the three rounds of the 
AmericasBarometer surveys. As a summary, here I present a balance of results in Table III.2.  
Table III.2. Summary of result from Models Splitting the Sample of Countries 
Variable Result 
Illiterates Unexpected results 
Lower class CV diminishes bias 
Rural CV vanishes bias 
Woman No bias 
Young citizens CV diminishes bias 
Older citizens CV vanishes bias 
Party identification CV diminishes bias 
Persuasion CV diminishes or vanishes bias 
Campaigning CV diminishes bias 
Support for democracy Not clear results 
System support No bias 
Internal efficacy CV vanishes bias 
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
The results indicate that compulsory voting rules are effective at reducing gaps in 
electoral participation, but this rule does not eliminate all differences in electoral participation. 
Mandatory voting seems to be more effective at reducing gaps with respect to variables related to 
the benefits of voting. It is also effective at reducing differences with respect to the costs of 
voting, but some results are contrary to expectation; and this electoral rule seems to be not so 
effective at vanishing gaps with respect to the sense of duty, except for internal efficacy. 
The reduction in the gaps in electoral participation is marginal in the case of the lower 
class. For example, the difference between people at the lower class and others decreases from -
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2.6 percentage points in countries with voluntary voting to -1.7 percentage points in countries 
with compulsory voting. Decreases are noteworthy with respect to party identification and 
campaigning, where two-digit differences plummet to one-digit gaps. Finally, with respect to 
respondents’ sense of civic duty, internal efficacy seems to fulfill expectation of advocates of 
compulsory voting. Differences between those high and those low in internal efficacy vanish in 
compulsory voting systems in all rounds.  
These models are informative, because they test differences between groups (young 
people versus older people, illiterates versus educated individuals, and so on) in each type of 
system. This approach allows me to compare the coefficients and predicted probabilities; 
however, these models are not appropriate to clarify whether the difference in differences 
between these two types of systems is statistically significant for each variable. For example, 
these models indicate that the difference between young people and older people decreases from 
39% in voluntary voting systems to 21.2% in compulsory voting systems in 2012. Yet, we do not 
know whether this decrease is statistically significant. In the same manner, Table III.2 shows that 
the difference between the lower class and others decreases from 3.3% to 1.7% in 2012, but it is 
likely this decrease would not be statistically. 
A formal statistical test of whether there are significant differences between countries 
with voluntary voting and countries with compulsory voting requires the use of hierarchical 
logistic models in which individual-level variables (the same used in previous models), two 
country-level variables (compulsory voting and closeness of elections), and cross-level 
interaction terms between each individual-level variable and compulsory voting are included. If 
the interaction term between the indicator for young respondents and the country-level indicator 
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for compulsory voting is statistically significant, for example, it would indicate that the decrease 
(from 39% to 20.7%, according to results from split subsamples) is statistically significant.55 
Table III.3 presents the results for hierarchical random-intercept logistic models for the 
2014, 2012, and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer survey with all individual-level 
variables from previous models, two country-level variables (closeness of elections and 
compulsory voting), and interactions terms for each individual-level variable and the indicator 
for compulsory voting. 
																																																								
55 Table III.2 uses a dichotomized compulsory voting variable, but Table III.3 uses a three-fold classification of 
compulsory voting. 
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Table III.3. Individual-level and Country-level Determinants of Voter Turnout in Latin 
America, 2010 and 2012 
 2014 2012 2010 
Individual-level    
Illiterates -0.087 
0.116 
-0.374** 
0.118 
-0.032 
0.134 
Lower class -0.154** 
0.049 
-0.168** 
0.057 
-0.146** 
0.055 
Rural 0.214** 
0.056 
-0.083 
0.063 
0.006 
0.068 
Woman 0.073 
0.048 
0.059 
0.057 
-0.013 
0.055 
Young citizens -0.989** 
0.058 
-0.727** 
0.075 
-0.490** 
0.071 
Older citizens 0.323** 
0.092 
0.281* 
0.111 
0.397** 
0.130 
Party identification 0.910** 
0.057 
1.102** 
0.074 
1.015** 
0.067 
Persuasion 
 
0.429** 
0.096 
0.089 
0.067 
Campaigning 
 
1.330** 
0.165 
0.853** 
0.112 
Support for democracy 0.080 
0.088 
0.142 
0.100 
0.433** 
0.096 
System support 0.074 
0.115 
0.417* 
0.132 
0.103 
0.128 
Internal efficacy 0.510** 0.412** 0.185** 
	 89 
0.085 0.097 0.097 
Country-level    
Closeness of elections -0.033 
0.129 
0.124 
0.178 
0.152 
0.165 
Compulsory voting 0.622** 
0.148 
0.704** 
0.183 
0.503** 
0.191 
Cross-level interactions    
Illiterate x CV -0.146 
0.131 
-0.111 
0.147 
-0.305* 
0.194 
Lower class x CV -0.058 
0.044 
-0.063 
0.050 
-0.044 
0.044 
Rural x CV -0.189** 
0.052 
0.001 
0.058 
0.054 
0.058 
Woman x CV 0.045 
0.043 
0.033 
0.049 
-0.004 
0.043 
Young x CV -0.222** 
0.050 
-0.023 
0.060 
-0.176** 
0.054 
Older x CV -0.327** 
0.078 
-0.246** 
0.092 
-0.162 
0.089 
PID x CV -0.066 
0.054 
-0.208** 
0.068 
-0.164** 
0.058 
Persuasion x CV 
 
-0.101 
0.082 
-0.027 
0.050 
Campaigning x CV 
 
-0.433** 
0.134 
-0.284** 
0.091 
Support for democracy x CV 0.133 0.173* -0.022 
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0.081 0.089 0.078 
System support x CV -0.080 
0.107 
-0.061 
0.117 
0.144 
0.102 
Internal efficacy x CV -0.191* 
0.079 
-0.228* 
0.088 
-0.116 
0.078 
Constant 0.800** 
0.353 
0.110 
0.531 
0.126 
0.462 
Random effects parameters    
Std Dev. (constant) 0.196 
0.068 
0.344 
0.118 
0.393 
0.133 
Number of observations 24,507 22,165 24,246 
Number of countries 18 18 18 
Prob > chi2 <.001 <.001 <.001 
** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
 
Results for the individual-level variables are similar to those obtained in previous 
analysis for voluntary voting countries. In the 2014 round, I find consistent results for those in 
the lower class, for young citizens, older citizens, for party identification, and for internal 
efficacy. In this wave, the coefficient for rural is positive and statistically significant and it 
indicates that all else equal rural inhabitant are more likely to turn out to vote than urban 
residents, when compulsory voting is zero, i.e. in voluntary voting settings. However, this result 
is not robust. In other rounds, this variable turns negative but not significant. 
The coefficients for young citizens are negative and statistically significant in all three 
rounds. They indicate that the young people are significantly less likely to vote in voluntary 
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voting systems. On the contrary, the coefficients for older citizens are all positive and significant. 
They indicate that older citizens are more likely to turn out in voluntary voting countries. 
The coefficients for party identification, persuasion, and campaigning display the same 
pattern: positive and significant. They indicate significant differences in electoral participation in 
voluntary voting systems. The same occurs with internal efficacy. These results are consistent 
with results from split samples. 
Regarding country-level variables, closeness of elections is not statistically significant in 
any model. This result indicates that turnout is independent of differences between the two 
leading candidates in the first round of the last presidential elections. In contrast, as expected, 
compulsory voting is positive and statistically significant in the three models. To test whether 
compulsory voting increases turnout, I calculate predicted turnout by levels of compulsory 
voting for the 2014, 2012, and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer surveys.56  
The following figures display a monotonic increase in turnout, as compulsory voting is 
stricter. According to the results, the difference in predicted turnout between countries with 
voluntary voting and countries with enforced compulsory voting is around 15-20 percentage 
points, all else equal, and this difference is statistically significant in two rounds of the 
AmericasBarometer survey. These results are consistent with previous research about the impact 
of compulsory voting on electoral participation (see, e.g. Jackman 2001). 
																																																								
56 I have also performed these models using the dichotomous compulsory voting variable and results are similar. I 
prefer to use the three-fold variable to show how turnout decreases monotonically. Predicted probabilities include 
only the fixed part of the equation.  
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AmericasBarometer 2014 AmericasBarometer 2012 
  
AmericasBarometer 2010 
 
Figure III.1. Predicted Turnout by Levels of Compulsory Voting, 2014 -2010 
 
The cross-level interactions are mostly not statistically significant, except for rural 
residents, young and older citizens in the 2014 wave, for older citizens in the 2012 wave, and for 
illiterates in 2010. These coefficients are negative and statistically significant. 
The negative sign of the cross-level interaction for rural and compulsory voting indicates 
that compulsory voting significantly decreases the gap between rural and urban inhabitants. 
Along the same line, the coefficients for older citizens are as expected; the negative sign of the 
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cross-level interaction term means that compulsory voting reduces the gap between citizens older 
than 66 years old and those younger than 66 years old. In voluntary voting countries, older 
citizens are significantly more likely to vote, but this difference diminishes in countries with 
compulsory voting rules. In contrast, the negative sign of the cross-level interaction for young 
people and compulsory voting indicates that compulsory voting augments the differences 
between young and older citizens, as previous results also indicate. This last conclusion is 
contrary to expectations. Thus, differences within electoral systems exist, but differences 
between electoral systems are not undistinguishable from zero in many cases, i.e. compulsory 
voting does not reduce significantly socioeconomic differences in electoral participation. Given 
that age and education are also related to the citizens’ sense of duty, I conclude that compulsory 
voting does not reduce differences with respect to this dimension of the rational calculus of 
voting either. 
From the cross-level interactions between components of the benefits of voting and 
compulsory voting, having tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate is not 
statistically significant. Party identification is statistically significant in the 2014 and 2012 
rounds and the coefficients are in the expected direction. The sign of the coefficient for party 
identification is positive and it indicates a significant difference between partisans and non-
partisans in voluntary voting systems. When compulsory voting increases (to countries with 
compulsory voting with no sanctions and to compulsory voting with enforced sanctions), the 
coefficient reduces its impact, as the negative sign of the coefficient of the interaction term 
indicates. It means that the difference between partisans and non-partisans becomes smaller and 
it could even vanish in countries with enforced sanctions. 
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The interaction between having campaigned for a candidate or a party and compulsory 
voting is also statistically significant and the coefficient is negative, as expected. This means that 
the difference between those who campaigned and those who do not is smaller in compulsory 
voting countries and it could vanish in countries with enforced sanctions. I obtain similar results 
using the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer survey. 
With respect to variables related to the sense of duty, results show that, contrary to 
expectations, the coefficient for the cross-level interaction between support for democracy and 
compulsory voting and between system support and compulsory voting are positive and 
statistically significant in the 2012 round. They indicate higher differences between those who 
support democracy and those who do not and between those who support the system and those 
with do not in compulsory voting systems in comparison with voluntary voting systems. 
However, these results are not robust. The coefficients of these interactions are not statistically 
significant in the 2014 and 2010 rounds. 
The cross-level interactions between internal efficacy and compulsory voting are negative 
and significant in the 2014 and 2012 rounds. They indicate that the difference in turnout by 
levels of internal efficacy changes between electoral systems in the expected direction. The 
negative signs indicate that the differences diminish when the variable that gauges compulsory 
voting changes from voluntary to enforced mandatory voting. 
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The following figures present the calculated predicted probabilities for the most robust 
findings; those related to party identification and campaigning, variables related to the benefits of 
voting in the rational calculus of voting.57 
																																																								
57 In the Appendix 7 I present predicted probabilities for all cross-level interactions for the 2014 and 2012 rounds of 
the AmericasBarometer. They show graphically how the gap in electoral participation is similar among types of 
countries for the cross-level interactions that are not statistically significant. 
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Figure III.2. Figures for Predicted Probabilities of Party Identification and Campaigning 
for the 2014-2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer Surveys 
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As mentioned before, the gap between partisans and no partisans diminishes from 
countries with voluntary voting to countries with compulsory voting and no sanctions, and to 
countries with compulsory voting and enforced sanctions. Because the confidence intervals 
overlap in countries with enforced sanctions, it means that this gap vanishes in this type of 
countries. I arrive at a similar conclusion with respect to campaigning. The difference between 
those who campaigned and those who did not diminishes and it vanishes in countries with 
enforced sanctions. 
In sum, results from these hierarchical models indicate that gaps with respect to 
socioeconomic and political variables exist within voluntary electoral systems and that 
compulsory voting slightly diminishes these gaps in some cases (in particular with respect to the 
gap between older citizens and those younger than 66 years old), but that it does not eliminate 
them. In particular, compulsory voting seems to fulfill expectations with respect to variables 
related to the benefits of voting. The difference in electoral participation between those who 
identify with a party and those who do not is significant in voluntary voting systems. 
Compulsory voting seems to eliminate this gap, equalizing levels of turnout between both 
groups. I arrive at a similar conclusion with respect to campaigning: compulsory voting equalizes 
participation between those interested in the campaign and those who are not interested. 
However, this electoral rule does not equalize participation on the basis of variables related to 
civic duty. Actually, the coefficients for the interaction terms between support for democracy 
and compulsory voting and between system support and compulsory voting are positive and 
statistically significant in 2012, which is contrary to expectations. The coefficient for the 
interaction between internal efficacy and compulsory voting is negative and significant and it 
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indicates that compulsory voting withers the difference between those with high internal efficacy 
and those with low levels of efficacy in 2014 and 2012, but not in 2010. 
 
Conclusions 	
I propose that individuals’ decisions regarding whether to vote or not to vote are not only 
conditioned by individual characteristics, but also by institutional characteristics. In particular, I 
shed light on the effects of an electoral institution –compulsory voting- on individuals’ voting 
behavior. 
Conceptually, this electoral rule should not only increase participation, but it also should 
eliminate differences in electoral participation. The argument is straightforward: the more people 
participate, the more the electorate is representative of the voting age population. As Lijphart 
(1997) affirms “The democratic goal should be not just universal suffrage but universal or near-
universal turnout” (2). Empirically, this argument implies that the determinants of turnout should 
lose power to explain participation under compulsory voting rules. 
I have classified determinants of turnout in three groups, based on the elements of the 
rational calculus of voting. Socioeconomic characteristics belong to the costs of voting. I find 
that there are differences in participation among socioeconomic groups. However, these groups 
are also related to other dimension of the calculus of voting because age is correlated with levels 
of duty. The most dramatic difference is between young citizens and older citizens. Young 
citizens are significantly less likely to go to the polls, but I also find that this gap remains in both 
types of systems. This finding may be explained because young citizens do not have experience 
to navigate the complexities of the political world. Also, they have not had time to develop a 
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higher sense of civic duty. Because compulsory voting does not eliminate the difference between 
young and older citizens, this raises the question on how to incentivize young citizens to the 
polls. According to these results, penalties for not voting are not enough to change their decision 
towards voting. An alternative might be to incentivize this group via positive incentives, such as 
rewards for voting. 
Further, older citizens are more likely to go to the polls in voluntary voting countries. 
Probably it is due to an elevated sense of duty and to the increasing cognitive resources to 
navigate the political landscape. These characteristics may exceed the costs involved in voting 
and the fact that voting is a low-benefit act and as a result they decide to go to the polls. This 
difference decreases in compulsory voting countries. 
There are also political differences in participation. According to the rational calculus of 
voting, those who expect more benefits if their preferred candidate wins are more likely to go to 
the polls. These differences again should vanish in compulsory voting systems. Empirical results 
support this expectation. In voluntary voting countries, results indicate that partisans and those 
who campaigned for a candidate are more likely to vote, but these differences decrease in 
compulsory voting systems and vanish in countries with enforced sanctions. Changes between 
types of systems are high enough to be statistically significant. Thus, these results indicate that 
compulsory voting is effective at pushing those who do not expect much in the way of benefits 
from elections to the polls, elevating their turnout to levels similar to those observed for citizens 
more involved in the campaign. 
Utilitarian calculations are not the only inducement to turn out. A group of people votes 
in search of intrinsic benefits, related to the internal satisfaction of fulfilling their civic duties. 
	 100 
Duty has been found to be a major predictor of turnout in voluntary voting systems and 
compulsory voting is expected to shrink the difference in participation between those who 
exhibit higher levels of duty and those who have lower levels of duty. Here I measure sense of 
duty using three indirect measures. Among these variables, support for democracy and internal 
efficacy are significant predictors of turnout in individual-level models. Compulsory voting does 
not reduce the differences in turnout by levels of support for democracy, but it increases the gap 
in 2012. It may indicate that compulsory voting is more effective at pushing to the polls those 
with high levels of support for democracy than those with low levels of support for democracy. 
Results for internal efficacy are in the expected direction in a hierarchical model in 2014 and 
2012. In this case, compulsory voting reduces the gap between those with high levels of efficacy 
and those with low levels and it vanishes when it is enforced. 
In conclusion, I have replicated a well-known finding in the literature: compulsory voting 
increases participation and it is more effective at doing so when sanctions are enforced. Further, 
compulsory voting partially fulfills its promises. It significantly reduces important political gaps 
in electoral participation; but it does not eliminate biases with respect to socioeconomic 
characteristics and civic-minded attitudes. 
A potential avenue for future research is whether penalties for abstention interact with the 
determinants of the calculus of voting. The literature has suggested interactions between 
elements of the calculus of voting. For example, Blais (2000) discusses this idea when he runs 
models of voting for those with low levels of duty and those with high levels of duty. He 
concludes that, “B, P, and C do a much better job of explaining the vote among those with a 
weak sense of duty than among those who feel a strong moral obligation to vote” (102). Thus, 
because penalties for not voting introduce a new element in the calculus of voting (i.e., the cost 
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of abstention), it remains to be tested whether this cost affects more those with low levels of duty 
than those with a strong sense of civic duty, and how this relationship changes between types of 
electoral systems. 
Countries with compulsory voting rules establish monetary fines and civic penalties. 
Potentially, monetary fees are more effective at diminishing socioeconomic gaps in electoral 
participation and civic penalties at diminishing gaps with respect to benefits or duty. Because 
countries introduce both types of penalties, this design cannot disentangle the single effect of 
each. Further, the literature has found that levels of monetary fines matter. Thus, an open 
question is whether differences in electoral participation remain because monetary fines are not 
high enough and if so, what would be the level of penalties to erase participatory gaps? This 
question opens a discussion whether penalties are the most efficient way to push citizens to the 
polls. The other side of the same coin is to think in rewards. The literature has discussed the role 
of prizes by draw among those who participate in an election (see a discussion in Kato 2008). 
Actually, some countries institute rewards for certain voters. Colombia, for example, offers 
discounts in tuition at public universities if students vote. 
It also remains to be tested whether these conclusions are robust to the use of tailored 
variables to tap each of the components of the rational calculus of voting. In this chapter, I have 
used indirect measures (but standard in the literature) to gauge the costs, benefits, and the sense 
of duty. Moreover, some of this measures gauge more than one dimension of the calculus of 
voting (age and education, for instance). The use of tailored measures would give a better 
understanding of the behavior of the components of the calculus of voting under different 
electoral systems. 
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Finally, compulsory voting is far from being an atypical electoral institution. It is used in 
a significant number of countries in the world and it is particularly clustered in Latin America 
with varying flavors. In this chapter, I demonstrate that this electoral rule actually increases 
turnout, but it does not completely fulfill its promise of erasing gaps in electoral participation. 
Political scientists, politicians, and policy makers should think of additional or different 
measures to eliminate these gaps and to move countries closer to the ideal of full participation. 
This chapter focuses on a potential positive impact of the implementation of compulsory 
voting: an equalization of electoral participation across socioeconomic and political groups in 
Latin America. However, the literature has also evaluated negative effects of the implementation 
of this rule. The next chapter introduces a new potential negative effect of compulsory voting: a 
decreased citizens’ sense of duty. 
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CHAPTER IV 	
IV. SIDE EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY VOTING: THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
COERCION FOR CIVIC DUTY 	
Introduction 	
In his presidential address to the American Political Science Association, Lijphart (1997: 
1) proposed compulsory voting as a solution to the problem of “unequal turnout that is 
systematically biased against less well-to-do citizens.” The notion is that, by implementing 
compulsory voting, countries will increase turnout in elections and this in turn will mitigate one 
of the longstanding failures of democracy, namely, unequal electoral participation. At first 
glance, Lijphart’s prescription for remedying this problem is supported by the empirical 
evidence; countries with compulsory voting exhibit higher levels of turnout than countries with 
voluntary voting. For example, Birch (2009) finds an average increase in turnout of 13.7 
percentage points after the introduction of compulsory voting and Fornos, Power, and Garand 
(2004) show that in Latin American countries with compulsory voting, turnout is approximately 
20 percentage points higher than in voluntary voting countries. However, the previous chapter 
shows that compulsory voting partially fulfills Lijphart´s expectations. That compulsory voting 
raises turnout is a well-established fact. But, looking beyond turnout, does it have second-order 
effects that may not be as positive? 
Scholars have suggested and debated several second-order effects of compulsory voting 
at the individual and country levels. Some focus on the consequences for electoral outcomes: for 
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example, it is argued that compulsory voting pushes people to vote, those who otherwise would 
be less likely to engage and, because these individuals are systematically different from those 
who voluntarily vote, they are more likely to vote for certain candidates or parties, such as the 
left (Mackerras and McAllister 1999). Others focus on positive effects for the citizenry. On the 
one hand, it has been argued that individuals could feel pressure from a compulsory electoral rule 
to become more informed and to cast a valid ballot. However, the evidence is inconclusive 
(Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 2008) and some even suggesting a negative effect, perhaps because 
individuals may simply cast more blank and invalid ballots (Power and Roberts 1995). Another 
potential positive effect is the degree to which individuals have higher levels of satisfaction with 
democracy as a consequence of having been brought into the fold of the political community and 
electoral processes (Birch 2009). 
In this chapter I draw attention to a distinct potential negative effect of compulsory 
voting: decreased sense of civic duty. Civic duty, for the purposes of this study, is an intrinsic, or 
subjective, motivation to turnout in elections. The argument I develop builds on and extends 
scholarship on the effects of external inducements (rewards and punishments) on individual 
performance and intrinsic motivation. Specifically, I argue that compulsory voting is likely to 
have a negative effect on civic duty. Moreover, I provide reasons to expect that this relationship 
is monotonic, such that the negative effect increases with the magnitude of enforcement. 
Second, I assess whether some individuals are more sensitive to compulsory voting laws 
than others. To answer this question, I draw on research on authoritarianism to argue that those 
high in authoritarian predispositions are more sensitive to threats coming from the environment 
and in consequence experience the obligation to vote as a more severe coercion than people who 
score low in an authoritarian scale. As a result, I expect that those high in authoritarian 
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predispositions will show a steeper decline in levels of citizens’ sense of duty than their non-
authoritarians counterparts, when confronted with compulsory voting rules. 
To test the general theoretical framework as well as these secondary expectations, I make 
use of data from an original experiment conducted in Peru in the summer of 2012 with a 
representative sample of adults from the metropolitan capital area (Lima). The experiment was 
embedded in a face-to-face survey of individuals’ democratic attitudes, and the treatments took 
the form of primes regarding the levels of punishment for non-voting in Peru. 
The empirical results provide support for expectations in some indicators: when people 
are reminded about both punishments, they show lower levels of civic duty in one indicator. 
Moreover, the effect is monotonic: the harsher the punishment, the lower the intrinsic motivation 
to vote in two indicators of duty. Authoritarians also exhibit higher levels of duty in two 
measures. And, finally, by one measure, those high in authoritarian predispositions exposed to 
the harsher treatment exhibit a decline in their intrinsic motivation to vote while those who are in 
the control condition show an increase in their levels of duty, but these results are not robust to 
alternative indicators of duty. 
If compulsory voting decreases civic duty, this is important because it could lead us to 
erroneous conclusions about the condition of a political system. Turnout is a key indicator of 
democratic health, and because, in theory, democracy requires a willing public, declining civic 
duty may ultimately chip away at the public’s interest in and support for more general 
democratic mechanisms. So, if citizens turn out to vote only because they are compelled by 
extrinsic motivation, and not because they are intrinsically motivated to participate, high levels 
of turnout in a country would not necessarily be a sign of a healthy polity, but could instead 
mask the opposite: a hollow democracy. 
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A Theoretical Framework Connecting Compulsory Voting to Civic Duty 	
Civic duty relates to an individual’s belief that turning out to elections is a responsibility 
that should be met by democratic citizens, regardless of the nature of the ballot or race. The 
concept was introduced into political science to resolve a paradox: if citizens only consider their 
own self-interest with respect to the costs of voting, its benefits, and the likelihood of 
determining the electoral outcome, then rationally they should stay home. Yet, citizens do vote, 
and one reason may be that they are motivated to do so because of a sense of civic duty. As a 
subjective motivation to participate, civic duty bears some similarities to other intrinsic 
motivations that can be shaped by punishment and reward systems. In this section, I first expand 
on the conceptualization of civic duty, then apply insights from other disciplines to argue that 
compulsory voting laws should decrease the subjective motivation to turnout, and finally I posit 
that this effect will vary across types of individuals. 
 
Conceptualizing Civic Duty 	
Civic duty provides an explanation for why individuals turn out to vote despite the low 
odds that their single vote will make a difference in an election.  But, what is civic duty? Classic 
conceptions are found in work by Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968). In addressing 
the so-called paradox of voting, Riker and Ordeshook (1968) state that duty is related to the 
internal satisfaction of fulfilling one’s civic responsibilities. They define duty as an intrinsic 
reward for the act of voting and being part of the political community, regardless of any 
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utilitarian benefit obtained. This definition is close to Downs’ idea that people vote even when 
short-term considerations are negligible because they consider maintaining democracy a long-
term interest. The notion is that, if citizens consider the act of voting to be an important feature to 
preserve democracy, they are higher in civic duty and will consequently be more likely to turn 
out to vote. In other words, citizens’ opinion about the importance of voting to preserve 
democracy may be considered as one indicator of the broader concept of civic duty. 
The introduction of the D-term into the rational calculus of voting has been criticized 
because “ethical concerns fit only obliquely into the rational choice tradition, where self-interest 
looms large” (Blais and Achen 2010: 4). In a strict sense, the expected benefits, the costs of 
turning out and the probability of casting a decisive vote are the rational/utilitarian parts of the 
equation. Conditional on the value of these components, a voter obtains consumption benefits 
from the act of voting. The addition of the sense of duty includes a non-utilitarian motivation 
into the equation, from which a voter gets psychological benefits.  
In this chapter, I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic parts of each component of 
the calculus of voting, depending if the locus of action is internal or external to the individual. 
For example, the cost term, a component of the utilitarian part of the equation, can be intrinsic, 
when it is related to the internal characteristics of an individual, for instance her socioeconomic 
status or her educational background. It is extrinsic when costs are not related to a citizen’s 
characteristics. Seasonal factors, such as rain, have been found to affect turnout (Gomez, 
Hansford, and Krause 2007; Knack 1994; Rallings, Thrasher, and Borisyuk 2003). These are 
extrinsic costs to the individual. In the same line, Panagopoulos (2008) introduces the cost of not 
voting in compulsory voting systems. This cost is not related to an individual’s characteristic but 
it is instituted by the state. 
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Expected benefits from voting can also be intrinsic. Downs (1957) conceptualizes the 
intrinsic voting benefit as the one a voter would gain if her preferred candidate wins rather than 
loses. Extrinsic benefits, for their part, are related to benefits that an external actor sets, such as 
when the state institutes a reward for the act of voting. There have been proposals to implement 
policies along these lines in the U.S. (Panagopoulos 2013b) and, in fact, Colombia institutes 
some rewards for certain voters if they go to the polls, for instance, a discount in tuition for 
university students. Vote buying efforts also yield a type of extrinsic benefits because an external 
actor (a party or candidate) determines and administers such bribes. 
The non-utilitarian part of the calculus of voting can also be decomposed into an intrinsic 
and an extrinsic part.  The extrinsic part is associated with the social consequences of voting, for 
example positive feelings of pride for voting and negative feelings of shame for not doing it. In 
this case, people vote because they want social approval and seek to be part of the political 
community and because they also want to avoid social disapproval. Hence, extrinsic motivations 
emerge from others’ scrutiny, which generates individuals’ positive or negative feelings. Under 
this conceptualization, it is a sense of civic duty at large that increases turnout, with the locus of 
action external to the individual (in the eyes of one’s fellow citizens). 
In turn, the intrinsic aspect of the non-utilitarian side of the equation relates to an internal 
satisfaction of fulfilling one’s civic responsibilities. In this case, citizens cast a ballot because 
turning out comports with their internalized norms about how democratic citizens should behave, 
and they seek coherence between their actions and their values. In this case, they would not need 
others’ evaluations to turn out at the polls, and so the locus of action is internal to the individual. 
In both cases, nonetheless, the act of voting is done regardless of any immediate utilitarian 
benefit.  While conceptions of civic duty can vary, at their core they refer to the notion that 
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voting is driven by the individual satisfaction one receives from exercising the democratic right 
to participate in the electoral process. 
In sum, I distinguish between a utilitarian and a non-utilitarian part of the calculus of 
voting. The costs, the expected benefits and the probability of casting a decisive vote are 
elements of the utilitarian side because they are related to the voters’ narrowly defined self-
interest. All these terms can be decomposed into an extrinsic and an intrinsic part, depending if 
the locus of action is on an external actor or on the voter. The non-utilitarian side of the equation 
includes the social pressures to vote –the extrinsic part- and the sense of duty –the intrinsic 
component. 
 
Compulsion and Civic Duty 	
To the degree that civic duty, the intrinsic non-utilitarian part of the calculus of voting, 
reflects individuals’ internalized compulsion to behave in a certain way (to turn out to vote), it 
accords with the more general concept of “intrinsic motivation”. Scholars across multiple 
subfields have studied how external systems of punishment and reward affect both performance 
and intrinsic motivation toward that behavior. Given that compulsory voting establishes a set of 
punishments, it is important to consider how this type of rule affects civic duty. In other words, 
what is the link between rules governing rewards and punishments and motivation to participate 
in the electoral arena? 
One conventional economic view says that incentives, either positive or negative, are 
desirable because they increase performance (expressed in an employee who completes more 
tasks in the workplace or in a student that does more homework in his school). Yet, this view has 
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been debated by research centered mostly in other disciplines, such as psychology, education, 
and management. Those lines of scholarship suggest that monetary incentives can have some 
negative side effects; specifically, they may decrease intrinsic motivation to perform an activity. 
Given that compulsory voting establishes a system of extrinsic incentives around punishment for 
non-voting, this raises the question: are there side effects for citizens’ intrinsic motivation that 
stem from systems of penalization for not voting in compulsory voting countries? 
In considering how these apply to civic duty, I propose that rewards and punishments are 
incentives cast by an external actor: a parent who wants to bribe his child, a teacher who wants to 
motivate students, a boss who wants to incentivize employees, or, as this chapter suggests, a state 
that wants to push voters to the polls through sanctions.58 Each of these types of reward or 
punishment systems – that is, factors providing extrinsic motivations – carries the potential to 
affect the intrinsic motivation to perform an activity. In considering rewards, the balance of 
evidence supports the notion that tangible rewards issued contingent on performance decrease 
intrinsic motivation.59 
When and why would this be the case? According to Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999), 
some rewards work as controllers of behavior while others provide indicators of competence: 
monetary incentives are in the first group and verbal incentives in the second one. When people 
experience rewards as controllers, they feel a change in the locus of control from themselves to 																																																								
58 Panagopoulos (2008) proposes that sanctions in compulsory voting systems affect costs, introducing a cost of 
abstention. Rewards for voting, in turn, can be considered part of the benefits. Both, however, are extrinsic 
motivations. As the literature discusses, extrinsic motivations may interact with intrinsic motivations: an effect that 
is called crowding out. 
59 Considering rewards, Deci (1971)’s seminal work on the subject finds that tangible motivations – monetary 
rewards – negatively affect intrinsic motivation and that non-tangible rewards –reinforcement, verbal praise and 
social approval- increase intrinsic motivation. Since then, scholars have distinguished many other types of rewards, 
for example expected/unexpected or contingent/non-contingent, and have evaluated the effect of them on intrinsic 
motivation (Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett 1973; Podsakoff et al. 1984; Podsakoff, Todor, and Skov 1982).  While 
much of that research finds inconclusive results with respect to the effects of these reward types on intrinsic 
motivation, Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) examine findings in the literature in a meta-analysis of hundreds of 
studies and find support for Deci’s original core expectation. 
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another and consequently rewards affect their perceived self-determination and competence. On 
the contrary, when people take rewards as positive feedback about their performance, they tend 
to increase feelings of self-determination and competence. Bénabou and Tirole (2003) offer an 
alternative explanation. They argue that decision makers in an uncertain context take rewards as 
signals; they infer that they will not enjoy the task because they are paid for doing it and hence 
they will be less motivated to do the task. 
It is an open and debated question whether rewards and punishments are two sides of the 
same coin, whether both increase performance, and whether both decrease motivation. 
Compulsory voting is an electoral rule that establishes, not a reward, but a punishment. This 
punishment is issued contingent on whether the individual votes and it is tangible; as such, it 
contains the same types of contingency and tangibility factors identified as relevant to other 
studies of the effects of reward and punishment systems on intrinsic motivations. If a voting-age 
citizen does not vote –which, in this context, can be considered failing to perform well, the state 
institutes a contingent penalty: a monetary fee or civic penalties (e.g., loss of a right to get a 
passport or to cash check in banks). Deci and Cascio (1972) in fact find that threats of 
punishments work as controllers of behavior –they weaken feelings of competence and self-
determination- and therefore affect intrinsic motivation. However, these results have been 
disputed. For example, Podsakoff, Todor, and Skov (1982) find that punishments do not affect 
performance and satisfaction in the work place and Atwater and Lau (1997) say that research on 
the impact of contingent punishments on recipients’ behavior is not conclusive. Other 
interpretation suggests that fees may undermine prosocial behavior because they reduce the 
extent to which engaging in this kind of behavior signals being a good and altruistic citizen and 
thus monetary fees can reduce the citizens’ willingness and motivation to do good (Kamenica 
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2012). Fines can also have unintended consequences because they change a behavior from the 
realm of social norms to the realm of market exchanges. For example, Gneezy and Rustichini 
(2000) find that when a fine is instituted, parents are more likely to arrive late for picking up 
their kids at school. The argument is that monetizing the penalty legitimizes the behavior and 
makes it easier to swallow than some hazier social norm. Applying this argument to the subject 
at hand, I consider that the institution of a fine for not voting could be perceived to cheapen 
democracy because it changes a prosocial behavior to a market exchange, reducing a glorious 
belief in the preservation of democracy to paying a fine. 
In this chapter, I evaluate whether the threat of punishment established by compulsory 
voting affects citizens’ intrinsic motivation to vote. Prior attempts by political scientists to 
examine external incentives and the vote are mostly non-existent, though an exception is novel 
work by Panagopoulos (2013a), who assesses the effects of tangible rewards (monetary) on 
electoral behavior.60 
Panagopoulos endorses the idea that extrinsic incentives can depress intrinsic motivation. 
To test this expectation, he conducted an experiment that randomly assigned potential voters to 
receive either a postcard with a simple reminder to vote or an offer to receive a financial reward 
in exchange of participation in elections. He finds no significant effects on turnout and concludes 
that “a striking implication of the results I report is that, even when successful, monetary rewards 
do not appear to be notably effective in stimulating voting than many other types of 
interventions” (278). The study is innovative, but it does not observe intrinsic motivation, only 
its net effect on performance. This tendency to use the same construct to capture both motivation 																																																								
60 Other recent work that has commonalities with the ideas in this chapter includes that by Singh (2014), who tests 
whether punishments in compulsory voting countries lead to a higher gap between ‘democrats’ and ‘anti-democrats’ 
in their levels of satisfaction with democracy. He mentions the effect of punishments on intrinsic motivation and 
argues that it leads also to a diminished trust in the legitimacy of the coercer, especially for those negatively 
predisposed towards democracy. 
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and performance is common in research in psychology and economics. For example, Deci tests 
his hypothesis using an activity that is intended to be interesting for subjects –solving puzzles- so 
they may feel intrinsically motivated to do it. He measures intrinsic motivation by performance –
the number of puzzles solved- because both are highly correlated. However, research on 
activities that are not often intrinsically motivating requires distinguishing between performance 
and intrinsic motivation. In a review of the literature and findings, Kamenica (2012) 
differentiates, for example, between paying for an inherently interesting task and paying for 
prosocial behavior. Further, Podsakoff et al. (1984) explore the workplace and discern between 
subordinates’ performance and satisfaction. They mention that when a manager incentivizes a 
group of workers, they may respond by increasing their performance (the amount of job done), 
but decreasing their satisfaction with the job (an attitude more closely related to intrinsic 
motivation), especially when punishments are set. 
Voting can be understood as an intrinsically motivated behavior. If so, performance and 
motivation would both be highly correlated and changes in performance indicate also changes in 
motivation. However, voting can also be seen as an activity that citizens do not necessarily enjoy 
because they would prefer to spend their time in other activities. As such, the difference between 
participation and motivation is theoretically discernible. 
Thus, in the realm of voting, performance and intrinsic motivation are better understood 
and measured as two distinct constructs. In fact, this distinction comprises the core of my 
argument: under compulsory voting, voters may increase in “performance” by turning out at 
higher levels at the polls, but at the same time they may be less intrinsically motivated to do so. 
This implies that intrinsic motivation cannot be only measured as turnout since demotivated 
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people may go to vote for other reasons (especially in compulsory voting countries, but also in 
non-compulsory systems where social pressures or other forces may induce turnout). 
In sum, I argue that the concept of motivation in the literature of rewards and 
punishments is similar to the concept of sense of duty in the literature of the calculus of voting. 
A review of the literature of rewards and punishment indicates that tangible punishments issued 
contingent on performance decrease intrinsic motivation. Given that the state institutes this type 
of punishment over non-voters in compulsory voting systems, I hypothesize that punishments for 
not voting increase performance expressed by more people going to the polls, but they can 
decrease citizens’ intrinsic sense of duty to vote. Given that civic duty can be assessed along 
several different dimensions, I further consider that the threat of punishment for not voting is 
consequential for a variety of indicators of duty. Generally speaking, the expectation is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Citizens exposed to reminders of penalties for not voting will present on average 
lower levels of intrinsic motivation to vote than citizens not exposed to such reminders. 
 
Monotonicity of the Effect of Compulsory Voting 	
When punishments are more severe, I expect to observe a greater decline in the intrinsic 
motivation. Thus, I propose that contingent punishments and motivation show a monotonic 
negative relationship. Panagopoulos (2013a) tests the effects of different levels of monetary 
incentives on voters’ performance and finds a linear but non-substantive effect. Singh (2014) also 
tests for different levels of compulsion and finds a linear, but not perfect, relationship between 
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penalties and the probability of being not satisfied with democracy. Here, I test whether levels of 
punishments display a linear relationship not with performance, but with motivation. 
Hypothesis 2: Citizens exposed to reminders of higher penalties will report lower levels of 
intrinsic motivation to vote than citizens exposed to reminders of lower penalties. 
 
High Authoritarians are More Sensitive to the Negative Effects of Compulsory Voting 	
Classic works define authoritarianism as a predisposition according to which individuals 
need little situational pressure to submit to authority (Altemeyer 1996). This predisposition maps 
onto a dimension from extreme authoritarianism to extreme libertarianism (Stenner 2005). 
Individuals on the authoritarian side are more likely to “escape from freedom”, in Fromm’s 
words, and to obey and conform to authorities to restore order and security disrupted by 
normative threats. Further, certain values characterize authoritarian individuals. For example, 
“authoritarians stress values of self-denial, strong group loyalties, serving others, and putting 
group interests ahead of one’s own, finding fulfillment in work and doing what is right, and 
adherence to strict moral codes” (Flanagan and Lee 2003: 238). Actually, research has found that 
right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is positively correlated with a measure of duty because a 
RWA person is “someone who is keen to follow the instructions of those in positions of power 
and influence” (Heaven and Bucci 2001: 55). Because voting is understood as doing what is right 
and it involves privileging group interests more than self-interest, then people who score high in 
an authoritarian scale should be also more likely to consider voting as a duty.  
Hypothesis 3: Citizens who score high in an authoritarian scale will present on average higher 
levels of intrinsic motivation to vote. 
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Finally, I inspect whether the effect of compulsory voting varies by types of subject. The 
literature on rewards and punishments has not distinguished if this effect varies by type of 
recipient. Research in this field basically divides the world in two groups: those who establish 
rewards and punishments (parents, teachers, employers) and those who receive incentives 
(children, students, employees). But, another line of research in political psychology suggests an 
important division within the second group, by which individuals differ in their sensitivity to 
threats. Sidman (1989, cited in Singh 2014) argues that the effects of coercive mechanisms on 
attitudes and behaviors depend on subjects’ orientations toward the system and that these effects 
are most pronounced for those who are negatively oriented toward the coercer. If so, distinct 
types of citizens may experience rewards and punishments differently. In this chapter, I propose 
that the effect of extrinsic incentives on intrinsic motivation varies by authoritarianism, such that 
more authoritarian citizens, by virtue of being more sensitive to these threats, experience an 
exacerbated decline in their levels of motivation when threatened with punishment. 
 The relationship between threats and authoritarianism has been amply documented 
(Feldman and Stenner 1997; Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas 2005). This line of research, mostly in 
political psychology, has found that those who score high on certain authoritarian measures are 
particularly sensitive to threats coming from the environment. Feldman and Stenner (1997) 
demonstrate that threats activate authoritarian predispositions and these predispositions then 
result in higher expressed authoritarian attitudes, such as negative attitudes toward minority 
groups (see also Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Stenner 2005). This line of research suggests 
that threats generate a gap between authoritarians and non-authoritarians in their opinions about 
sensitive issues. However, this line of argument is not undisputed. In fact, Hetherington and 
Weiler (2009) find support for the opposite relationship. They find that changes over time in 
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expressed authoritarianism are due to changing preferences of those who score lower in 
authoritarian predispositions. 
In the electoral field, Lavine et al. (1999) determine that authoritarian personalities are 
more likely to see a threat message (negative consequences of failing to vote) as having more 
quality –measured by how convincing and persuasive a massage was- than a reward message 
(positive benefits of voting). Therefore, if compulsory voting works as a threat message, it is 
possible that citizens who score high in authoritarianism will perceive this negative message 
stronger in quality (more convincing and persuasive) and so the detrimental effect on their 
intrinsic motivation may be amplified. 
Another expectation, however, is plausible. Citizens who score high in authoritarianism 
may see the state as a proper legal authority and therefore they may be more likely to conform to 
messages from this agent, even threat messages. Extant scholarship tends to focus on threats 
external to the individual’s own government. In this case the threat is coming from the same 
authority and so the imposition of an obligation to vote might not be perceived as a threat 
message, rather it might be understood as a message from an authority that authoritarians should 
follow. As a result, a threat messages from the state may reinforce the compliance with social 
norms among authoritarians and so they may exhibit higher levels of duty. 
While recognizing that empirical research on authoritarians’ reactions to threat has 
produced mixed findings and there are competing interpretations, I hypothesize a higher decline 
in intrinsic motivation among authoritarians than among non-authoritarians when considering for 
whom compulsory voting is made salient. 
Hypothesis 4: Authoritarians exposed to reminders of penalties for not voting will display a 
higher decline in their levels of intrinsic motivation than non-authoritarian citizens. 
	 118 
 
Data and Measurement 	
The data used in this chapter to test these hypotheses come from a survey carried out in 
Lima, Peru –a country with compulsory voting with varying types of enforcement, in which 760 
voting-age citizens were selected using a complex sample design representative of the capital 
city and were interviewed face to face. Peru is a country that established compulsory voting in 
1931 when congressmen proposed the obligation to vote and dictated sanctions for those who do 
not vote. Presently several Latin American countries mention compulsory voting in their 
constitutions or electoral codes; however not all implement mechanisms to enforce this rule. Peru 
not only is part of the group of those countries that implement sanctions, but also is one of the 
countries with the harsher sanctions in the region. In Peru, this rule applies for national and 
subnational elections, for electing the president, members of the congress and subnational 
executives. Also, the electoral law specifies civic penalties: if a citizen does not pay the fine, she 
is not allowed to do several official acts like renew a passport or get access to some social 
services. The author of this dissertation has in fact personally experienced this penalty: while 
living out of the country I failed to vote twice in Peru and, for each time, I had to pay a fine of 
around U.S. $25 before being allowed to renew my passport. 
In this survey in Peru, I introduced an experiment in which I randomly assigned subjects 
to one of three different messages, intending to prime the consequences of not voting: a reminder 
of receiving a monetary fee (N=189)61, a reminder of receiving civic penalties (N=190)62, or a 
																																																								
61 This treatment was worded as follow: “The following questions are about voting. Please remember that voting in 
Peru is compulsory and if you do not vote in an election, you would be subject to a fine of S/ 72 ($ 25).” 
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reminder of both types of penalties (N=193).63 The control group (N=188)64 did not receive a 
reminder of the enforcement. After treatment, respondents were asked questions about whether 
voting is a choice or a duty and a battery of standard questions to measure duty. 
A potential concern of this design is that citizens may be aware of the penalties for not 
voting before treatment. León (2011) finds that citizens in Lima overestimate a perceived fine 
(126.5 soles) close to the fine before the Peru’s electoral reform in 2006 (144 soles), but far from 
current level (72 soles). Hence, when treatments remind citizens that present fine is 72 soles, 
they may be reducing citizens’ perceived fine. However, this design is not only intended to test 
different levels of fines, but to place fines at the top of citizens’ minds, because penalizations for 
not voting are barely salient in non-electoral times. Thus, after treatments, citizens may have 
reduced their expected level of fines, but penalties are salient in their minds. Because levels of 
fines are the same for all citizens living in Lima, I could not prime different amounts, but I varied 
intensity by priming monetary fines, civic restrictions for not voting, or both types of penalties. 
Finally, experimenting with the salience of electoral rules is an option to get causal estimates, 
due to the difficulty of randomizing electoral rules in practice. 
The key dependent variable in this project is an index similar to one developed by Blais 
and Achen (2010) based on two related question about duty. The first question asked respondents 
whether voting is first and foremost a duty or a choice. If they respond duty, then the second 
question asks respondents to evaluate how strongly they feel that voting is a duty, from not very 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
62 This treatment was worded as follow: “The following questions are about voting. Please remember that voting in 
Peru is compulsory and if you do not vote in an election, you would not be allowed to use some state services such 
as getting or renewing a passport or cash checks in banks.” 
63 This treatment was worded as follow: “The following questions are about voting. Please remember that voting in 
Peru is compulsory and if you do not vote, you would be subject to a fine of S/. 72 and you would not be allowed to 
use some state services such as getting or renewing a passport or cash checks in banks.” 
64 The control was worded as follow: “The following questions are about voting.” 
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strongly to somewhat strongly and very strongly.65 I combined these two questions to create an 
index called ‘Levels of duty’ that goes from 0, which means voting is a choice, to 3, which 
means that voting is a strong duty. The average duty is 2 and the standard deviation is 1. This 
measure tries to offer an alternative positive view of voting as a duty. The “non-duty” option 
(voting as a choice) is linked with the freedom to exercise the right to vote or the right not to 
vote. So, if one option is related to choice, the duty option is related to a moral obligation to vote. 
However, I recognize that this measure was developed for a voluntary voting setting. In countries 
with compulsory voting, individuals may think about “duty” (deber in Spanish) as the legal 
coercion to vote. To deal with this possibility, I use alternative measures of duty. 
The questionnaire includes a battery to tap duty from several angles using standard 
questions in the literature. It includes a question to gauge the importance of voting to preserve 
democracy. This variable taps into Downs’ idea that citizens may vote in order to maintain 
democracy, as a long-term benefit. Further, this battery also includes a question to measure if a 
respondent feels guilty if she does not vote, if a respondent thinks her vote is not important 
because many people vote, if a respondent thinks a person who does not care an election should 
not vote, and if a respondent thinks it is not important to vote when her candidate does not have a 
chance to win.66 All these questions were asked with response options on a 1-7 agree/disagree 																																																								
65 The dependent variable was built from two questions. The first was: “DUTY1. Different people feel differently 
about voting. For some, voting is a DUTY. They feel that they should vote in every election however they feel about 
the candidates and parties. For other, voting is a CHOICE. They feel free to vote in an election depending on how 
they feel about the candidates and parties. For you personally, voting is FIRST and FOREMOST a: 1) Duty, 2) 
Choice, 3) Not sure, 88) DK, 99) DA.” The second question was worded as follow: “DUTY1b. [If respondent chose 
“duty”] How strongly do you feel personally that voting is a duty? 1) Very strongly, 2) Somewhat strongly, 3) Not 
very strongly, 88) DK, 99) DA.” 
66 The questions are worded as follow: “Using the following scale, where 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means 
“strongly agree”, to what extend do you agree or disagree the following statements. DUTY2. In order to preserve 
democracy, it is important you vote.” DUTY3. “If I didn't vote, I'd feel guilty.” DUTY4. “So many people vote that 
it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not.” DUTY5. “If a person doesn't care how an election comes out he 
shouldn't vote in it.” And DUTY6. “It isn't important to vote when your candidate or party doesn't have a chance to 
win.” 
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scale and they were rescaled so higher values indicate higher levels of duty. A factor analysis of 
these five variables yields two factors.67 The first factor includes two questions: importance of 
voting to preserve democracy and if a respondent does not vote, she feels guilty. Looking at the 
wordings of the questions, the first factor includes questions related to citizens’ values or 
feelings. The question about the importance of voting to preserve democracy is related to 
citizens’ democratic values. If a citizen is high in democratic values, she probably expresses 
higher allegiance to the political system and so she would consider greater values in this 
question. The question about feeling guilty for not voting is related to citizens’ feelings of shame 
and pride for the act of voting. I combined these two questions to create an index called ‘Duty as 
values and feelings.’ 
The second factor includes the remaining three variables. It comprises questions related 
to negative incentives for voting: too many people voting that my vote is irrelevant, citizens’ lack 
of interest, or low options of being in the winner side. If a person responds that she strongly 
disagrees with these statements, it indicates that she values the act of voting despite these barriers 
and negative incentives, and so it may indicate that she is high in duty. I create an index as the 
mean value of these three variables and it is called ‘Duty as overcoming of barriers.’ While both 
dimensions map onto the definition of sense of duty, it seems that the first factor is capturing 
elements closer related to the intrinsic motivation to vote, the one closer to internal values and 
feelings. 
Following Feldman and Stenner (1997), I measure authoritarian predispositions with 
three questions that ask about child-rearing values (whether a child must obey his parents, 
whether a child must respect the elderly, and whether a child must have good manners). I 																																																								
67 See Appendix 8 for results of factor analysis. 
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combine these three questions to build an index that goes from 0 to 3 where higher values 
indicate more authoritarian predispositions.68 This index has a mean of 2.5 and standard 
deviation of 0.77. 
In the dataset, there were no differences across experimental conditions in age, proportion 
of women, educational level, self-placement in the left-right scale, proportion of Catholics, party 
identification, evaluation of the performance of the president, and proportion who think 
democracy is preferable, all of which was verified by separate t-tests.69 In other words, post-
study diagnostics reveal that the four conditions (three treatment and one control groups) are 
balanced on average on these variables. However, the control condition contains more affluent 
people (6.73) than the combined treatments conditions (6.36) and this difference, though small, 
(0.37 on a 0-10 scale of income) is statistically significant. However, a significant number of 
respondents (140) do not answer the income question and consequently when I include income 
as a control, models lose observations. To prevent this issue, I set those who refused to answer at 
the mean of income and I include a dummy to control for those who refused to report their 
income. Also, the control condition has people with lower authoritarian predispositions (2.42) 
than the treatment conditions (2.59) and the difference (0.17 on a 0-3 scale) is statistically 
significant as well. In what follows, I present analyses with controls for these imbalances. 
 
Analyses and Results 	
																																																								
68 To assess the internal consistency of this index, I determined the Cronbach’s Alpha=0.61. This indicates a 
moderate degree of consistency. 
69 See Appendix 9 for full results of balance check. 
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The following analyses examine whether reminders of penalties for not voting decrease 
citizens’ sense of duty and whether this decrease is monotonic with the intensity of the threat. 
Table IV.1 presents the results for OLS models using the respondents’ three indicators of duty as 
dependent variables and dummies for each treatment group: monetary fees, civic penalties, and 
fees and civic penalties. The control condition is the baseline category. Additionally I include 
controls for income and authoritarian predispositions.70 The incorporation of authoritarian 
predispositions also helps to test hypothesis 3. I use one-tailed tests in the following analyses 
because all hypotheses are uni-directional and such an approach is conventional in experimental 
research (see Kam and Utych 2011). 
First, I examine the results for levels of duty in models 1, 2 and 3 for testing hypotheses 1 
and 2. In the control condition, the average level of duty is 2.07. Those exposed to threats of 
punishments exhibit lower levels of duty, as the negative signs indicate; and the value on duty 
decreases monotonically with the severity of the penalty, from the reminder of monetary fees to 
civic penalties and both. Those exposed to the reminder of the harshest penalty -fees plus civic 
penalties- score 0.15 points lower on average on the duty index than those in the control 
condition. This difference represents a modest but statistically significant decrease of 7% at one-
tailed p<0.09. 
In examining the effect of treatments on the duty as values and feelings and duty as 
overcoming of barriers in models 2 and 3, those in the treatment groups show lower levels of 
duty on average compared to those in the control group. In model 2, using the duty as values and 
feelings, coefficients decrease monotonically with the severity of the punishment, so those 
exposed to the more severe threat score 0.15 points lower on average than those in the control 																																																								
70 The first dependent variable is not strictly continuous variables. I have used OLS models for ease of 
interpretation, but I have also run these models using ordered logit models that deal with ordinal dependent 
variables, such as levels of duty (0-3). Results are substantively similar. See Appendix 10 for results. 
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condition, though this difference is significant only at a generous level (one-tailed p=0.11). In 
model 3, using duty as overcoming of barriers, the coefficient of a reminder of monetary fees and 
civic penalties are both positive, which is contrary to expectations, but they are not significant. 
The sign of the coefficient of a reminder of both types of penalties is negative, but this 
coefficient does not reach standard levels of significance. 
Thus, in considering H1 and H2, these results provide some support for expectations. 
They indicate that when citizens are reminded about penalties for not voting, they experience a 
decline in different indicators of duty. Also, they suggest that when penalties are more severe, 
citizens experience an even higher decline, as the sign and magnitude of the coefficients indicate; 
however, they are not statistically significant at conventional levels, except for the more severe 
treatment in model 1. 
 Authoritarian predispositions are positive and statistically significant in model 1 and 2. 
These results indicate that individuals who score high in authoritarianism are also higher in duty. 
This conclusion provides support for H3 and accords with the literature on authoritarianism that 
concludes that authoritarian people are more likely to follow social norms, for example voting in 
this case. Income is also positive and statistically significant. It means that more affluent people 
display higher levels of duty, as measured by these indicators. Finally, those who refused to 
report their income display lower levels of duty. 
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Table IV.1. Analyses of Reminders of Punishments on Indicators of Duty 
Variables 
Level of 
duty 
(1) 
Duty as values and 
feelings 
(2) 
Duty as overcoming 
of barriers 
(3) 
Reminder of monetary fee -0.06 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.13) 
0.07 
(0.15) 
Reminder of civic penalties -0.09 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.13) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
Reminder of monetary fee and 
civic penalties 
-0.15* 
(0.11) 
-0.15 
(0.13) 
-0.002 
(0.15) 
Income 0.04* 
(0.03) 
0.10* 
(0.03) 
0.18* 
(0.04) 
Authoritarian predispositions 0.15* 
(0.05) 
0.23* 
(0.06) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
Refused income -0.25* 
(0.11) 
-0.11 
(0.12) 
-0.64* 
(0.15) 
Constant 1.53* 
(0.24) 
4.46* 
(0.27) 
3.81* 
(0.32) 
Prob>F 0.003 0.00 0.00 
N 691 701 691 
Table entry is the OLS coefficient with standard error below. 
*p<0.1, one-tailed 
 
The following figures show the fitted values of duty with 90% confidence interval of the 
prediction by treatment for each model. According to these figures, results for model 1 show a 
monotonic decline. As penalties are more severe, we observe a higher decline in levels of duty. 
Model 2 does not show this decline, but those exposed to reminders of both penalties experience 
a significant decline in their levels of duty. Results for model 3 do not show a clear pattern. 
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Figure IV.1. Predicted Values for Levels of Duty and Importance of Voting by Treatments 
and Authoritarianism 	
I next examine Hypothesis 4, which states that the effect of reminders of punishments 
will be higher for authoritarians. To test this hypothesis, I interact each dummy for treatment 
groups with the variable that taps respondents’ authoritarian predispositions. Recall that the 
authoritarian variable goes from 0 to 3, where higher values indicate more authoritarianism and 
that authoritarianism is positively correlated with duty. The models also include income and 
those who refuse to report income as controls. 
Results for levels of duty in Model 4 show that coefficients for treatments and 
interactions are not statistically significant. The authoritarian predispositions index is positive 
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and significant. It indicates that authoritarians have on average higher levels of duty, as previous 
models also show. 
Model 5 shows positive coefficients for reminders of penalties and negative coefficients 
for the interaction terms. The reminder of monetary and civic penalties is statistically significant 
and it indicates that people who is reminded both penalties display higher levels of duty (duty as 
values and feelings) when authoritarianism is zero. The interactions for civic penalties and both 
penalties are negative and statistically significant. Because coefficients for treatments are 
positive, a negative interaction indicates that treatments decrease the gap between those in the 
treatment condition and those in the control group when authoritarianism increases. 
Model 6 mirrors, in the opposite direction, Model 5. In this case, the coefficient of 
reminders of both penalties is negative and statistically significant. This means that this treatment 
reduces levels of duty (duty as overcoming of barriers) when authoritarianism is at its minimum. 
The interaction for this treatment is positive and statistically significant. The combined effect of 
both coefficients indicates that the gap between individuals in the control group and those in the 
treatment group reduces when authoritarianism increases. 
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Table IV.2. Analyses of Reminders of Punishments and Authoritarianism on Indicators of 
Duty 
Variables 
Level of duty 
(4) 
Duty as values and 
feelings 
(5) 
Duty as overcoming 
of barriers 
(6) 
Reminder of monetary fee -0.32 
(0.36) 
0.16 
(0.43) 
-0.29 
(0.51) 
Reminder of civic penalties -0.28 
(0.35) 
0.47 
(0.42) 
-0.52 
(0.50) 
Reminder of monetary fee and civic 
penalties 
0.01 
(0.37) 
0.86* 
(0.43) 
-0.67* 
(0.51) 
Authoritarian predispositions 0.12* 
(0.09) 
0.40* 
(0.11) 
-0.06* 
(0.13) 
Reminder of monetary fee x 
Authoritarian predispositions 
0.10 
(0.14) 
-0.08 
(0.16) 
0.15 
(0.19) 
Reminder of civic penalties x 
Authoritarian predispositions 
0.07 
(0.14) 
-0.22* 
(0.16) 
0.21 
(0.19) 
Reminder of both penalties x 
Authoritarian predispositions 
-0.06 
(0.14) 
-0.40* 
(0.16) 
0.27* 
(0.19) 
Income 0.04* 
(0.03) 
0.11* 
(0.02) 
0.18* 
(0.04) 
Refused income -0.25* 
(0.11) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.62* 
(0.15) 
Constant 1.58* 
(0.29) 
4.02* 
(0.35) 
4.18* 
(0.42) 
Prob>F 0.01 0.00 0.00 
N 691 701 691 
Table entry is the OLS coefficient with standard error below. 
*p<0.1, one-tailed 
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In order to analyze differences between those who score high and those who score low in 
authoritarians for each treatment, Figure IV.2 shows predicted values of indicators of duty by 
treatments and authoritarianism for the cases where I find statistically significant coefficients in 
Table IV.2. The first figure plots the interaction between reminders of both penalties in Model 5, 
the one using duty as values and feelings as dependent variable. The second figure shows the 
same for Model 6, the one using duty as overcoming of barriers as dependent variable. 
 
 
	 	
Figure IV.2. Predicted Values for Levels of Duty and Importance of Voting by Treatments 
and Authoritarianism 	
These results are inconclusive. The first figure shows a declining gap when 
authoritarianism increases for low values of authoritarianism. Actually, when authoritarianism is 
higher than 2, results are as expected. In this area, individuals in the treatment condition exhibit 
lower levels of duty than individual in the control condition. Further, authoritarianism is 
positively correlated with duty for citizens in the control condition, but it is negatively correlated 
for people in the treatment condition. This finding would provide some support for H4. 
However, the second figure shows the opposite conclusion. In this figure, those in the 
control condition score higher in levels of duty than people in the treatment condition when 
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authoritarianism is low and this line is almost flat indicating that those in the control condition do 
not change much with authoritarianism. Those in the treatment conditions exhibit changes. When 
authoritarianism increases, they show higher levels of duty and when it is higher than 2.5, they 
show higher levels of duty than those in the control condition. 
In sum, results indicate that, on average, levels of duty decrease with the harsher penalty 
and they also fall monotonically with reminders of penalties for two indicators of duty. I have 
manipulated levels of penalties distinguishing between monetary fees and civic penalties. 
Probably, monetary fees and civic penalties do not work on their own because actually both are 
jointly applied in Peru. So, people may not respond when only one is mentioned, but when both 
are primed. However, the distinction between monetary fees and civic penalties seems to work 
for monotonicity looking at the magnitude of the coefficients, though they are not statistically 
significant. 
These results, however, mask differences between high authoritarians and low 
authoritarians. Because high authoritarians are a majority of the sample (68.7%), the analysis 
should focus on the region above the mean (2.5) in Table IV.2. In this area, results are in the 
expected direction for the first index of duty as values and feelings, the one that also exhibit a 
monotonic decline with levels of penalties: duty increases with authoritarianism for those in the 
control condition, but it decreases for those in the treatment condition. I would conclude that 
high authoritarians are more sensitive to the threat and so they respond to the treatment and their 
levels of duty decrease. However, results for the second index of duty as overcoming of barriers 
show the opposite conclusion for high authoritarians. In this case, individuals in the treatment 
condition increase their levels of duty, while those in the control condition do not change. In 
balance, results are not conclusive. 
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I also find that those higher in authoritarianism exhibit higher values of duty. These 
results may indicate that authoritarian citizens see voting as a higher duty because they consider 
that state as a proper authority and so they should conform from its mandates. If it were the case, 
then these citizens face two conflicting messages; one in which the message –the fine for not 
voting- is a threat, and the other in which the message comes from a proper authority. This 
ambiguity may explain disagreeing results on the interaction between treatments and 
authoritarianism in Table IV.2. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 	
Participation is a key component of a modern democracy. Freedom House, for example, 
includes the right to vote for distinct alternatives in competitive elections as one criterion for 
building its index. Because electoral participation is normatively desirable for a democracy, 
compulsory voting has been proposed as a rule to increase citizens’ levels of engagement with 
electoral politics. The direct effectiveness of such a rule is supported by ample evidence of 
higher levels of turnout in compulsory systems, but supporters of this electoral rule and 
lawmakers have not considered that mandatory voting might also have some side effects that can 
be counterproductive to the initial expectations of its advocates. This chapter goes beyond the 
direct effect of compulsory voting: the increasing levels of turnout –a positive quantitative effect, 
and evaluates a potential side effect of compulsory voting: a decrease in citizens’ intrinsic 
motivation to turn out –a negative qualitative effect. 
Electoral rules set positive and negative incentives for citizens’ participation. In this case, 
compulsory voting establishes extrinsic tangible negative incentives: a threat of punishment. In 
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line with the psychological view that proposes that extrinsic motivations, such as punishments, 
deteriorate intrinsic motivation, this analysis finds that when citizens are primed with reminders 
of both types of punishments, they experience a decline in in one indicator of the intrinsic sense 
of duty. In his seminal piece, Deci (1971) finds that monetary rewards affect the intrinsic 
motivation to perform an activity. Further, Deci and Cascio (1972) use threats of punishments 
and find parallel results. In this chapter, I apply this idea to the electoral context in countries with 
compulsory voting in which voters experience a threat of punishment if they do not vote and I 
find evidence in support of expectations at the margins. Thus, these results provide somewhat 
support for Deci’s findings about the detrimental effect of extrinsic incentives on intrinsic 
motivation in a different setting. However, one question remains open: are rewards and 
punishments two sides of the same coin in the electoral context? Colombia, for example, 
provides an example of a country that incentivizes some groups of citizens with rewards for 
voting. So, an avenue for future research would be to test whether extrinsic tangible positive 
incentives also affect citizens’ intrinsic motivation to vote. According to Podsakoff et al. (1984), 
I would expect to find even stronger results for the effect of contingent rewards on performance 
and satisfaction; I mean a significant increase in performance: those who are entitled of the 
benefits would exhibit higher levels of turnout, but a relevant decrease in levels of duty due to 
rewards: those who vote mobilized by incentives would show lower levels of intrinsic 
motivation. These hypotheses remain to be tested. 
I also find that a drop in motivation brought about by the threats associated with 
compulsory voting is confined among those who express higher authoritarian predispositions, 
measured through child-rearing values, in one indicator of duty. Unfortunately, results for the 
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other indicator of duty do not corroborate this finding and so these results are similar to mixed 
empirical evidence on the relationships between authoritarian predispositions and threats.  
Compulsory voting is far from being a societal threat, but one view may see it as an 
intimidation that might trigger some levels of anxiety on voters, particularly among those more 
sensitive to this type of threats –authoritarian citizens. If it is the case, a reminder of penalties in 
compulsory voting systems may generate more anxiety and so it may decrease authoritarians’ 
motivation to vote. Other view may see compulsory voting as a rule established by a proper 
authority that an authoritarian person must follow. If it is the case, a reminder of this rule may 
generate more submission with the authority and trigger elevated adherence to this social norm, 
increasing authoritarians’ sense of duty. Mixed results in this chapter may be due to the 
ambiguous message from the state, which sends a threat message –a fine if a citizen does not 
vote, but at the same time the state may be considered a proper authority that authoritarians 
should conform and so its message may increase adherence to the social norm of voting. Results 
in this chapter cannot distinguish between these two options. 
In sum, previous research has found that a sense of duty has a great influence on turnout 
and that elevated levels of sense of duty is a desirable trait of democratic citizens. Thus, a 
declining motivation in compulsory voting systems is unwanted because it may mask a flawed 
democracy as a healthy one. High levels of electoral participation would not indicate engaged 
citizens, but coerced citizens, who, according to these findings, are more likely to be disengaged 
about the electoral process and the democratic system. Hence, compulsory voting increases the 
number of people going to the polls, but at the same time, it might trigger harmful side effects on 
citizens’ motivation, and as a result, this electoral rule leads to higher turnout, but the electorate 
might contain mostly unmotivated citizens. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
V. CONCLUSION: AN ASSESSMENT OF COMPULSORY VOTING 
 
This project has emphasized the fact that compulsory voting has not been studied as 
much as it deserves and so its possibilities and consequences have been rather unclear. Millions 
of citizens are under the compulsion to vote in the world. According to IDEA International, 13% 
of countries in the world have this electoral rule; the largest proportion is found in Latin 
America. In fact, the biggest country having a compulsory voting rule is Brazil, where more than 
150 million voting-age people are compelled to the polls election after election by the threat of 
punishment.71 In spite of the prevalence of compulsory voting, there has been comparatively 
little scholarship on the topic and it has yielded ambiguous empirical evidence with respect to the 
supposed positive and negative consequences of this electoral rule, making it difficult to make a 
reasonable evaluation of compulsory voting. 
The main goal of this dissertation has been to offer scientific responses to three research 
questions that I consider relevant to understand this electoral rule in Latin American 
democracies. The first question I addressed was: (1) What are the factors that explain the origins 
of this electoral rule in this region? Subsequently, I answered the following question: (2) Is 
compulsory voting vanishing the gaps in electoral participation? Finally, I responded to a third 
question: (3) Does compulsory voting have second-order effects on levels of citizens’ sense of 
duty? In this chapter, I offer a summary and a discussion of the dissertation’s most relevant 
theoretical postulates and empirical findings regarding these questions. 
 																																																								
71 See: http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=30#pres. 
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The Nature of Voting 	
To vote or not to vote is an individual decision of private citizens, but the result of 
citizens’ individual decisions is a collective good: the selection of a government and its 
authorities. This characteristic motivates two debates: one is related to whether voting is a right 
or a duty and the other is related to the aggregation of individual decisions and the problem of 
free riding. The first debate involves a discussion about two values to be stressed in a democratic 
polity. On the one side, those who view voting as a right emphasize liberty and free will. On the 
other, those who view voting as a duty stress representation, legitimacy and participation. I 
discussed these issues in the Chapter I of this dissertation and here I present a summary and an 
evaluation. 
A democratic society usually compels citizens to follow social norms. In small societies, 
some social norms may be enforced via societal pressures, for example shame and pride 
mechanisms. In a mass society, however, these mechanisms do not work in the same way. They 
are not enough to guarantee the fulfillment of important social norms, such as the participation in 
the political life. Thus, mass societies need to enforce collective norms in the form of legal 
regulations. For example, state agencies require every newborn to be registered. As Birch (2009) 
says, compulsory voting is one among many of such regulations to enforce social norms. Lijphart 
(1997) adds that compulsory voting means a small decrease in freedom in exchange of solving a 
problem of collective action. 
Democracy is not a non-excludable good because it is provided to all members of a 
society independent if they collaborated or not in their procurement. Accordingly, citizens have 
incentives to “free ride” and to not cooperate by means of their electoral participation –a 
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citizen’s individual contribution to democracy. This is a serious problem because if many 
citizens calculate and decide to free ride, then participate would decline and, as a consequence, 
high abstention could harm democracy. In some countries, if participation is below a certain 
threshold, the election is rendered void. 
On balance, normative arguments in favor of compulsory voting seem to be stronger than 
arguments against it. This electoral rule increases participation, prevents citizens’ free riding and 
entails a small decrease of freedom, similar to reductions on other social norms that citizens 
should fulfill. However, high turnout is not a straightforward indicator of democratic health. The 
effect of compulsory voting on turnout does not mean that countries with this electoral rule 
exhibit higher levels of democratic consolidation. On the contrary, countries that implement 
compulsory voting are often not established democracies. Thus, scholars should not assume that 
“artificially” high levels of turnout equal healthy democracies; rather citizens’ engagement via 
compulsory voting might mask a reality of a hollow democracy, in which citizens are going to 
the polls but they are not involved in the political process. 
 
The Nature of Compulsory Voting 	
Lijphart (1997) recommends two mechanisms to combat low levels of voter turnout: the 
removal of barriers for participation and the implementation of compulsory voting. Moreover, he 
proposes that low turnout means unequal turnout that is biased against poor citizens. Because 
compulsory voting increases participation, it should also help to reduce these gaps in electoral 
participation. However, opponents of compulsory voting argue that compulsory voting attacks 
the problem, but not the symptoms of low levels of voter turnout. From that perspective, the 
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symptoms are voter apathy and citizens’ disengagement and disillusion with politics. 
Compulsory voting enforces participation, but it does not necessarily contribute to reducing 
declining citizens’ interest in politics. A real remedy to the maladies of low voter turnout would 
integrate measures to improve citizens’ civic and political education. The consequence of such 
measures would be the participation of citizens because they trust in politics and want to 
contribute to the public good, and not because they are afraid of a threat of punishment. 
This dissertation sought to test Lijphart’s hypothesis about the reduction of biases in 
electoral participation. A first well-established fact is that countries with compulsory voting 
exhibit higher levels of turnout than countries with voluntary voting, but mandatory voting does 
not guarantee full participation. It moves a country closer to this ideal, yet there remains a 
proportion of voters that does not go to the polls, even when facing harsh penalties. 
Average turnout in countries with compulsory voting is around 80% to 90%, which is 10 
to 15 percentage points higher than turnout in countries with voluntary voting. According to 
Tingsten’s “law of dispersion”, “the probability of differences in voting turnout is smaller the 
higher the general participation is” (mentioned in Lijphart 1997: 2). Differences in voting turnout 
would be null if the group of abstainers encompasses random voters with no defined 
characteristics. On the contrary, if this group still shares certain qualities, the difference may be 
smaller, but it would persist. Chapter III examines these alternatives and finds that compulsory 
voting diminishes select differences in voting turnout across socioeconomic and political groups. 
This rule is more effective at removing differences with respect to variables related to the 
benefits of voting, for instance party identification, rather than with respect to variables related to 
sociodemographic or civic-minded characteristics. This finding also means that there is a core 
group of abstainers that is more reluctant to be forced to the polls. 
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These findings raise some questions. Lijphart mentions Hirczy's (1994) finding that the 
increase of turnout in a country depends on the baseline of participation without compulsory 
voting. Probably, something similar happens with respect to groups in a society. For example, it 
would be easier to diminish the gap in voting turnout between young and older citizens because 
the gap in voluntary voting countries is higher. An opposite situation would occur with respect to 
differences between men and women because they are marginal in voluntary voting countries. As 
a result, compulsory voting may have a diminishing marginal return depending on the baseline 
with respect to differences in voting turnout in voluntary voting countries.  
An additional question is related to the presence of a core group of abstainer: how can a 
state promote electoral participation for this group? There are some options discussed in the 
literature. 
Compulsory voting applies an extrinsic tangible negative incentive. It is extrinsic because 
it comes from an external agency: the state. An alternative would emphasize intrinsic incentives 
to vote, in which the motivation to go to the polls emerges from the same individual. However, 
this is a long-term solution in which education and the formation of citizens with consciousness 
of their civic duties is needed. 
Compulsory electoral rules are tangible because they entail monetary and civic penalties 
if citizens abstain. These two types of penalties are combined in reality. If citizens do not vote, 
they suffer a restriction of some civic rights. For example, they cannot cash checks in banks or 
cannot get public employment. These restrictions are effective until voters pay a monetary fee. 
When they pay it, they get back all their civic rights. Thus, it means that we observe the effect of 
both types of punishment in reality. Table I.2 displayed the fact that most countries enforce 
compulsory voting with both types of penalties at the same time in Latin America. For this 
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reason, the results in Chapter III cannot disentangle the effect of each type of penalty. This is 
relevant because different types of penalties hypothetically may have varying effects on different 
groups. For example, monetary fees may strongly push poor people for whom penalties are a 
higher proportion of their total income. Consequently, the difference in levels of turnout between 
rich and poor people should decrease in comparison to countries with voluntary voting where the 
difference between rich and poor people should be higher, as wealthy people are more likely to 
afford the cost of voting. Thus, monetary fees may have an equalizing effect on electoral 
participation. 
On the other side, non-monetary enforcement mechanisms may exacerbate the 
differences in voting behavior between rich and poor people. Power (2009), for example, 
mentions that public employees in Brazil are extremely obligated to vote, as they may lose their 
jobs if they do not. In this case public employees would seem more motivated by the possibility 
of losing their jobs rather than for the monetary fees imposed if they do not vote. Thus, civic 
penalties may exert a higher effect on turnout over some citizens: those that need to interact more 
with the state because they need to preserve their job, as in Power’s piece, or need to get a 
passport or cash a check in the bank, for example. From this perspective, those who need to 
interact more with the state would be pushed most heavily by compulsory voting laws with 
enforcement that establish this type of penalty for not voting. Conversely, the poor and those 
isolated of the formal economy have relatively less contact with the state, and so they may be 
less affected by civic penalties. Therefore, compulsory voting enforced in this way may 
exacerbate the gap in electoral participation between those in need of state services and those 
who do not need to interact with the state, because the former have more incentive to go to the 
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polls than the latter. Because enforcement matters, this discussion implies the need for more 
research on the particular effects of different types of penalties. 
In Chapter IV, I evaluated the effect of reminders of types of penalties (each and 
combined) on citizens’ levels of civic duty. I found that single reminders of penalties do not have 
an effect on levels of duty, but that joint penalties have a significant effect. I discuss that the lack 
of effect of single reminders of penalties may be due to the artificiality of presenting each type of 
penalty when they are combined in reality. However, it is relevant to ask about the single effect 
of each. Which one is more effective and for whom? Policy makers may apply this knowledge 
when they think about mechanisms to enforce compulsory voting and when they think on how to 
push particular groups of citizens to the polls. 
Compulsory voting is also based in punishments and not in rewards. The literature has 
discussed whether they are both sides of the same coin. The balance of evidence indicates they 
are not. First, a negative incentive like compulsory voting elevates voting turnout, but a positive 
incentive like rewards does not have the same effect. Colombia is a country that establishes 
benefits for some groups of voters. For example, the electoral legislation stipulates discounts in 
university fees for voters. However, levels of turnout in this country are really low (below 50% 
in some elections). Thus, it seems that these selective positive incentives do not have a similar 
effect than a general negative incentive. Second, in Chapter IV, I build on theories that 
hypothesize a detrimental effect of incentives on citizens’ intrinsic motivation to perform an 
activity and I propose that compulsory voting has a negative side effect on citizens’ sense of 
duty. Podsakoff et al. (1984) find that positive incentives have a stronger effect on intrinsic 
motivation than negative incentives. Thus, this dissertation hypothesizes a stronger negative 
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effect of systems of electoral rewards on citizens’ sense of duty. This hypothesis remains to be 
tested and, thus, this question remains for research beyond the scope of this project. 
A damaging effect on levels of citizens’ duty is important because this variable is a 
significant predictor in models of turnout. The sense of duty was introduced as a way to evade 
the paradox of voting, introducing long-term considerations -the voter’s decision to invest in the 
permanence of democracy. Yet, some scholars argue its incorporation is tautological (Barry 
1978,	mentioned in Blais and Achen 2010).	Empirically, models of turnout show that duty –
measured in several different ways- has a substantive impact on levels of turnout. Thus, on the 
one side, compulsory voting increases turnout because of the cost of not voting, and on the other 
side, it depresses duty, a central predictor of turnout. The net effect, however, seems to be 
positive, but compulsory voting still needs a negative enforcement to operate. 
In Chapter III the results presented in this dissertation indicated that penalties established 
in electoral legislation matter for diminishing the gaps in electoral participation. In Chapter IV, I 
find that the combination of monetary fines and civic restrictions has an effect on levels of civic 
duty. However, the inclusion of penalties in the legislation does not indicate they are enforced in 
reality because they may be dead letters.72 To be enforced, the state has to invest money in 
bureaucracy to penalize abstainers. If the state has a special agency for this activity, it increases 
the probability that an abstainer is punished. Birch (2009) mentions an economic option: random 
examinations. The argument is that the state does not need to castigate all abstainers, but to make 
credible the punishment. So, it would be enough to punish a proportion of abstainers to instill the 
threat of punishment to all voters. 
In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer surveys, I introduced a question about how 
probable people think they will be punished by the state if they do not vote. Results vary 																																																								
72 Laws that are still in effect but are neither complied with nor enforced. 
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significantly. For example, in Ecuador and Peru, two countries with penalties in their 
legislations, 48.1% and 42.9% indicate it is very probable respectively. In Argentina, only 11.3% 
says it is very probable regardless Argentinean legislation mentions monetary fees and civic 
restrictions. In Paraguay, one of the countries with the more relaxed version of compulsory 
voting, only 3% of the population says effective punishments are very probable. Thus, 
indications of punishments in electoral legislation are correlated to actual penalties, but this 
creates a set of insufficient indicators to measure enforcement.  Research needs to measure 
enforcement by the method of process tracing, meaning an evaluation of each step in the process 
of making penalties effective. Chapter I briefly describes the process in Peru. Similar efforts 
would be needed in other countries to produce comparable measures. After the production of a 
measure of enforcement in reality, it can be included in models of turnout to test the effects of 
degrees of punishments. The literature indicates that enforcement matters, but we still do not 
know whether there is a threshold over which compulsory voting works. This question also 
remains an avenue for future research. 
In conclusion, these considerations need to be included in a balance of compulsory 
voting. Making such a balance, Birch (2009) concludes that positive consequences of 
compulsory voting outweigh negative ones. This dissertation adds some negative considerations 
to this balance. It shows that compulsory voting does not fulfill completely its promise of full 
participation and of closing all differences in electoral participation across socioeconomic and 
political groups. Further, it tests an alternative negative consequence of the implementation of 
compulsory voting: a decrease in levels of citizens’ sense of duty, which is a substantive 
predictor of voting turnout. Despite these findings might tip the scale towards the negative side, 
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positive consequences are still prevailing. The question is whether there are alternatives to 
maximize positive outcomes and to minimize negative consequences. 
 
Further Considerations 	
The literature has found that voting is a habit-forming behavior (Blais 2006; Gerber, 
Green, and Shachar 2003; Geys 2006). This is one reason why previous voting behavior is a 
powerful determinant of current voting behavior, either participation or abstention. If this is the 
case, the time period when a citizen is young is fundamental to set the habit. In the very first 
election, young citizens decide whether to vote or abstain based on a group of parental, 
demographic, and personal factors and this decision would be fundamental for their future 
electoral behavior (Plutzer 2002). Not only do individual factors play a role, but also contextual 
factors help to develop this habit. In this frame, compulsory voting contributes to a habit-forming 
behavior of participation. However, if the critical moment is the very first election, the obligation 
to vote persists during the citizens’ entire political life. Thus, a question arises: why does 
compulsory voting oblige citizens during the whole life when the critical moment is the first 
election? Some scholars, for this reason, propose that compulsory voting should apply only for 
first-time voters (Birch 2009; Birch, Gottfried, and Logde 2013). In this case, the electoral rule 
minimizes the compulsion with the same substantive long-lasting effect. Further, this 
modification would target a core group of abstainers in voluntary voting countries: the young 
cohort. 
Even though it is a persuasive idea, the legislation of compulsory first-time voting faces 
the same barriers as the legislation of traditional compulsory voting. Chapter II shows how the 
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historical implementation of this electoral rule in Latin America depended on strategic 
consideration of political actors. Legislators, those who are in charge of proposing electoral 
reforms, do not have incentives to change the status quo -a set of rules under which they have 
won seats. Potentially, legislators from minority parties can propose such a change as a way to 
increase their electoral share if they see a large base of untapped supporters among abstainers. 
In reality, though, countries barely discuss the idea of an implementation of this rule in 
countries with voluntary voting. Lijphart (1997) recognizes that the probability of being enacted 
in more countries is very small, but not impossible. Further, legislators in countries with 
compulsory voting often discuss whether the implementation of voluntary voting is preferable. 
As I said previously, compulsory voting is a short-term solution for a long-term problem: 
citizens’ disengagement and disillusion with politics. In Latin America, it seems that this 
solution is a lesser evil to prevent massive absenteeism that might have pernicious effects on 
authorities’ legitimacy, trust in electoral procedures, and finally on democratic consolidation.  
Lastly, this dissertation rests on the assumption that more participation is desirable 
because, as Lijphart (1997) also expects, it leads to equality of voice and influence. This 
expectation is probably more accurate in well-established democracies. It, alas, is not widely 
supported in Latin America. Stokes (2001), for example, shows that politicians may change 
promised policies once elected with the expectation that new policies will improve voters’ well-
being and consequently they will serve their political ambitions. Paradigmatic cases of these 
policy switches are in Latin America, where voting, as an expression of preferences, did not 
transform into preferred policies. In Latin America, more participation of poor or young citizens, 
for example, does not imply they will have more influence on government decisions all the 
times. This situation conveys a problematic consequence: a diminishing value of voting. Thus, 
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compulsory voting countries where there were policy switches, such as Argentina or Peru, 
display higher levels of turnout, but voting may be devaluated and therefore trust in election 
would be debilitated and finally the quality of democracy is hurt. Yet, an alternative scenario in 
which voter turnout is low in a voluntary voting setting and policy switches occur is even worse 
because this scenario adds the problem of lack of representation and legitimacy of elected 
authorities. 
In sum, this dissertation focused on Latin American countries, the region where 
compulsory voting is more prevalent, and where this electoral rule seems to be more required to 
assure high levels of electoral participation, despite the fact that it also carries some negative 
effects. On balance, I suggest that compulsory voting may be considered as a lesser evil in Latin 
America. Politicians, policy-makers, and political scientist have to consider that this electoral 
rule is not perfect but it comprises more pros than cons. Thus, while much research remains, this 
dissertation goes beyond the direct effect of compulsory voting: the increasing levels of turnout –
the quantitative effect-, and evaluates the origins of this electoral rule and positive and negative 
effects of compulsory voting –the qualitative effects. In doing so, this project has contributed to 
the scholarly community and has taken part in the research’s collective academic enterprise. 
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APPENDICES 	
Appendix Chapter 1 	
Appendix 1. Turnout by Country and Year 
Country 
Type of 
Election Year Voter Turnout 
Argentina Parliamentary 2005 70.94 
Argentina Presidential 2007 71.81 
Argentina Parliamentary 2007 73.13 
Argentina Parliamentary 2009 72.39 
Argentina Parliamentary 2011 79.39 
Argentina Presidential 2011 79.39 
Argentina Parliamentary 2013 77.17 
Bahamas Parliamentary 2007 92.13 
Bahamas Parliamentary 2012 90.78 
Belize Parliamentary 2008 77.18 
Belize Parliamentary 2012 73.18 
Bolivia Parliamentary 2005 84.51 
Bolivia Presidential 2005 84.51 
Bolivia Parliamentary 2009 94.55 
Bolivia Presidential 2009 94.55 
Bolivia Parliamentary 2014 87.45 
Bolivia Presidential 2014 91.86 
Brazil Presidential 2006 83.25 
Brazil Parliamentary 2006 83.27 
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Brazil Presidential 2010 78.5 
Brazil Parliamentary 2010 81.88 
Brazil Presidential 2014 78.9 
Brazil Parliamentary 2014 80.6 
Canada Parliamentary 2006 64.94 
Canada Parliamentary 2008 59.52 
Canada Parliamentary 2011 61.11 
Chile Parliamentary 2005 87.67 
Chile Presidential 2006 87.12 
Chile Parliamentary 2009 87.67 
Chile Presidential 2010 86.94 
Chile Presidential 2013 41.98 
Chile Parliamentary 2013 49.25 
Colombia Parliamentary 2006 40.49 
Colombia Presidential 2006 45.11 
Colombia Parliamentary 2010 43.75 
Colombia Presidential 2010 44.35 
Colombia Parliamentary 2014 43.58 
Colombia Presidential 2014 47.9 
Costa Rica Parliamentary 2006 65.13 
Costa Rica Presidential 2006 65.21 
Costa Rica Parliamentary 2010 69.11 
Costa Rica Presidential 2010 69.12 
Costa Rica Presidential 2014 55.64 
Costa Rica Parliamentary 2014 68.38 
Dominican Republic Parliamentary 2006 56.46 
Dominican Republic Presidential 2008 71.36 
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Dominican Republic Parliamentary 2010 56.43 
Dominican Republic Presidential 2012 70.23 
Ecuador Parliamentary 2006 63.5 
Ecuador Presidential 2006 76.01 
Ecuador Presidential 2009 75.28 
Ecuador Parliamentary 2009 75.72 
Ecuador Parliamentary 2013 80.84 
Ecuador Presidential 2013 81.08 
El Salvador Parliamentary 2006 52.56 
El Salvador Parliamentary 2009 53.58 
El Salvador Presidential 2009 61.91 
El Salvador Presidential 2014 60.17 
El Salvador Parliamentary 2015 45.91 
Guatemala Presidential 2007 48.15 
Guatemala Parliamentary 2007 60.46 
Guatemala Presidential 2011 60.83 
Guatemala Parliamentary 2011 69.38 
Guyana Parliamentary 2006 68.82 
Guyana Parliamentary 2011 72.89 
Guyana Parliamentary 2015 72.19 
Haiti Parliamentary 2006 28.31 
Haiti Presidential 2006 59.26 
Haiti Presidential 2011 22.36 
Haiti Parliamentary 2011 22.77 
Honduras Parliamentary 2005 45.97 
Honduras Presidential 2005 55.08 
Honduras Presidential 2009 49.88 
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Honduras Parliamentary 2009 50.05 
Honduras Presidential 2013 59.14 
Honduras Parliamentary 2013 61.16 
Jamaica Parliamentary 2007 60.4 
Jamaica Parliamentary 2011 53.17 
Mexico Presidential 2006 58.55 
Mexico Parliamentary 2006 58.9 
Mexico Parliamentary 2009 44.61 
Mexico Parliamentary 2012 62.45 
Mexico Presidential 2012 63.14 
Mexico Parliamentary 2015 47.72 
Nicaragua Presidential 2006 61.23 
Nicaragua Parliamentary 2006 66.73 
Nicaragua Parliamentary 2011 79.09 
Nicaragua Presidential 2011 79.09 
Panama Presidential 2009 68.57 
Panama Parliamentary 2009 70.05 
Panama Parliamentary 2014 75.19 
Panama Presidential 2014 76.76 
Paraguay Presidential 2008 60.34 
Paraguay Parliamentary 2008 65.48 
Paraguay Presidential 2013 68.02 
Paraguay Parliamentary 2013 68.24 
Peru Presidential 2006 87.71 
Peru Parliamentary 2006 88.66 
Peru Presidential 2011 82.54 
Peru Parliamentary 2011 83.72 
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Suriname Parliamentary 2005 46.68 
Suriname Parliamentary 2010 73.21 
Trinidad and Tobago Parliamentary 2007 66.03 
Trinidad and Tobago Parliamentary 2010 69.45 
United States Parliamentary 2006 47.52 
United States Parliamentary 2008 64.36 
United States Presidential 2008 70.33 
United States Parliamentary 2010 48.59 
United States Parliamentary 2012 64.44 
United States Presidential 2012 66.66 
United States Parliamentary 2014 42.5 
Uruguay Presidential 2009 89.18 
Uruguay Parliamentary 2009 89.91 
Uruguay Presidential 2014 88.57 
Uruguay Parliamentary 2014 89.62 
Venezuela Parliamentary 2005 25.26 
Venezuela Presidential 2006 74.69 
Venezuela Parliamentary 2010 66.42 
Venezuela Presidential 2012 80.28 
Venezuela Presidential 2013 79.64 
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Appendices Chapter 3 	
Appendix 2. Reported Turnout by Country, 2014, 2012 and 2010 
2014	 2012	
	 	
2010	
60.8%
67.8%
69.5%
70.1%
72.3%
72.3%
74.2%
74.6%
74.6%
74.9%
76.2%
76.9%
77.2%
78.7%
84.7%
84.8%
91.5%
92.2%
Colombia
Chile
Nicaragua
Panama
Costa Rica
Guatemala
Paraguay
El Salvador
Honduras
Mexico
Bolivia
Brazil
Argentina
Dominican Republic
Uruguay
Peru
Venezuela
Ecuador
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0
Turnout (%)
          95 % Confidence Interval 
          (with Design-Effects)
Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014
50.7%
60.6%
63.7%
66.5%
67.6%
68.3%
68.4%
69.6%
70.6%
78.7%
80.1%
81.8%
82.2%
88.5%
88.7%
88.9%
89.9%
90.6%
Honduras
Paraguay
Colombia
Costa Rica
Mexico
Chile
El Salvador
Panama
Dom. Rep.
Guatemala
Nicaragua
Bolivia
Venezuela
Brazil
Argentina
Ecuador
Uruguay
Peru
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0
Turnout (%)
          95 % Confidence Interval 
          (with Design-Effects)
Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP. 2012
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58.0%
60.2%
60.9%
63.8%
66.8%
68.6%
69.0%
69.4%
71.0%
75.2%
76.1%
79.3%
80.0%
81.8%
83.2%
89.4%
92.2%
93.5%
Costa Rica
Colombia
Honduras
Chile
Paraguay
Venezuela
Guatemala
Nicaragua
Mexico
Argentina
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Peru
Panama
Brazil
Bolivia
Ecuador
Uruguay
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0
Turnout (%)
          95 % Confidence Interval 
          (with Design-Effects)
Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP. 2010
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Appendix 3. Countries by Type of System 
Country Classification IDEA’s classification 
Argentina Compulsory with enforced sanctions Compulsory with enforced sanctions 
Bolivia Compulsory with enforced sanctions Compulsory with not enforced 
sanctions 
Brazil Compulsory with enforced sanctions Compulsory with enforced sanctions 
Chile Compulsory with enforced 
sanctions73 
Compulsory with enforced sanctions 
Colombia Voluntary Voluntary 
Costa Rica Compulsory with no sanctions Compulsory with no sanctions 
Dominican 
Republic 
Voluntary Compulsory with no sanctions 
Ecuador Compulsory with enforced sanctions Compulsory with enforced sanctions 
El Salvador Voluntary Voluntary 
Guatemala Voluntary Compulsory with no sanctions 
Honduras Compulsory with no sanctions Compulsory with no sanctions 
Mexico Compulsory with no sanctions Compulsory with no sanctions 
Nicaragua Voluntary Voluntary 
Panama Voluntary Compulsory with no sanctions 
Paraguay Compulsory with no sanctions Compulsory with no sanctions 
Peru Compulsory with enforced sanctions Compulsory with enforced sanctions 
Uruguay Compulsory with enforced sanctions Compulsory with enforced sanctions 
Venezuela Voluntary Voluntary 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
73 Chile used voluntary registration and then compulsory voting for registered citizens. From 2014, this country 
changes to automatic registration and voluntary voting. 
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Appendix 4. Determinants of Voter Turnout in Latin America, 2014, 2012 and 2010 
 
2014 AB 2012 AB 2010 AB 
Variables Coefficient 
s.e. 
Coefficient 
s.e. 
Coefficient 
s.e. 
Illiterates -0.118 
0.097 
-0.413** 
0.089 
-0.233* 
0.096 
Lower class -0.192** 
0.036 
-0.188** 
0.035 
-0.151** 
0.033 
Rural 0.093* 
0.043 
-0.091* 
0.039 
0.019 
0.039 
Woman 0.131** 
0.036 
0.081* 
0.035 
-0.009 
0.032 
Young citizens -1.107** 
0.042 
-1.759** 
0.038 
-1.606** 
0.034 
Older citizens 0.315** 
0.074 
0.064 
0.075 
0.223** 
0.077 
Party identification 0.860** 
0.043 
0.816** 
0.043 
0.735** 
0.039 
Persuasion  0.336** 
0.058 
0.104** 
0.038 
Campaigning  0.985** 
0.088 
0.678** 
0.064 
Support for democracy 0.184** 
0.065 
0.246** 
0.062 
0.413** 
0.058 
System support 0.082 
0.082 
0.164* 
0.083 
0.042 
0.077 
Internal efficacy 0.367** 
0.064 
0.214** 
0.061 
0.158** 
0.059 
Constant 1.000** 
0.093 
0.536** 
0.090 
0.774** 
0.089 
N 24,323 25,069 27,649 
% Correctly predicted 82.52% 81.65% 79.67% 
Prob > chi2 <.000 <.000 <.000 
** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
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Appendix 5. Results from Models Splitting the Sample of Countries for the 2014, 2012, and 
the 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer 
 
2014 AB 2012 AB 
 Countries with 
Voluntary Voting 
Countries with 
Compulsory Voting 
Countries with 
Voluntary Voting 
Countries with 
Compulsory Voting 
Variables Coefficient 
s.e. 
Discrete 
Change 
min !  
max 
Coefficient 
s.e. 
Discrete 
Change 
min !  
max 
Coefficient 
s.e. 
Discrete 
Change 
min !  
max 
Coefficient 
s.e. 
Discrete 
Change 
min !  
max 
Illiterates -0.041 
0.100 
 -0.519* 
0.249 
-0.067 -0.415** 
0.093 
-0.086 -0.830** 
0.328 
-0.089 
Lower class -0.144** 
0.040 
-0.026 -0.153* 
0.066 
-0.017 -0.172** 
0.042 
-0.033 -0.215** 
0.067 
-0.017 
Rural 0.125** 
0.045 
0.022 -0.173* 
0.080 
-0.019 -0.114** 
0.045 
-0.022 -0.011 
0.082 
 
Woman 0.081* 
0.039 
0.014 0.160* 
0.064 
0.017 0.075 
0.041 
 0.093 
0.067 
 
Young 
citizens 
-1.497** 
0.043 
-0.314 -2.956** 
0.067 
-0.514 -1.787** 
0.046 
-0.39 -1.777** 
0.069 
-0.212 
Older citizens 0.254** 
0.080 
0.042   0.235** 
0.089 
0.043   
Party 
identification 
0.894** 
0.045 
0.150 0.539** 
0.078 
0.054 0.955** 
0.049 
0.172 0.287** 
0.112 
0.021 
Persuasion     0.353** 
0.068 
0.064 0.287* 
0.112 
0.020 
Campaigning     1.234** 
0.106 
0.179 0.319* 
0.155 
0.022 
Support for 
democracy 
0.078 
0.070 
 0.379** 
0.126 
0.043 0.156* 
0.071 
0.030 0.518** 
0.126 
0.044 
System 
support 
-0.026 
0.094 
 -0.204 
0.166 
 0.220* 
0.097 
0.042 -0.008 
0.167 
 
Internal 
efficacy 
0.445** 
0.069 
0.079 0.086 
0.122 
 0.264** 
0.071 
0.050 -0.064 
0.128 
 
Constant 0.894** 
0.085 
 3.593** 
0.183 
 0.494** 
0.098 
 2.469** 
0.160 
 
N 16,479  9,625  14,666  10,403  
% Correctly 
predicted 
78.81%  86.89%  76.48%  88.88%  
Prob > chi2 <.000  <.000  <.000  <.000  
** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
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2010 AB 
 Countries with 
Voluntary Voting 
Countries with 
Compulsory Voting 
 Coefficient 
s.e. 
Discrete 
Change 
min !  
max 
Coefficient 
s.e. 
Discrete 
Change 
min !  
max 
Illiterates -0.132 
0.109 
 -0.693** 
0.203 
-0.086 
Lower class -0.120* 
0.041 
-0.024 -0.206** 
0.055 
-0.020 
Rural 0.010 
0.047 
 0.052 
0.078 
 
Woman -0.004 
0.040 
 -0.039 
0.055 
 
Young citizens -1.554** 
0.043 
-0.337 -1.742** 
0.059 
-0.238 
Older citizens 0.402** 
0.108 
0.072   
Party identification 0.827** 
0.045 
0.154 0.455** 
0.073 
0.041 
Persuasion 0.126* 
0.049 
0.024 0.093 
0.060 
 
Campaigning 0.875** 
0.079 
0.143 0.215* 
0.109 
0.019 
Support for democracy 0.430** 
0.070 
0.087 0.342** 
0.109 
0.035 
System support 0.082 
0.096 
 -0.051 
0.132 
 
Internal efficacy 0.237** 
0.072 
0.046 -0.033 
0.104 
 
Constant 0.624** 
0.099 
 3.166** 
0.138 
 
N 14,939  12,710  
% Correctly predicted 74.41%  85.75%  
Prob > chi2 <.000  <.000  
** p<0.01 * p<0.05 				
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Appendix 6. Results of Hierarchical Logistic Model restricted to elections in the last three 
years for the 2014, 2012 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer 
Individual-level 2014 2012 2010 
Illiterates -0.038 
0.121 
-0.349** 
0.123 
-0.111 
0.136 
Lower class -0.192** 
0.054 
-0.146* 
0.059 
-0.080 
0.054 
Rural 0.143* 
0.061 
-0.095 
0.063 
0.012 
0.060 
Woman 0.052 
0.053 
0.083 
0.058 
-0.014 
0.056 
Young -1.284** 
0.060 
-1.407** 
0.063 
-1.455** 
0.056 
Older 0.393** 
0.102 
0.253* 
0.122 
0.191 
0.139 
Party identification 0.785** 
0.063 
1.180** 
0.079 
0.818** 
0.063 
Persuasion  0.406** 
0.099 
0.131* 
0.066 
Campaigning  1.023** 
0.157 
0.960** 
0.108 
Support for democracy 0.019 
0.097 
0.079 
0.102 
0.335** 
0.093 
System support -0.007 
0.167 
0.361** 
0.100 
-0.050 
0.125 
Internal efficacy 0.572** 
0.093 
0.362** 
0.010 
0.218* 
0.095 
Country-level    
Closeness of elections  -0.136 
0.248 
0.088 
0.345 
Compulsory voting 0.466* 
0.200 
0.812** 
0.183 
0.409 
0.240 
Cross-level interactions    
Illiterate x CV 0.025 
0.202 
-0.076 
0.153 
-0.274* 
0.139 
Lower class x CV 0.043 
0.054 
-0.067 
0.046 
-0.059 
0.043 
Rural x CV -0.153* 
0.064 
0.035 
0.052 
0.034 
0.052 
Woman x CV 0.044 
0.053 
0.008 
0.045 
-0.053 
0.043 
Young x CV -0.240** 
0.058 
-0.119* 
0.048 
0.058 
0.046 
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Older x CV -0.513** 
0.097 
-0.240* 
0.094 
-0.003 
0.096 
PID x CV 0.114 
0.067 
-0.364** 
0.063 
-0.093 
0.057 
Convince x CV  -0.077 
0.077 
-0.041 
0.050 
Campaigning x CV  -0.279* 
0.118 
-0.309** 
0.090 
Support for democracy x CV 0.099 
0.099 
0.222** 
0.083 
0.021 
0.078 
System support x CV -0.073 
0.128 
-0.128 
0.110 
0.106 
0.101 
Internal efficacy x CV -0.188** 
0.096 
-0.216* 
0.082 
-0.063 
0.077 
Constant 0.853 
0.215 
0.895 
0.740 
0.572 
0.826 
Random effects parameters    
Std Dev. (constant) 0.242 
0.098 
0.290 
0.112 
0.389 
0.155 
Number of observations 17,716 19,777 20,252 
Number of countries 13 14 13 
Prob > chi2 <.001 <.001 <.001 
** p<0.01 * p<0.05 												
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Appendix 7. Figures for Predicted Probabilities by Determinants of Turnout, and 
Compulsory Voting, 2014 and 2012 
2014 2012 
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Appendices Chapter 4 	
Appendix 8. Results from Factor Analysis: Rotated Factor Loadings and Unique Variance 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
In order to preserve democracy it is important you vote 0.1152 0.8103 0.3301 
If I didn't vote, I'd feel guilty 0.0675 0.8042 0.3487 
So many people vote that it doesn't matter much to me 
whether I vote or not (inverted) 
0.7884 0.1647 0.3513 
If a person doesn't care how an election comes out he 
shouldn't vote in it (inverted) 
0.7578 -0.0120 0.4256 
It isn't important to vote when your candidate or party 
doesn't have a chance to win (inverted) 
0.7955 0.1209 0.3525 		 	
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Appendix 9. Balance Between the Treatment and the Control Groups 
Variable Obs. Treatment Control C-T P-value 
Age 760 39.5 39.6 0.07 0.96 
Woman 760 0.49 0.54 0.05 0.27 
Quartiles of wealth 620 2.40 2.61 0.22 0.04 
Education 758 2.57 2.51 -0.06 0.45 
Left – Right scale 564 5.96 5.86 -0.10 0.65 
Catholic 760 0.76 0.78 0.02 0.61 
Authoritarian predisposition 719 2.59 2.42 -0.17 0.01 
Party identification 724 0.52 0.52 0.003 0.93 
Evaluation of performance 
of president 
742 49.73 51.37 1.63 0.27 
Democracy is preferable 729 0.80 0.79 -0.002 0.96 		 	
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Appendix 10. Analyses of reminders of punishments on levels of duty and importance of 
voting 
Variables Level of duty Level of duty 
Reminder of monetary fee -0.15 
(0.21) 
-0.46 
(0.66) 
Reminder of civic penalties -0.24 
(0.20) 
-0.21 
(0.66) 
Reminder of monetary fee and civic penalties 
-0.33* 
(0.20) 
0.24 
(0.68) 
Authoritarian predispositions 0.27* 
(0.09) 
0.30* 
(0.17) 
Income 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
0.11* 
(0.05) 
-0.48* 
(0.19) 
Refused to report income -0.47* 
(0.19) 
-0.48* 
(0.19) 
Authoritarian pred. x Reminder of monetary fee 
 
0.12 
(0.15) 
Authoritarian pred. x Reminder of civic penalties 
 
-0.01 
(0.25) 
Authoritarian pred. x Reminder of both 
 
-0.22 
(0.25) 
τ1 -0.82 
(0.43) 
-0.73 
(0.55) 
τ2 -0.13 
(0.43) 
-0.03 
(0.55) 
τ3 1.54 
(0.43) 
1.63 
(0.55) 
Prob>F or 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 
N 691 691 
Table entry is the ordered logit coefficient with standard error below. 
*p<0.1, one-tailed	
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